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Abstract 
This qualitative study describes and analyzes the contextual factors that have 
conditioned the Korean Information Infrastructure (KII) project implemented by the 
Korean government between 1995 and 2005. The theoretical framework undergirding this 
study is the political economy of networked mobility, which is given detail by the theory 
of globalization, state theory (especially, the developmental state theories concerning East 
Asia), and critical geographies. The theory of globalization aims at situating Korea’s 
information and technology growth within the universal structure of networked global 
 viii 
capitalism, and revealing it as a desperate striving to enlist the local as an active part of 
the new global network; the developmental state theories that interpret the East Asian 
“economic miracle” seek to evaluate specific linkages of the state and capital for 
economic imperatives; and critical geographies allow this study to uncover the hidden 
layers of the spatial reconfigurations actively implemented by the state and large capital. 
Employing these three theoretical approaches, this study examines the major contextual 
factors conditioning the KII project in Korea: the global constraints conditioning its 
telecom policies (globalization theory), the dense state–capital linkages (developmental 
state theories), and the bureaucratic desire for control and the shift in capital accumulation 
to a knowledge-based mode of production (critical geographies). As methods for analysis, 
the data for this study are gathered from archival documents and also incorporate in-depth 
informant interviews with key actors from both the public and the private sector who were 
directly involved in the KII project. This study examines that, although the KII project 
was no longer implemented by an autocracy, the close relationships between the 
government and the Chaebols were influential in designing the national IT plans, and civil 
society’s ability to be involved in or monitor the policymaking processes was limited. The 
present study concludes that the state plan of a “second-stage catching-up” economy 
through the KII project has easily overruled voices from below by regarding them as 
unnecessary noise. This study suggests that policy change in Korea should lead toward 
reformulating telecom policies along much more socially-interventionist and redistributive 
lines, and toward decentralizing or democratically controlling the overwhelming power of 
the Chaebols, Korean conglomerates.  
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
1.1. BACKGROUND 
In South Korea, the rapid construction of national roads and railways under the 
military regimes of the 1970s and 80s was a typical case of state interventionism aimed at 
promoting industrial economies that were lagging behind the West. The highway and 
railway infrastructures were closely tied to the government’s project of economic 
modernization to save on the costs of transporting goods and services and to speed up the 
mobility of the labor population. More recently, for the same reasons, national electronic 
backbone networks have become appealing to the government as the engine of economic 
efficiencies and growth. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the civilian governments’ desire for 
strong ties to world IT economies in Korea was concretized in its implementation of a 
decade-long telecom policy plan, the Korean Information Infrastructure (KII) project 
(1995–2005), which aimed to establish a nationwide high-speed backbone network. 
Undeterred by the financial crisis of 1997, the main drive for unrestrained IT growth in 
Korea was to construct high-speed telecom mobility and connectivity across the country. 
The government-led project seems to have been quite successful in shifting the market 
 2 
condition into a new economic system: for instance, Paul Wolfowitz, the ex-World Bank 
president and well-known neo-conservative, visited Seoul and praised Korea as the 
“world IT leader.” In fact, the Korean informatization index (NCA, 2005) shows Korea 
on a sharp curve rising up into the first tier of information wealth within a short time 
span. 
This qualitative study describes and analyzes the contextual factors that have 
conditioned the nationwide telecommunications superhighway project implemented by 
the Korean civilian governments between 1995 and 2005. The theoretical framework 
undergirding this study is the political economy of networked mobility, which explains 
power as “a form of control” in the production, distribution, and exchange of electronic 
mediated communication (e.g., Mosco, 1996). To grasp the essence of power embedded 
in the national project of infrastructural construction, the political economy approach 
insists that an analysis must be firmly rooted in the wider social and global context: 
specifically, it looks at the structural factors that establish such patterns as government 
regulation and intervention favoring capital, the concentration of ownership and market 
monopoly by both foreign and domestic large capital, capital accumulation based on the 
uneven development of geographies, and the swelling wave of privatization, 
commercialization, and deregulation. The theoretical framework of political economy 
encourages us to question and critically assess the essential components of how the world 
order of contemporary capitalism continues to expand its scope by networked mobility 
and further leads to severe geographical and social gentrification, commercialization, and 
the transformation of information and communication technology, as well as cultural 
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outputs, to mere market commodities, instead of beneficial improvements in the common 
welfare and the lives of citizens.  
This study investigates the empirical case of the nationwide information 
infrastructure project in South Korea, based on the following theoretical approaches 
situated in the political economy of networked mobility: the theory of globalization, state 
theory (especially, the developmental state theories concerning East Asia), and critical 
geographies.  
 
1. The theory of globalization aims at elaborating the structural metamorphosis of 
capitalism from the old system of imperialism to the dispersal of power 
throughout the world market under the new system of Empire. The theoretical 
approach used in this study situates Korea’s information and technology growth 
within the universal structure of networked global capitalism, and reveals it as 
striving to enlist the local as an active part of the new global network.  
2. Developmental state theories for interpreting the “economic miracle” in East Asia 
are intended to evaluate specific mechanisms of East Asian states’ 
interventionism both for regulatory control and for economic imperatives. The 
state theories help us to understand how authoritarian states such as that in South 
Korea have been able to successfully catch up to high-tech industrialization.   
3. Critical geographies allow this study to consider space as an expansive source of 
the state’s bureaucratic power, as well as economic power, which has been 
sustained by reconstructing its infrastructural bases. The recognition in critical 
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geography that space is inseparable from the social power intersecting it enables 
us to uncover the hidden layers of the spatial reconfigurations actively 
implemented by the state and large capital.  
 
Employing these three theoretical approaches, this study examines the major contextual 
factors conditioning the KII project in Korea: the global constraints conditioning the East 
Asian states’ telecom policies (globalization theory), the dense state–capital linkages in 
the East Asian states (developmental state theories), and the bureaucratic desire for 
control (critical geographies). 
The data for this study are gathered from archival documents from various 
sources, including newspapers, white papers, public reports, and transcripts. To assure 
that the study’s findings are well-supported and broadly based, it also incorporates in-
depth informant interviews with key actors from both the public and private sectors who 
were directly involved in the KII project.   
 
 
1.2. THE PROBLEM 
The Korean government’s information backbone network project was originally 
modeled after the US “Information Superhighway” project in 1993, which was further 
developed by Japan’s “Pilot model” and the EU’s “Euro-ISDN” in 1994. In order to 
establish a US-style nationwide information superhighway network, the Korean 
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government invested public funds of US $6.2 billion over eleven years, with the 
expenditure of US $16.5 billion from the private sector (see Chapter 4.2.1).1 The Korean 
government currently celebrates the synergistic effects of the national information 
infrastructure — chiefly, the bureaucratic efficiencies brought about by the technological 
rationalization of interconnecting public institutions electronically and the growth of the 
new IT-related economic market. In other words, the current state of the KII project is 
viewed as a vehicle for promoting e-governance and IT business.  
This study examines South Korea’s structural mechanisms and politico-economic 
processes for installing the KII during the period from 1995 to 2005, and how the KII 
project has been largely driven by the threefold aim of enlisting South Korea as an Asian 
hub of global capitalism (boosting economic growth), supporting its domestic 
conglomerates (buttressing the so-called Chaebols, the Korean form of crony 
capitalism),2 and normalizing social control through nationwide networked mobility 
(maximizing bureaucratic efficiency).3 This study describes in detail the deep structure 
of the relationships between the state and large capital directly involved in implementing 
the KII project, investigating how they enter into alliances with each other, how they 
exclude the agendas of other stakeholders, and how they articulate their own interests as 
                                                 
1 In contrast to the Korean government’s public investment in establishing the national backbone 
networks, the US information superhighway project depended entirely on private sector efforts.   
2 A Chaebol in Korea means a family-owned business group with large subsidiaries occupying an 
oligopolistic position, despite a relatively low concentration of ownership and the absence of pure holding 
companies.  
3 This study uses “social control” in the context of the government’s database of information on individual 
citizens based on digital technology and electronic networks, rather than in the context of violence or the 
threat of violence against citizens using repressive powers of the state such as police, national guard, or 
military forces. 
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they relate to implementing the project. Moreover, the study investigates how the 
technical effect of the nationwide telecom backbone network has the tendency to 
facilitate the invisibility and neutrality of power and allows the government’s reach to 
become ubiquitous and omnipresent, based on electronic and high-speed transmission 
capacity and networked mobility. The concern of this study, therefore, is to see how the 
Korean government’s desire for technological rationalization through the KII project 
became the material grounds of the electronic backbone networks that currently are 
furthering capitalist accumulation in Korea.  
The study’s primary question is:  
 
• What were the major driving forces in the Korean Information Infrastructure 
project during the period of 1995 to 2005?  
 
The purpose of this question is to observe determinants that condition the social 
code of technology in a newly industrialized economy. This primary question leads to the 
following sub-questions:   
 
1. What were the relevant policy decisions concerning the KII project, and how did 
global factors affect those decisions (Chapter 5)?  
2. What kinds of symbiotic relationships between governmental and business 
entities have developed through the KII project (Chapter 6)? 
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3. How was the Korean government’s desire for social control articulated and 
realized in establishing the KII plan (Chapter 7)?  
 
1.3. RATIONALE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY 
Within political elites in Korea, the KII project is seen as a very recent successful 
story of state interventionism since the Korean economic crisis of 1997. Many scholars 
view the IT project in Korea as the “second” phase of the Asian economic miracle: the 
first phase involved Asia catching up to the West in the industrial economy, while the 
second phase involves Asia becoming the leader in IT fields. The present study 
challenges the optimistic view of the ostensibly successful IT project, and instead focuses 
on the hidden mechanisms for implementing the KII project, observing the external factor 
of global capital as a global constraint, the state–business linkages and the sacrifice of 
other stakeholders in order to create or maintain those links, and the institutional desire of 
control over society.    
Second, interventionism in East Asian states usually has been explained by their 
dense linkages to the private sector in economic policies. In the case of the KII project, 
this study contributes to exposing the state’s covert desire to expand its control over the 
citizen, in addition to the publicly-stated desire to promote the shift from an industrial 
economy into the new economy.  
 8 
Third, this study considers the KII project as a complex event in which three 
entities — the state, local business, and global capital — collide at once in the process of 
the spatial rezoning of the nation. In this study, spatialization based on networked 
mobility is seen as a kind of stimulus for uniting the interests of the state and of large 
capital in a common project. The state-led KII project in Korea is thus a significant case 
in which to examine the new spatial patterns of state power and accumulation, based on 
the national infrastructure. 
Finally, the developmental state theories which explained in glowing terms the 
East Asian economic miracle have been diminished by the financial crisis of the East 
Asian states in the late 1990s. Despite the decline in popularity of developmental state 
theories, this study rereads the old developmental arguments anew, and rethinks those 
arguments in the light of the state-led KII project in Korea.  
 9 
Chapter II: The Political Economy of Networked Mobility 
 
2.1. THE NEW CONDITIONS OF GLOBALIZATION: A GLOBAL NETWORKED 
MOBILITY  
This section focuses on the new material conditions of globalization virtually 
constructed by the worldwide electronic network of capital.4 The virtual geography of 
globalization based on mobility and connectivity signifies a power shift of capital, and 
forces local states to affiliate or integrate into a part of the new world system which Hardt 
and Negri (2000) have described as “Empire,” the replacement for classical imperialism. 
According to their argument, the survival of local regions depends largely on their close 
links to the global electronic conduits of capital. Under the new conditions of virtual 
geographies, inequalities of development and underdevelopment are complicated by 
whether an entity is “plugged” or “unplugged” into the worldwide electronic web of 
global capitalism (Castells, 1996). In this theoretical section, the present study 
investigates the new global order of electronic Empire by tracking back the development 
of globalization theories — a series of critical theories extending from classical 
                                                 
4 The present study investigates mainly the worldwide electronic network as a conduit of capital. The 
other significant momentum of capital accumulation in the digital age — the privatizing mechanisms of 
“immaterial” or intellectual labor on a global scale — are beyond the scope of the present study. It is now 
clear, however, that the expropriation and privatization of the common cultural assets of humankind have 
become the ultimate goals of contemporary capitalism, which also accompanies the construction of a new 
virtual geography of electronic connectivity and mobility. For instance, Hardt and Negri (2004) describe 
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imperialism to the current discussion of Empire via dependency theories in Latin 
America, the world system theory, cultural complexity theory, and global-local nexus 
theory.          
 
2.1.1. Looking back to the age of imperialism 
The term globalization and related terms such as global system, global economy, 
and global culture have been used since the mid-80s in both popular and academic 
literature to describe the “temporal-spatial compression” of the physical world (Harvey 
1989). New information and (tele-)communication technologies are viewed as linking 
distant localities into one globalizing world in a synchronous time zone that goes beyond 
real territories. The speed and mobility generated by electronic networks become 
indispensable for creating the physical conditions of globalization, tying together the 
world as a whole. Popular futurists have optimistically characterized a globalizing or 
united world: Fukuyama (1992) depicts globalization as the last triumph of capitalism 
and its market economy, and Friedman (2006) writes of a flattening and fiber-optic global 
world, while Gates (1999) refers to friction-free capitalism that creates new opportunities 
for all countries to participate in global competition. Meanwhile, critical scholars see 
globalization as the result of the industrialized countries’ and multinationals’ imperialist 
expansion without colonies (Magdoff, 2003). In this view, advanced technologies offer 
                                                                                                                                                 
the expropriation of value in the age of digital capitalism as “the capture of value” that is produced by 
cooperative labor and that must be protected by powerful intellectual property laws.  
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support for absorbing the surplus generated in the so-called “third world,” thus 
undermining its technological, political, economic, and cultural viability. Already in the 
mid-19th century, Marx predicted a global move toward unconstrained capitalist 
expansion: 
 
All that is solid melts into air [...]. The need of a constantly expanding market for 
its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must 
nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere. [...] In 
one word, it creates a world after its own image. (Marx and Engels, [1848] 1998: 
38–40) 
 
The more production comes to rest on exchange value […] the more important do 
the physical conditions of exchange — the means of communication and transport 
— become for the costs of circulation. Capital by its nature drives beyond every 
spatial barrier. Thus the creation of the physical conditions of exchange — of the 
means of communication and transport — the annihilation of space by time — 
becomes an extraordinary necessity for it. (Marx, [1857] 1973: 524) 
 
Confronting the age of imperialism in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
a revolutionary Marxist like Lenin ([1916] 1969) sees the colonialist mechanism of 
dominance in terms of the rise of monopoly and the export of capital abroad. Luxemburg 
([1913] 2003) posits the birth of imperialism in the capitalist need for surplus outlets in 
non-capitalist formations; Baran ([1957] 1968) sees imperialism as arising from an 
American capitalism dominated by monopolies: since these are incompatible with growth 
and technological innovation, he thinks that the only way to escape the monopolistic state 
of stagnation is by exporting capital, which helps to absorb surplus from underdeveloped 
countries like those in Latin America. These Marxist scholars’ studies of imperialism 
contributed to establishing the theoretical framework that describes capitalism as always 
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needing to expand the lifespan of monopolies in the advanced countries at the cost of 
non-capitalist or underdeveloped ones.    
In a similar way, from the late 1960s to the late 1970s, critical scholars who 
looked at Latin America developed so-called “dependency theories” which enabled us to 
see how large businesses reconfigure the new order of capitalism and reproduce the 
unequal relations between states. For instance, Andre Frank (1969) sees 
“underdevelopment” in Latin America as largely controlled by US monopolies. Frank 
attempts to explain a continued failure of “development” in Latin America, even in the 
era of decolonization, and views the capitalist system as divided into a centre and a 
periphery. Similarly, Amin (1974) describes a chain of “metropolis–satellite” or center–
periphery structures using the concept of “accumulation on a world scale.” Wallerstein 
(1979) extends Amin’s dual system to the hierarchical division of the capitalist “world 
system” as a totality divided into three tiers of states, those at the core, at the semi-
periphery, and at the periphery. Related to the economic status of the peripheral 
countries, Cardoso’s (1973) “associated dependent development” and Evans’ (1979) 
“dependent development” are further examinations of the limited scope of development 
in the Third World which suggest that “partial” development or growth can be 
accomplished under the general conditions of dependency. These dependency theories 
were devoted to explaining a value chain of accumulation on a global scale, unequal 
development among states, and the destructive effects of multinational capital to the 
Third World. They failed, however, to anticipate the East Asian form of state-
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interventionist “development,” in which states become relatively free of the structural 
constraints of dependency (see Chapter 2.2).  
Scholars working in the political economy tradition view global expansion of 
capitalism as linked to the microelectronic revolution and networked flows of 
information, communication, and culture and to the flows of industrial and financial 
capital. Research in this tradition has been centrally concerned with the integrated 
contribution of digital information and communication to the operation of global 
monopolies and with trans-border data flows (Schiller, 1981, 1984; Hamelink, 1984). 
Examining the international traffic of media content such as film and TV programs, 
Guback (1984) presents an analysis of the film business with the state as its active 
supporter in the national and international arena. Employing the classical view of 
imperialism, Varis (1984) regards the dominant flows of the US television programs as 
similar to the export of commodities in general, rather than as “cultural” output which 
should be “interpreted” and “decoded” by the audience. A significant theme in research 
on the international political economy is how the global activities of transnational media 
and telecommunication industries are freer from the regulatory barriers of other countries 
than those of industries in the classical sense. This theme has led to such critical topics 
as: the monopolistic global media system and the cross-border flows of media outputs 
(e.g., Herman & McChesney, 1997); the homogenizing effects of media contents on 
indigenous cultures (e.g., Tomlinson’s [1991] discussion of “cultural imperialism” in the 
critique of global capitalism); and the reorganization of global electronic communications 
on behalf of capital’s demands (e.g., Castells, 1996; Golding, 1996; Mosco, 1996; 
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Schiller, 1999, 2001). These approaches, however, were based on a rather simple 
dichotomy of dominance and subordination in the global economy, which fails to take 
into consideration the complex and heterogeneous flows of technology, information, 
culture, and people across borders.    
 
2.1.2. Whose hybridity or complexity? 
Critiques of Marxist economic reductionism, which had a tendency to focus on a 
shift towards a single united world economy, have arisen first from the problematic that 
globalization can no longer be understood by simple center–periphery models or as a 
single one world-system. One kind of critique arises from a “loose” structure thesis, 
which emphasizes the relative independence of “socio-cultural” factors in the local 
setting when subjected to the globalizing force (e.g., Robertson, 1990). It is based on the 
theoretical presumption that there are fundamental “disjunctures” between economy, 
culture, and politics. Appadurai (1990) argues that we need to differentiate the manifold 
spheres of international interaction in terms of “ethnoscapes” (descriptions of the flows of 
peoples), “technoscapes” (of technology), “finanscapes” (of money), “mediascapes” (of 
media contents), and “ideoscapes” (of ideologies). Sreberny (2005) extends the analysis 
of globalization to the multi-dimensional spheres of global culture, including map-
making and nation-building, the export of religion, the institutionalization of Western-
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style education, administration as a “professional imperialism,” colonial languages, the 
“pleasure periphery” produced to serve travel and tourism, and the transfer of technology. 
These analytical divisions of “globalization” into multi-layered mini-globalizing 
processes have resulted in an awareness of the “non-linear, fractured nature of cultural 
globalization” (Ang, 1996: 154) — the so-called “hybridity” of global culture — in 
contrast to the replication of uniformity by economic globalization. Some empirical 
studies, for instance, focus on the independent consumption patterns of TV audiences, 
which are greatly affected by the “cultural proximity” created by such factors as local 
culture, language difference, and local market strength, and other cultural variables 
(Straubhaar, 1991). These studies were largely based on the successful story of 
multinational channels such as Televisa (Mexico) and TV Globo (Brazil) in Latin 
America as a counter to worldwide cultural standardization by global media outputs 
(Sinclair, 1999).5 Defenders of cultural localism note the “loose” relation between 
structure as a globalizing power and the local as having relative autonomy — a dialectical 
relation that is conditioned by the “slightly higher” weight of the former on the latter 
(Straubhaar, 1997: 6).   
The research particularly on Latin America in terms of cultural proximity reveals 
globalization as a web of “hybridity,” “complexity,” or “mélange” (Pieterse, [1995] 2005; 
                                                 
5 Similar to the pan-Spanish “Telenovela” culture, which is relatively independent from the monolithic 
cultural dominance of the Hollywood production system, Korea’s cultural products — notably, its 
blockbuster movies, television programs, fashion, and popular music — have become favorites among 
Asians and even among Latin Americans. The so-called Halryu (韓流: “Korean wave”) refers to the 
growing appeal of Korean popular culture in other Asian countries, and is often theoretically explained by 
“cultural proximity,” a phenomenon first identified by empirical studies of the TV-watching patterns of 
Latin Americans.  
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García Canclini, 1997; Straubhaar & Hammond, 1998). These new approaches view 
uneven, asymmetric, and even “unpredictable” links in the global–local nexus as salient 
in the present phase of globalization. They aim to negate the dualistic and hierarchical 
framing of the world in terms of dominant and dominated, colonizer and colonized, and 
center and periphery, to engender more fertile possibilities that allow us to see 
globalization “from below” (the local), specifically, to ground critical globalization 
studies in praxis (e.g., Kellner, 2002; Robinson, 2005). Globalization as complex and 
hybrid enables us to see many deviations from a rigidly “prefigured” path of a globalizing 
force into one world-system (Straubhaar & Hammond, 1998), and to perceive socio-
cultural complexities as supporting cultural sustainability and participatory democracy in 
the local or the periphery.   
In contrast, rather than seeing the politics of “hope” or the “Third Way” in global 
complexity, some scholars approach complexity as the art of legitimating the scope of 
global capitalism. For instance, Urry (2005) divides the global system into two main 
forms, “global networks” and “global fluids” (pp. 245–249): while global networks are 
predictable, calculable, routinized, integrated, and standardized (as in global enterprises), 
global fluids are autopoietic, rhizomatic, and decentralized (as in world money, social 
movements, the Internet, the anti-globalization movement, international terrorism, and so 
forth); it is the latter that accounts for the aspects of global complexity and hybridity. It is 
significant that Urry describes globalization as “pools of order that heighten overall 
disorder” (249). His viewpoint is analogous to Hall’s (1991) perspective on global 
economic and cultural power, which is always “wanting to recognize and absorb 
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[cultural] differences within the larger, overarching framework” (28). Hall argues that 
global power never attempts to obliterate differences or complexities: “it operates 
through them, it has to hold the whole framework of globalization in place and 
simultaneously police that system: it stage-manages independence within it […], without 
absolutely destroying what is specific and particular” (28–29). Hall describes the “de-
centered” power of globalization as absorbing the differences of the local; similarly, Urry 
describes it as “mobile power” (249): it is based on “speed, lightness, distance, 
weightlessness,” crossing over both global networks and global fluids. In fact, mobile 
power achieves new and intricate relations between global networks (the universalizing 
power) and global fluids (the complex localities). Globalization thus is “like putting 
together a jigsaw puzzle: it is a matter of inserting a multiplicity of localities into the 
overall picture of a new global system […]. The ‘local’ should be seen as a fluid and 
relational space, constituted only in and through its relation to the global” (Morley & 
Robins, 1995: 116–117). 
These new approaches to the intertwined dynamics of the global–local nexus 
revive the more holistic and pessimistic vision of a “global state” or “market state” that 
modulates the local differences over its global network system, a system of “Empire.” 
The present study examines the structure of Empire in order to situate the historical–
geographical condition of Korea’s informatization in relation to Empire’s global 
networks.  
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2.1.3. The “smooth world” of electronic Empire 
As promoted by the Reagan administration in the US and Margaret Thatcher in 
Britain from the early 1980s onwards, neoliberal public policy has engaged in 
commercialization (from state regulation to market regulation), liberalization (from 
monopoly regulation to competition), privatization (selling off state enterprises), and 
transnationalization (global and local expansion of transnational or multinational 
corporations), subsidized by the “constitutive” role of the state (e.g., Mosco, 1996; 
Murdock & Golding, 1999; McChesney, 2004). Neoliberalism aims to reconfigure global 
society through the operations of national and international business powers, thus going 
beyond the classical claims of the laissez-faire market operated by the “invisible hand.” 
Harvey (2003, 2005, 2006) defines neoliberalism with the concept of “accumulation by 
dispossession”: it designates the active role of the state which releases a set of public 
assets toward deregulation, privatization, financial liberalization, and the 
commercialization of cultural and historical assets that were once in the public domain. 
To optimize conditions for capital accumulation, market-friendly public policy is 
essential in the neoliberal state system, which typically causes cut-backs in welfare 
provision, health care, public education, core social services, and at the same time 
produces market incentives in the form of tax breaks, the provision of infrastructure at 
state expense, and the opening of local markets known as “structural adjustment” to 
global forces (Harvey, 2006: 23–26). The state constitutes the rules under which the 
market exists, and thus “deregulation” is only a name for shifting from overt government 
regulation to regulation by the market structure enabled by the state (Horwitz, 1989). The 
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state provides national and international incentives for preferred corporate behavior, 
which is promoted by an “intrinsic” logic of policymaking (Hills, 2002: 12). 
Under the neoliberal order of chaos, global power has been transformed from a 
center–periphery system to a complex and dispersed system of global–local nexus, and 
worldwide capitalist power integrates local differences within a globalizing force by 
means of digital technology and its electronic networks. For example, Hardt and Negri 
suggest the holistic vision of a global society of control crossing over national 
boundaries. According to them, we have entered into the new age of “Empire” in which 
“rule has no limits” and “encompasses the spatial totality” of the globe (Hardt & Negri, 
2000: xiv). The establishment of a global society of control “goes hand in hand with the 
realization of the world market and the real subsumption of global society under capital” 
(332). In the immanent and ubiquitous condition of global control by capital, it is 
meaningless to demarcate geographical zones as center and periphery, North and South, 
First World and Third World: “The geography of uneven development and the lines of 
division and hierarchy will no longer be found along stable national or international 
boundaries, but in fluid infra- and supranational borders” (335). This vision of a hybrid 
totality goes beyond the above-mentioned multi-layered global–local nexus thesis, and 
argues for a global web structure of control by capital over the “space of flows.” Under 
these conditions of control, the sovereignty of nation-states has declined, and the network 
of Empire becomes a description of the physical conduit for contemporary global power. 
Fundamental sources of modern capitalist power are dependent upon both connectivity 
and mobility. 
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 The present study is interested in the electronic infrastructural conditions for 
current global capitalism, and uses such descriptions as the “electronic global Empire” or 
“e-Empire” (Raley, 2004) or the “information Empire” (Poster, 2004). These terms are 
used to designate a new global power which has modulated its worldwide control through 
media and electronic networks. The complex pyramid of global power has been built on 
“access to the means of transportation and the resulting freedom of movement” (Bauman, 
2000: 10).  
The principal strategy in the exercise of power has become extraterritorial and 
unbounded. The rejection of any territorial confinement means that for the use of power, 
it rarely matters now “where the giver of the command is” (11), since power has become 
dispersed, de-centered, and even hybridized — what Hardt and Negri call the “smooth 
world” of Empire. From these ubiquitous traits of the power of capital, we need to 
observe the virtual geographies of the invisible web of global fluids, and how it enables 
the concrete redefining of the new global system. The fluid and liquid space is geared by 
a global conduit of electronic networks: transcontinental networks such as submarine 
cables, ship-to-shore wireless, broadcast radio and shortwave wireless, the telephone 
lines, and the worldwide business and Internet networks. A fabric of electronic networks 
has been created to help abstract intellectual properties such as financial capital, 
electronic business data, and entertainment content to move about quickly on a planetary 
scale. Contemporary capitalism is reshuffling local geographies so as to facilitate the 
national and global expansion of capital by increasing and channeling the mobility of 
people, money, goods, and information. 
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Table 1.1. The virtual topography of globalization  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.1 describes the virtual phase of capitalism in the age of globalization. This table 
shows the technological and physical layers that enable the expansive mechanisms of 
power to operate through physical and virtual geographies, as well as through the uneven 
geography of segregations and disparities that lead to social disintegration and the 
furtherance of class divisions. New complex hierarchies are being reconfigured with the 
metropolitan and global cities as command centers and nodal points, “technopoles” as 
research and development (R&D) centers, and the worldwide telecommunication 
infrastructures as the conduit of capital and information. “A new geography of centrality 
and marginality” (Sassen, 2005) is being drawn not so much by national boundaries as by 
these virtual geometric representations of power. In sum, the unequal mechanisms among 
localities depend on whether they have plugged into, switched on, and connected 
themselves to the virtual geographies of mobility. 
ICT layers in virtual globalization    Physical layers in a globalizing space 
  Digital information (bits and bytes)    Immaterial labor, information commodities 
  The circuit of electronic networks National and international ICT backbone     
Infrastructures 
  Nodal points, exchangers,  
  Communication hubs 
Informational cities, global cities, command   
and control centers (Headquarters of   
transnationals) 
  Servers, databases Technopoles, new industrial districts   
(milieus for innovation) 
  Technical standards Supranational institutions for intellectual  
property rights  
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2.1.4. Summary 
This section has briefly surveyed the genealogy of globalization theories, focusing 
especially on Marxist interpretations of capital accumulation on a global scale. In the first 
stage, critical scholars investigated the absorption of surplus by colonialist expansion to 
non-capitalist states, and, next, by the export of capital to underdeveloped countries. In 
the second stage of globalization studies, scholars considered the “underdevelopment” or 
“dependent development” of the Third World, especially Latin America, with a dualistic 
structure of center–periphery and North–South. These dependency theories and world 
system analyses of globalization supposed a rigid hierarchical structure of the globalizing 
force over the local. Scholars’ recognition of hybridity and complexity in globalization 
has led some to view the flexible and multiple status of the local as relatively free from 
the dominion of global capital. Other scholars, however, have argued that these hybrid 
and complex traits should be regarded as the sign of global capital’s ability to absorb 
such local differences. This argument is mostly dependent on seeing the global–local 
nexus as an intricate web structure.           
Globalization as empire upgrades these global–local debates with the concept of a 
global society of control. Negri argues that the current digitized patterns of a globalizing 
force that the electronic networks make possible are able to absorb the differences and 
complexities across the world through “modulating networks of command” and 
“insinuation.” Thus, Empire no longer designates the Pax Americana or the “Triad” of 
economic powers, but rather denotes the interconnected web of the world market. The 
worldwide web structure becomes “mobile power,” the overarching regulatory control of 
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global capital. The new “hypermobile” power is able to “lay an abstract space over 
concrete territorial configurations” (Morley & Robins, 1995: 75) and construct a global 
space of control through weaving hyperspace electronically. The present study uses this 
theoretical approach, but will, in addition, consider the active role of the state as an agent 
of local and global capital. The next section thus reviews the state-led role of establishing 
industrial accumulation and the global networked mobility. 
 
 
2.2. DEVELOPMENTAL STATE THEORIES OF EAST ASIAN GROWTH AND THEIR 
LIMITS 
Confronting East Asia’s economic “miracle” during 1970s and 1980s, a group of 
social scientists in the West turned away from neoclassical or market-centered view and 
dependency theories and developed alternative interpretations for the new phenomenon. 
The academic field known as “developmental state theories” rapidly grew to explain how 
the interventionist role of the state in the four “Asian Tigers” — Hong Kong, Singapore, 
South Korea, and Taiwan — allowed these countries to successfully catch up with the 
industrialization of the West. Although the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, which 
represented a harbinger of global instability, diminished scholarly interest in 
“developmental state theories,” it is obvious that, even after this economic turmoil, a rigid 
tendency toward state interventionism in the economy has survived in East Asian states, 
and the interventionist state has partly succeeded in promoting the national information 
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economy—  while simultaneously creating massive new labor market insecurities, the 
intensification of inequality, and exploitation (Burkett & Hart-Landsberg, 1998; Pirie, 
2006). 
This section first reviews the main arguments of developmental state theories, 
especially those dealing with state–capital relationships and state autonomy issues, then 
points out these theories’ shortcomings in interpreting the contemporary conditions of the 
East Asian states, and finally maps out a research design for examining the role of the 
state in Korea’s recent electronic superhighway plan. 
 
2.2.1. The revival of the role of the state in the developmental state theories 
The first state theories that were developed to explain the economic miracle in the 
East Asian states began with a critique of two theoretical camps: the neoclassical or 
market-centered approach and dependency theories (e.g., Haggard, 1990). On the one 
hand, the dependency theorists (see Chapter 2.1.1) are devoted to explaining a value 
chain of accumulation on a global scale (a chain of “metropolis–satellite” or “center–
periphery” structures), unequal development among states, and the destructive effects of 
multinational capital to the Third World, but they failed to anticipate the East Asian form 
of state-interventionist development, in which states become relatively free of the 
structural constraints of dependency. On the other hand, the so-called “market-centered” 
approach — which has been rapidly disseminated by such international economic 
institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund — closely ties 
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East Asia’s economic growth to the rise of market idealism in post-socialist societies. The 
neoclassical arguments are based on the idea that East Asia’s success is in line with 
market-based outcomes, but that nonmarket mechanisms such as extensive government 
interventions in markets have generally failed to improve economic performance and that 
government’s role should be the minimal one of providing a safe environment for the 
market. From the neoliberal perspective, “governments are likely to do more harm than 
good, unless interventions are market friendly” (World Bank, 1993: 10). The market-
centered view rarely confronts the fact that the East Asian states create and command the 
(new) market. A failure to understand the Asian quality of these states is parallel to the 
economistic approach evident in Marxist-Leninist exegeses which often regard the state 
as merely a reflection of the class structure and mode of production as a whole.6 
Developmental state theories, therefore, were also a theoretical rebuttal to the 
economistic tendencies of Marxism. Skocpol (1979), a prominent non-Marxist statist, 
challenged the economic reductionism in both the neoclassical view and the economistic 
approach of Marxism. She conceives of states as “administrative and coercive 
organizations — that are potentially autonomous from (though of course conditioned by) 
socioeconomic interests and structures” (p. 14). She views the state as an agent of social 
and political change. In Skocpol’s analysis, the basis for the potential autonomy of state 
action originates from the maintenance of the social order and its involvement in an 
international network of states (30–31). Her state-centered perspective has become the 
                                                 
6 A view of the state as an “epiphenomenon” of the system of property relations, which is merely a mirror 
of class rule, represents the vulgar Marxist tradition of economistic reductionism.     
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most often cited epistemological basis for the developmental state model, especially 
about state autonomy, seeing the state as insulated from and even above society.  
In short, the first developmental state model is a reaction to both dependency 
theories and the neoclassical perspective: in contrast to the former, it encouraged scholars 
to rethink “development” in the Third World, since it is apparent now that “partial” 
development or growth in the Third World can be accomplished even under the general 
conditions of global capitalism. In contrast to the latter, it brought the state back into the 
analysis of economic development in East Asia. State-centered studies consider the state 
as relatively autonomous and created by the need for a bureaucratic (rule-enforcing) 
apparatus. Taking this thesis of “state autonomy,” developmental state theorists mostly 
focus on the “strong state” (Myrdal, 1968: 898), which is relatively independent from 
social and economic interest groups and which imposes obedience to state policy.  
The role of a strong state in late industrialization was originally introduced by 
Gerschenkron (1962). In his three different categories of industrialization patterns, Russia 
in late nineteenth century is described as an “extremely backward” country, in which the 
state directly mobilized financial resources and created new heavy and chemical 
industries sheltered behind tariff walls to allow Russia to catch up to two different 
industrial models — that of Britain (advanced) and of Germany (“moderately 
backward”).7 Gerschenkron (1962: 7) argues that differences in the speed and character 
                                                 
7 From a Gerschenkronian perspective of catching-up, Shin and Chang (2003) consider South Korea to be 
an “extremely backward” country. They characterize the Korean system as a late-twentieth-century 
example of a late industrializer, based on the “close relationship between the state, the national banks and 
the Chaebol” (25).  
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of industrial development across countries were to a considerable extent the result of the 
application of different institutional instruments and patterns. An equivalent to 
Gerschenkron’s schema for “extremely backward countries,” the East Asian 
developmental state model was first suggested by Johnson (1982, 1987) to explain the 
institutional role of the state in organizing the economic activities of private firms. 
Johnson (1982: 20–21) first differentiates between the “developmental” orientation of the 
East Asian states, especially Japan, where state involvement enabled rapid recovery after 
World War II, and the “regulatory” one in the US. While the US-style regulatory state 
concerns itself with the rules of economic competition, the East Asian developmental 
states concern themselves with substantive matters such as what industries ought to exist 
and what industries are no longer needed. In the developmental mode of the Asian states 
Johnson sees “the commitment by political elites to ‘market-conforming’ methods of 
intervention in the economy” (1987: 141). Johnson regards the developmental regime in 
East Asia as “soft authoritarianism” since it is based on a coercive political–bureaucratic 
elite, autocratic power and political repression, and oppressive labor policy, through 
which the states drive the private sector toward the one goal of economic growth. In her 
analysis of the Korean case, Amsden (1989) goes a step further than the autonomous state 
model offered by Johnson by arguing that the state autonomy in Korea was almost 
absolute in planning late industrialization, disciplining private firms dependent on their 
performance, and controlling the opposition to growth from unions and civil rights 
movements. Wade (1990a: 24–29) adds the “governed market” (GM) theory which 
highlights the bureaucratic power of the Korean and Taiwanese governments that 
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“manage” or control their national markets, rather than following or conforming to its 
demands.8 Shin (1998) describes how the governments in Korea have supervised the 
business entities and even disciplined them: 
 
The series of economic plans in South Korea has constituted the major source of 
industrial transformation and economic growth. […] The state […] selected 
several industries as strategic sectors and gave them protection from excessive 
competition among domestic as well as foreign enterprises. The state provided 
financial subsidies and supports and scrutinized their economic performance. It 
controlled the number of competing enterprises in the market by restricting entry 
and production capacity and [by] frequent state-led mergers of private firms. (8) 
 
In summary, the models of the first developmental state school (e.g., Amsden, 
1989; Haggard, Cooper & Collins, 1994; Wade, 1990a, 1990b; White & Wade, 1988) 
emphasize the autonomous power of the state in leading the industrial transformations of 
the East Asian economic “miracle.” According to the investigations of these theorists, the 
strong developmental states created a set of strategic industrial policies in high-tech 
sectors aimed at creating the long-run wealth of their nations. The obvious features of the 
strong East Asian states made the first developmental state theorists believe firmly that 
the East Asian states acted in complete autonomy. A new group of statists responded 
critically to this concept of the state as a set of institutions commanding power and 
discipline over society and capital. Some developmental state theorists designated as 
                                                 
8 Wade (1990b: 234) summarizes the autonomous features of the state’s selective industrial policies that 
control the market: (1) government initiatives as to what technologies should be adopted; (2) public 
influence over private resources to carry out these initiatives; (3) a larger before-the-fact plan or strategy. 
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“neo-statists” have shifted their focus to examining the densely interconnected linkages 
between the state and business.9   
 
2.2.2. From total state autonomy to state–business linkages  
Neo-statists pay close attention to the blurring demarcation between state and 
society, without ignoring the leading role of the states over business in East Asia. Evans 
(1995) is a leading scholar pioneering this new statist trend. With his concept of 
“embedded autonomy,” Evans tries to reinterpret state autonomy in the following two 
directions: First, while these states are sufficiently autonomous and sovereign from 
specific social groups so as to formulate their own goals (the state’s internal structure), 
their autonomy is also embedded in specific social links (state–society relationships). In 
Evans’ analysis, South Korea as one of the typical developmental states is a case of 
establishing successfully cooperative links between political bureaucrats and industrial 
elites at the institutional level.  
The developmental state is, Evans says, different from the “predatory state” such 
as Zaire in Africa. The predatory state usually exercises a strong top-down power without 
institutionalized negotiation with social groups, and thus “has little capability of 
transforming the economy and social structure over which it presides” (Evans, 1995: 45). 
Borrowing Mann’s (1988: 5) categories of state power, we can say that the state elites in 
Zaire possesses “despotic power” (top-down predation by a strong state on society) but 
                                                 
9 Weiss and Hobson (1995: 9–10) designated a new emerging group of theorists focusing on state–
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weak “infrastructural power” (capacity of the state to penetrate society and to implement 
political decisions throughout the realm).10 To the first statist school, state autonomy was 
the capability of the state to wield “despotic” power with little interference from interest 
groups, and therefore the states have a high degree of flexibility in the formulation and 
implementation of policy.  
The earlier statists rarely noted the “infrastructural” capacity of the state, which 
refers to its increasing ability to coordinate society’s resources and allocate them to 
desired ends. In contrast, Evans’ neo-statist perspective affirms Mann’s thesis that 
despotic power is a source of state weakness while state strength is derived from a 
developed degree of infrastructural power. When Mann’s concept is applied to the case of 
Korea, the political elites until the early 1990s were both “despotically and 
infrastructurally strong,” at least in the state–business linkages. In other words, we can 
say that, without the state’s “embedded autonomy,” or “infrastructural power,” vis-à-vis 
business, the developmental path in Korea could never have emerged, and it would have 
fallen into the predatory condition of despotic power. According to Weiss and Hobson 
(1995: 7), state strength increases with effective infrastructural power (the developmental 
state), whereas state weakness ensues from the exertion of despotic power (the predatory 
state). Therefore, whether a state is a predatory or a developmental one lies in the extent 
of the “embeddedness” of a state’s autonomy. 
                                                                                                                                                 
business links “neo-statists.”  
10 Mann (1988: 9) introduces one of the logistical techniques which have aided state “infrastructural” 
power: “rapidity of communication of messages and of transport of people and resources through improved 
roads, ships, telegraphy, etc.” This point is significant for investigating Korea’s developmental strategies 
for establishing the KII.      
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According to Evans (1995), Korea is a prototypical case of a developmental state 
which created dense linkages between bureaucratic elites and industrial capital. In such 
linkages, Evans notes, the state usually performs four different roles: formulating and 
enforcing rules (the role of “custodian”); playing out the generic role of regulator (the 
role of “demiurge”); and assisting emergent entrepreneurial groups (the role of 
“midwife”); and protecting local entrepreneurial groups from global changes (the role of 
“husbandry”) (12–14). Weiss (1998) views state autonomy as more limited in its 
relationship to the private sector. Weiss’ model of state–business relationships reflects the 
increased economic power of Korea’s family-owned conglomerates, the Chaebols, a 
power almost equivalent to that of the state.11 The state–business linkages are highly 
“selective” and mutually “dependent.” Weiss’ so-called “governed interdependence” (GI) 
theory notes that both state and dominant private sector are equally strong in their 
autonomy. GI refers to “a negotiated relationship, in which public and private participants 
maintain their autonomy, yet which is nevertheless governed by broader goals set and 
monitored by the state” (38). By introducing such relational terms as “mutual 
dependence” or “interdependence” between two public and private entities, Weiss’ GI 
theory expresses a much weaker view of state power than Evans’ “embedded autonomy” 
does, and focuses on the growth of highly concentrated business power. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
11 Weiss (1998: 61) sees the increased autonomy of Chaebols such as Samsung, Hyundai, and LG group 
in their relative independence of finance from the interventionist state and in the internationalized scope of 
their business operations. Her observation is closely related to the financial liberalization of the early 
1990s, a liberalization that weakened the government’s control over investment decisions and increased 
Chaebol-owned non-bank financial institutions’ channeling of funding to group subsidiaries (e.g., Hahm, 
2003: 12). 
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Weiss (1998: 49–53) takes into account the centrally “coordinated” and “governed” 
quality of state power over industry. In Korea, for instance, the coordinated capacities of 
the state are exemplified by highly qualified bureaucrats, the intelligence-gathering 
network for up-to-date knowledge about production conditions in priority sectors, and the 
Economic Planning Board (EPB) as a super-ministry insulated from the market.  
In sum, whereas the earlier statists looked at the East Asian “miracle” by focusing 
on the disjuncture between the state and society and the dominance of the state over 
society, the neo-statists explore this economic success by focusing on the dense linkages 
between the state and the private sector. Even the neo-statists, however, point to the 
“state-induced deliberate shifting of the industrial structure towards higher technology, 
higher value-added products” (Weiss & Hobson, 1995: 150). In fact, despite the varying 
emphases on the state–industry linkages, it is clear that both the old and new statists agree 
about the state’s dominant role in the East Asian economic miracle. From the beginning, 
developmental state theories were intended to describe a technique for “the rise of ‘the 
rest’” (Amsden, 2001) in the world market, based on the historical experiences of the 
East Asia states as late industrializers.  
2.2.3. Debunking developmental state theories as a recipe for growth  
This section describes some theoretical shortcomings in developmental state 
theories. The critique will be beneficial in clarifying the material conditions of the state in 
Korea. First, the statists’ arguments are essentially based on looking for a recipe for 
success and growth. Whether their approach is based on the autonomous power of the 
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state or on state–business linkages, both the old and the new statists focusing on the 
incredible performance of “growth” and “catching-up” in the East Asian economies. In 
order to detect the recipe for success, the statists concentrated excessively on how a state 
performed its role as coordinator and on what kind of industrial policy it used in 
collaborating with the private sector. This developmental logic could lead to the 
argument that dictatorship and exploitation should be endured in order to achieve 
developmental activities of effective planning and economic growth. We often ignore the 
fact that capitalist growth is accompanied by intense exploitation (see Hart-Landsberg, 
1993). The state theorists’ tribute to East Asian growth has led to ignoring the “tendency 
toward deformation” that occurs with rapid growth under conditions of extreme state 
intervention — a deformation which includes such phenomena as the unequal conditions 
between major cities and other areas of the same country, environmental destruction, 
repressive labor control, crony capitalism, and corruption. The statists fail to interrogate 
the problems of development in itself.  
Secondly, the statists overlook the possibility that the developmental states in East 
Asia could descend into being predatory (or rent-seeking).12 At the very least, it is clear 
that the symbiotic relationships between the state and big business in Korea have been 
damaging to civil rights, social welfare, and distributive justice. For the developmental 
state theorists, these symbiotic relationships — specifically, those between the 
                                                 
12 In a rent-seeking state, politicians and bureaucrats maximize their personal or political fortunes by 
extending rents — which in Korea were associated mostly with the privatization of vested properties, an 
overvalued exchange rate, high rates of protection, government procurement, and preferential credit — to 
the private sector (Lim, Haggard & Kim, 2003: 10–12). 
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authoritative state and the Chaebols — rarely become problems if the two actors serve to 
limit the extent of rent-seeking and corruption and pursue aggregate growth by means of 
the state’s dense “embeddedness” in the powerful conglomerates.13 The developmental 
state model shows how the crony linkages of corruption between government and 
business can develop into an engine for economic growth. It pays little attention, 
however, to the destructive linkages of corruption and rent-seeking between the actors, 
linkages between the political power of developmental dictatorships and the monopolistic 
power of privileged capital. The dominant blocs of the state and monopolistic capital 
benefit each other exclusively, denying the citizens’ need for participatory democracy 
and distributive justice. In short, a bias toward the positive dynamics of state–business 
linkages is one of the weaknesses of the developmental state theories. 
Thirdly, developmental state theories tend to reduce state–society relations into 
simple state–business linkages for economic growth.14 Koo (1993) precisely identifies 
the missing piece of developmental state theories:   
 
[T]he East Asian literature confines its focus to the interplay of the 
“developmental state” and the market, more or less separate from the broader 
context of civil society. This narrow economistic approach results in a tendency to 
exaggerate the autonomy and strength of the East Asian state and to interpret 
economic growth in isolation from other political and social changes. An obvious 
                                                 
13 For instance, Kang (2002: 116–121) explains the limits on the corruption of the state by using the term 
“mutual hostages.”  
14 Evans (1997: 84–85) admits that, in the East Asian model, workers were excluded from the public–
private networks, despite their key role in industrial transformation. His approach, however, is based on the 
“corporatist” vision of state–business–workers linkages promoting transformative growth. Evans can rarely 
free himself of the developmental project of growth, even though he considers the working class to be a 
missing part of the linkages.  
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danger of such an approach is a reification of the concept of the state, as often 
found in many stylistic accounts of the East Asian developmental states. (7) 
 
Koo further maintains that the state-centered approach overstresses the independent role 
of the state at the expense of societal forces, while it ignores how “the state is embedded 
in society” (5).15 Koo is much more inclusive in his approach to society, going beyond 
the traditional orthodox Communist view of “state monopoly capitalism” as a simple 
reflection of class relations rooted in the mode of production. Migdal’s (1988, 1994, 
2001) “state-in-society” approach shares common ground with Koo; from the socio-
centric perspective, states cannot be properly understood without looking at social 
contexts, at the various socioeconomic determinants of politics (Migdal, Kohli & Shue, 
1994: 2–3). According to Migdal (1994: 9), patterns of domination within states are 
determined by key struggles spread throughout a society’s multiple arenas of domination 
and opposition. In contrast, the developmental statists, despite their analysis of the dense 
state–business linkages, failed to look at the multitudinous layers of social contexts. The 
present study views the state not as a monolithic unity of command that simply represents 
uniform citizens, but as the “material condensation” or “institutional ensemble” balancing 
a relation of forces among classes (Poulantzas [1978] 2000: 35–46; Jessop, 1985: 336–
                                                 
15 This “state-in-society” view is not new among Marxists: in his discussion of the origin of the state, 
Engels ([1892] 1990) describes how the state becomes autonomous over society, despite its origin from 
within society: 
 
The state is […] by no means a power forced on society from without. […] Rather, it is a product 
of society at a certain stage of development […]. [Eventually,] it became necessary to have a 
power seemingly standing above which would alleviate the conflict and keep it within the bounds 
of “order”; and this power, having arisen out of society but placing itself above it, and alienating 
itself more and more from it, is the state. (269) 
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339). The degree of state autonomy thus depends on the specific social and class 
conditions and the field of class struggles in a given society (see Jessop, 1982: 12–24; 
1990: 24–47; Cho & Kim, 1998: 130–131; Lee, 2003: 27–31). The state-in-society 
approach, whether used by Marxist or non-Marxist state theorists, asks us to extend the 
state–business linkage approach to consider the state as situated within socioeconomic 
contexts and class tensions. Jessop (1982) gives us a clear-cut description of how to 
perform a theoretical analysis of a state: it must examine “not only [a state’s] economic 
determinations but also those rooted in the distinctive organization of the state as well as 
in the social division of labor between officialdom and people” (30).       
Finally, one of the theoretical problems in state-centered approaches is that they 
seek the engine for growth in a state’s “endogenous” property, focusing on domestic 
state–business linkages and the leading role of a strong state in boosting the national 
market. This myopic view results in overlooking how external factors, such as the 
changing global economic system of capitalism, affect local government and economies. 
The survival of the developing countries depends largely on their close links to the global 
electronic conduits of capital. Without fully examining external constraints such as the 
new conditions of global geographies, we are unable to fully understand the changing 
developmental mode in the East Asian states. The statists thus fail to take into account the 
reconfiguration of transnational capital and the vulnerable conditions of the East Asian 
states and businesses.  
 37 
2.2.4. Summary 
While developmental state theories contributed to tracking state dominance in the 
economic transformation and growth in East Asia, they failed to perceive the 
deformations caused by the symbiosis between the state and big business. Further, these 
theories were unable to describe both the class and social conditions within which the 
state is situated, and ignored the external factor of global capitalism, which greatly 
constrains the autonomy of regional governments and economies. By perceiving the state 
as wholly situated within class and society, the state-in-society approach critically 
supplements the weak or missing links of developmental state theories, going beyond the 
theses of unfettered state autonomy (promoted by the old statists) and the close liaison 
between the state and business (promoted by the new statists).  Moreover, both the old 
and the new statists tend to overestimate the state’s role in sustaining capital 
accumulation, and fail to see that the major function of the state is to preserve the stable 
cohesion of various classes in a given society through repression and concession 
(Gramsci, 1971: 206–76; Poulantzas, [1965] 2008: 98–100).  
The present study thus views the state’s autonomy as largely based on two 
sources of power: one is the state’s relative autonomy in establishing policies that 
influence industrial development; the other is the state’s bureaucratic capacity to embed 
its control in society at large and in citizens individually, which is exactly what is 
designated by Mann’s term “infrastructural power.” The latter derives from the 
autonomous power of the state continually to develop new bureaucratic techniques to 
control society. As will be surveyed in the next section, the rezoning and policing of 
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space exemplifies the introduction by the bureaucratic elites of a more pervasive and 
omnipresent technology for social control. The state-in-society approach enables us to 
explain why the state tries incessantly to rearrange the forces of social classes and to 
insert its bureaucratic desire for control into policy plans such as those for Korea’s 
national information superhighway. 
 
2.3. CRITICAL GEOGRAPHIES: THE STATE–SPACE–CAPITAL LINKS 
This section investigates so-called “spatialization” in critical geographies, which 
explains the process of re-zoning that stratifies and concentrates the power of capitalism 
over physical and virtual geographies (Mosco, 1996). The present study applies the 
theoretical perspective of critical geographies to analyzing the empirical case of the 
nationwide electronic superhighway project in the two directions of spatialization. One 
comes from the bureaucratic desire for control by developmental states over society, the 
institutional desire that is closely related to increasing the state’s “infrastructural power” 
(Mann, 1988) over society. By using Foucauldian concepts such as disciplinary societies 
and governmentality, this study examines how the techniques of power in contemporary 
states are gradually transformed from a centralized and hierarchical model into a 
distributed and ubiquitous network model through virtual spatialization, the so-called de-
territorialization of political power. Along with investigating the metamorphosis in 
techniques and technologies of state power, the other direction of spatialization comes 
from the need of large capital to metamorphose itself into the knowledge-based mode of 
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production. To East Asian states, spatial reconfiguration also signifies the economic 
capacities for the developing countries to achieve a “functional” position as one nodal 
point of Empire’s global networks. The spatial reconfiguration of domestic territories by 
capital is the strategic plan to survive in the age of digital capitalism.  
In short, this section examines how spatial rezoning facilitates the state and large 
capital to obtain their goals of control and accumulation, respectively. Before entering 
into the topic, let us begin first with the concept of space as the geographical medium 
through which socio-economic power is administered and controlled.  
 
2.3.1. Space as social power and “flows” 
Spatialization — such as spatial configuration by market need, segmentation of 
places, and spatial policing around class, gender, and race — produces complex spatial 
geometries of power (Dodge & Kitchin, 2001: 36). Harvey (1989: 226) notes that those 
who define the material practices, forms, and meanings of space, together with those of 
money and time, define certain basic rules of the social game. Harvey (1996), in his 
investigation of the historical transitions of capitalist geographies, describes the capitalist 
reshuffling in space with the concept of “flexible accumulation” by “time–space 
compression.” Different from the place-adhesive recognition of space as something fixed, 
his viewpoint extends space as an expansive source of capitalist power, which has been 
sustained by reconstructing its geographical bases. 
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Space is not wrought out of thin air but rather is socially constructed and mediated 
through the interplay of human beings striving to control political, economic, cultural 
forces. Space, therefore, is inseparable from the social power intersecting it. Borrowing 
Soja’s (1996) terminology, we are “first and always historical–social–spatial beings, 
actively participating individually and collectively in the construction/ production of 
histories, geographies, societies” (73). In Soja’s concept of the “trialectics of being,” the 
human body has been always located within the interplay between space and socio-
historicality. A linkage to socio-historicality of space indicates that space should be 
understood as grounded in the social and historical struggle to control places. In this 
respect, space as social power is a connotative texture that underlies the physicality of 
places. If space signifies “a system of containers of social power” (Harvey, 1989: 237), 
any struggle to reconstitute power relations is a struggle to reorganize their spatial bases 
(238). In this respect, space is not the passive host for the reifying society but rather a 
malleable container that allows its reconfiguration (Fabijancic, 1995).  
Many critical geographers have investigated the spatial reconfiguration of 
capitalism, such as global expansion of capital markets in order to ameliorate over-
accumulation with a “spatial fix” (Harvey, 2001) — spatial reorganization and 
geographical expansion facilitated by innovation in physical infrastructure — as well as 
re-territorialization and de-territorialization for controlling increasingly and 
bewilderingly complex flows of capital. Flexible spatialization corresponds to “lay[ing] 
an abstract space over concrete territorial configurations” (Morley & Robins, 1995: 75). 
Lash and Urry (1994: 13–17) also observe that through the rapid circulation of subjects 
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and objects, time and space “empty out” and dissolve into the spatio-temporal ether. 
Space is directed especially to channeling the mobility of people, money, goods, and 
information. Thus space is becoming increasingly “process-oriented” (Castells, 1985: 11–
15) and more “fluid” (Urry, 2000).  
When the spatial conduit of electronic communications becomes the material 
infrastructure of contemporary power, “the space of flows” is more dominant in our 
economic, political, and symbolic life than “the space of places” (Castells, 1996: 412). 
Space as “flows” reproduces a hierarchical network of social classes in terms of 
disparities among regions, locales, cities, and nations. The “space of flows” approach 
could be a useful method for reading the inner mechanisms of power and also the uneven 
geography of segregations and disparities that leads to social disintegration such as class 
divisions (Hepworth & Robins, 1988).  
 
Figure 2.1. Two different layers of spatiality 
 
Imagined Space 
    
  
  Invisibility, Mobility, “Dromology” (Virilio, 1986), Singularity,  
  Network Connectivity, “Nomadology” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986) 
 
Interpreted Space 
   
  Flexible Accumulation, Segmentation, Technological  
  Rationalization, Social Taylorism, Ubiquitous Control 
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In Figure 2.1, the second spatial layer “interpreted” by the state and large capital 
designates the inner or real mechanism of spatial enforcement, in contrast to the cognitive 
effects of electronic space in the first layer of “imagined” space. In other words, whereas 
imagined space refers to the reconfiguration of physical space based on mobility and 
speed, interpreted space depicts the actual dynamics of the fluid and mobile space 
affecting the structural system of capitalism.    
 
2.3.2. State/Space 
Foucault ([1979] 1991) describes governmentality as the art of exercising power 
on things, in other words, the scientific management of population and the constitution of 
political economy. He views the power shift in eighteenth-century Europe “from a regime 
dominated by structures of sovereignty to one ruled by techniques of government” (101). 
This concept illuminates how Korea’s power systems have developed the regulatory 
mechanism of a science of knowledge. Foucault’s concept of governmentality presents a 
vision of the exercise of rule as far more than simply its direct discipline or violence. The 
management of population or statistics is used more toward shaping the “general” 
conditions of the population than of directly managing its individual bodies. This section 
examines the new phase of institutional governmentality over society in terms of spatial 
reconfiguration in the electronic age.  
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2.3.2.1. Free-floating control 
In his “postscript on control societies,” Deleuze ([1990] 1995) contrasts 
Foucault’s concept of disciplines with the concept of controls. According to Deleuze, the 
“disciplinary societies” of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries should be differentiated 
from the kind of society we have today.  He describes today’s societies as control 
societies, and sees them superseding the disciplinary societies Foucault talked about. 
Deleuze’s division of societies into these two periods — one of discipline and the other 
of control — reflects digitization of information in modern society and its use for 
reproduction of power systems. He sees control societies as based on digital technology, 
while disciplinary societies are based on analog technology. Digital technology facilitates 
free-floating control and continuous flows of information between databases without 
spatial-temporal restraints, while analog information has the logic of “confinement” and 
“moldings” that are broken up into physical cells and molds such as factories and prisons, 
where monitoring is performed from a physical watchtower. Under digital conditions of 
control, Deleuze observes that masses become floating samples and data. Gandy (1993) 
notes that personal information is “produced through the monitoring of behavior, and not 
the behavior alone” (76). Just as workers’ actions in a workplace are managed by the 
employers, and as consumers in everyday life are identified, classified, and evaluated by 
private corporations, through the so-called “panoptic sort,” what new technologies 
enhance is the ability to digitize, collect, sort, and control the activities of citizens in the 
public space (Gandy, 1993). In this respect, digital technology becomes a new means for 
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modern power to escape from the confinement of barriers, fences, and borders into the 
free-floating control of flow, speed, and mobility.  
2.3.2.2. Invisibility of power  
In a move similar to Deleuze’s distinction between disciplinary societies and 
control societies, Bauman (2000) divides capitalist modernity into two phases using the 
concepts of “solidity” (analog in Deleuze’s term) and “liquidity” (digital). He observes 
that the pyramid of power has increasingly been built on “access to the means of 
transportation and the resulting freedom of movement” (10). Bauman notes that the 
principal strategy in the exercise of power has become exterritorial and unbounded. He 
regards the “melting of solids” in the current capitalist system as the “revenge of 
nomadism over the principle of territoriality and settlement” (13). This rejection of any 
territorial confinement means that for the use of power, it rarely matters now “where the 
giver of the command is” (11). Bauman’s metaphor of “liquid” power is useful in 
conceiving a dispersive, de-centered, and even neutralized power. This wide dispersion of 
power techniques makes it easier to conceal the goals of control. As Foucault ([1976] 
1990), says “power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself” 
(86). Accordingly, power seeks to make “all things visible by becoming itself invisible” 
(Foucault, 1980: 71; also see Foucault, [1975] 1995: 187). The invisibility of power has 
been greatly increased by the dispersed and “value-neutral” techniques of high-tech 
panoptic devices such as radio frequency identification (RFID) chips, electronic bugs, 
geographic positioning systems (GPS), wireless tracking techniques, and other fine-
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grained data-mining software. These devices have been accompanied by new hegemonic 
values that persuade people to embrace a “digital sublime” and thereby gain consensual 
acceptance of them throughout society.  
2.3.2.3. Modulation and assemblage of differences  
If power has difficulties in integrating the liquid, free-floating, and dispersed 
practices of surveillance into its library of databases, power’s regulatory mechanisms are 
likely to be incomplete (Poster, 1990). Thus modulation of power on a large scale is 
impossible without interconnected networks. Raley (2004) notes that interconnected 
networks make up “modulating networks of command” (125). Although Raley’s research 
focused on the current shift of the global capitalist system, in other words, on “societies 
of ‘imperial’ control” (e.g., Galloway, 2001), the concept of “modulating networks of 
command” is quite useful for analyzing the new techniques of control. Raley explains the 
modulating system of power as “a loose assemblage of relations characterized by […] 
flexibility, functionality, mobility, programmability, and automation” (132). The 
technology permitting such an assemblage is the electronic network, which “abstracts 
human bodies from their territorial settings and separates them into a series of discrete 
flows” (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000: 605). The loose but integrated communication 
network is the “instrumental facilitator” of power (Raley, 2004: 135). Raley concludes 
that the new mechanism of power “need” not necessarily operate through domination, 
subjection, and imposition, because it now operates through insinuation, which is a modal 
switch of power and consists of hosts accepting rather than rejecting or being forced to 
 46 
accept” (135). When the spatial conduit of electronic communications becomes the 
material infrastructure of contemporary power, modulation and assemblage become the 
technical standards of common protocols or codes that link the free-floating data of 
individuals, groups, and classes. 
2.3.3. Capital/Space 
As we reviewed previously, the importance of networked mobility for 
transnational capital at the global level (see Chapter 2.1.3) means that it is the fact that 
South Korea’s government and business sectors are urgently struggling to incorporate the 
country into the electronic mode of capitalism so that it can achieve a functional position 
as one nodal point. For instance, in the Second World War, during the Japanese 
occupation of Korea, Japanese military imperialism forced Koreans to build a national 
road and railway network across the Korean Peninsula to make the imperialists accessible 
to the vast markets of Manchuria (see Chapter 4.1.1). The current colonialist project, 
however, will not need the violence of physical mobilization to subordinate the local 
under its global order. To obtain membership in global society, Korea must construct 
information infrastructures across the entire country and plug itself into the electronic 
networks of economic globalization. Survival in the age of digital capitalism depends on 
local abilities to function as a part of the broader web structure of the global market.  
The electronic telecommunication network has become the material infrastructure 
of contemporary capitalism, allowing the products of immaterial labor to be disseminated 
beyond local boundaries. Terms such as “cybernetic capitalism” (Robins & Webster, 
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1999), “digital capitalism” (Schiller, 1999), and “fast capitalism” (Agger, 2004) denote 
the deepening reliance on the virtual dynamics of capitalism shaped by technological 
innovation. These terms suggest a new stage of capitalism in which the flows of capital, 
labor, commodities, information, and images achieve a global reach and in which they 
can be produced and consumed almost instantaneously.  
Virilio (1997: 119–145) describes how the incessant desire of large capital has 
been promoted by speed and mobility. Fundamental sources of modern capitalist power 
are dependent upon both electronic connectivity and mobility. The nationwide and 
worldwide infrastructural technologies thus have made it possible for media giants to 
establish powerful distribution and production networks (McChesney, 1999). For 
instance, Hills (2002) examines the burgeoning phase of the historical struggle for 
achieving domination of international telecommunications between the US and Britain 
from the mid-nineteenth century to the Second World War, and notes the major role of 
the communication infrastructure as a colonialist power resource and conduit — the 
transcontinental network such as submarine telegraph cables, ship-to-shore wireless, 
broadcast radio and shortwave wireless, and telephone lines. Regarding regional patterns 
of spatialization, Schiller and Mosco (2001) note the economic function of telecom 
network lines in the regional integration across the North American continent that 
culminated in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). These networks 
account for the geographical reconfiguration of Mexico and Canada by means of the 
continent-wide network lines of US-based telecom businesses. The virtual networks are 
an expanding source of capitalist power that enables optical flows of intellectual 
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properties embodied in financial capital, electronic business data, and entertainment 
content.  
2.3.4. Summary  
In sum, space is an active expression of both state power and capital power, and 
socio-economic power today is articulated in “flows” whose purpose is the flexible 
control of space. The materialist perspective on space deserves further exploration as a 
tool for analyzing the social domain in which communication technology is applied. The 
nationwide electronic highway project is most usefully viewed both as a new experiment 
in power enforcement and as one of the spatial designs of power in the wired world of 
flows. The change in the exercise of power from places to flows in space explains why 
mobile technology, which was enacted on the basis of placelessness, has been 
subordinated into modern power structures. To use Foucault’s ([1975] 1995) words, a 
“power of writing” or “documentary techniques” on bodies has been constituted as 
another component of the power mechanism of discipline (189–192). A “panoptic” vision 
of power allows us to understand networked mobility as an updated documentary 
technique for managing citizens’ bodies through the space of “flows.” Further, power 
structures as “flows” change the “writing” performance into invisibility so as to reduce 
antipathy of individuals as social classes to structural control. Networked mobility by 
electronic spatialization facilitates the invisibility and neutrality of power and allows a 
“micro-power” to become ubiquitous and omnipresent, “making all things visible by 
becoming itself invisible” (Foucault, 1980). While networked mobility gives us physical 
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freedom from spatial restraints, it may be grounded in the ubiquitous power to manage a 
social system. Electronic spatialization thus strengthens the dominant motive of control 
as well as the efficient regulation and segmentation of bodies as social classes. In my 
current research, a critical angle on friendly symbiosis of space as “flows” and state 
power is crucial to analyzing the systematic management of social class in a local 
domain, along with spatial reshuffling for the purpose of flexible accumulation of capital.  
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Chapter III: Method 
 
The purpose of this research is to describe and analyze the contextual factors that 
conditioned the Korean Information Infrastructure (KII) project implemented by the 
Korean government from 1995 to 2005. The primary question of this study is to observe 
driving forces that conditioned the KII project in the Newly Industrialized Economies 
(NIEs). This primary question leads to the following sub-questions:   
 
1. What were the relevant policy decisions concerning the KII project, and how did 
global factors affect those decisions (Chapter 4)?  
2. What kinds of symbiotic relationships between governmental and business 
entities have developed through the KII project (Chapter 5)? 
3. How was the Korean government’s desire for social control articulated and 
realized in establishing the KII plan (Chapter 6)?  
 
By examining these research questions through a qualitative research design, the 
current study enables to reveal the complex mechanisms of domination and accumulation 
in the state-led IT plan. A quantitative research method is insufficient for describing the 
social struggle, conflict, and compromise among dominant stakeholders involved in 
constructing the national infrastructure project. Therefore, for the research fields 
concerning human behavior and interaction (Strauss & Corbin, 1990: 19) and 
 51 
stakeholders’ structurally determined role in capitalist society, qualitative research is 
more useful. Qualitative research allows the investigator to explore the research theme in 
a comprehensive manner, by means of archival data, as well as by means of interviews 
and observation. The qualitative approach traditionally involves beginning with open-
ended questions and then creating research findings by gathering data (Creswell, 1994: 
4–10). The goal of qualitative approach is the perception of the deep structure that lies 
beneath the surface of an object or event. It is the procedure of abstraction. When each 
concrete event or theme has been examined, it is possible for a researcher to produce the 
abstract framework from the concrete data. Then, the researcher forms the concepts that 
describe the concreteness of those objects. This double movement, from the concrete to 
the abstract and from the abstract to the concrete, is closely related to the research method 
of observing a structural logic behind facts or events in society. Based on this double 
procedure, the present study aims to perform a “structural” analysis or “interpretation in 
context” of the empirical case. According to Sayer (1992: 86–96), structural analysis is 
based on distinguishing not only incidental from essential characteristics, but also 
external/ contingent from internal/ necessary relations. The method suggested by Sayer 
can help this study to distinguish the necessary and internal relationships from the 
contingent and external relationships among the competing factors determining the KII 
project. 
Methodologically, this study examines longitudinally the changing relationships 
between the public and private sectors during the implementation of the KII project. It is 
based on documents and in-depth informant interviews: the primary data are archival data 
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from various sources, including newspapers, white papers, technical reports, and other 
published articles and books. The secondary data come from in-depth informant 
interviews that will be used for enriching the interpretation of findings by mapping out 
the different positions of major stakeholders who were directly and indirectly involved in 
the KII project.   
 
3.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN  
This study mainly examines the following core policy initiatives and laws dealing 
with the KII project: Since its passage in August 1995, the Framework Act on 
Informatization Promotion (FAIP, Act No. 4969) has guided the Korean government’s 
basic telecom policy, and especially the KII project. The present study also examines the 
Basic Plan on Informatization Promotion (BPIP) and three more policy initiatives, all of 
which have been implemented for promoting the KII project. These four policy initiatives 
include policy directives on how to realize the KII project within a given time span: The 
first policy initiative (BPIP) was implemented from 1996 to 2000; the BPIP was further 
developed in the second policy initiative, Cyber Korea 21 (CK21), implemented during 
1999–2002, the third policy initiative, e-Korea Vision 2006 (e-KV06), implemented 
during 2002–2006, and Broadband IT Korea Vision 2007 (BK07), the most recent 
version of the government’s policy initiative which is implemented during the period of 
2003–07.  
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Figure 3.1. Overview of the research design 
 
 
* e-Chaebols: Korean conglomerates, such as Samsung, LG, KT, and SK, incumbents in new IT sector, as 
well as in the traditional manufacturing sector. 
 
 
Based on the previous literature review of globalization, dense state–business 
linkages, and social control through space, the study offers a model of the forces that 
influenced the implementation of the KII project from 1995 to 2005. Figure 3.1 
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graphically represents the factors that were analyzed in order to answer the overarching 
question of the study which investigates the major driving forces in the KII project.  
The diagram depicts the following structural conditions: 
First, as background to the investigation of the driving forces conditioning the KII 
project, Chapter 4 surveys the history of state-led infrastructural plans in modern Korea 
and situates the KII project within past governments’ infrastructure projects such as 
highway, railway, and communication networks. This chapter aims to observe how, in the 
dynamics of capital accumulation, the private sector needs constant spatial 
reconfiguration through the building of infrastructures; thus, the past state-led 
infrastructural plans are historically closely linked to the birth of the KII project. This 
historical overview is created using policy documents, statistical data on the IT indicators 
about Korea published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and the World Bank, and data on telecommunication from the Korean Ministry 
of Information and Communication (MIC) and the National Computerization Agency 
(NCA — renamed the National Information Society Agency [NIA] since 2007).  
Second, point A in the diagram shows the influence of the new material 
conditions of network-based global capitalism and the external constraints it imposes on 
the Korean policymaking processes related to the KII project — Chapter 5 discussed the 
first research question. This study defines a constraint as an external force that influences 
the Korean government’s policy action. These external constraints include political 
pressures, trade penalties, bilateral/multilateral trade agreements, indirect economic 
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pressure exerted by the international trade organizations, legal precedents, and lobbyists’ 
activities, which largely reflect the unequal power relations among nations.  
 
• In the KII project, external constraints include the global pressure for the openness of 
the telecom market that is exerted through the international trade organizations, which 
largely represent foreign investors, foreign telecom service providers, and patent 
owners. These are investigated using data about the 1997 World Trade Organization 
Agreement on Telecommunications and its influences on the Korean telecom market 
since the early 1990s.  
• This study aims at reading the dominant pattern of capitalism in the early 1990s as an 
attempt to transform each country’s economic structure into a digital mode of 
production. Another external constraint on the Korean project is the flurry of early 
1990s’ information superhighway policy experiments in advanced countries such as 
the US, Japan, and the EU, which the Korean government used as benchmarks for its 
own project. How these policy experiments in other countries figured into Korea’s 
planning was investigated using from each government’s official policy reports 
describing these projects and Korean documents referring to them.  
• To observe how external constraints influenced Korea’s domestic policymaking, this 
study examines the government’s policy response to both global pressure to open the 
telecom market and to the international trend of constructing the KII. The inner 
response of the Korean government can be investigated using data about the Korean 
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government’s policy plan implementing the KII project, which can be found in a 
series of white papers published by the MIC and the NIA.  
• This chapter also investigates government-sponsored R&D investment in and support 
for strategic telecom technologies such as the asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) 
switching system. This study aims to examine how the Korean government failed to 
escape from the market dominance by the transnational telecom manufacturers. This 
chapter uses white papers published by the NIA describing the development of ATM 
technology and interviews with informants who developed or closely were related to 
the national strategic equipment and networking technology.  
 
Third, C represents how the state has constructed a new relationship with the 
Chaebols through the KII project, far from the authoritarian and interventionist state in 
the past military regimes directing over the Chaebols — Chapter 6 investigates the 
second research question. In other words, C shows how the state, the rapidly growing 
telecom duopolies, and the Chaebols in Korea have become deeply interpenetrated, by 
means of state financial support, the organizational collaboration between these entities, 
and a hegemonic consensus.16 This study limits the observed scope of the linkages to the 
government-led investment in the private sector and the organizational network of 
collaboration. The denser the network of state–Chaebol alliances or linkages becomes, 
the more citizens are excluded from policy decision-making processes. To examine both 
                                                 
16 The collaborative links between the state and capital in Korea are well summarized in Weiss (1998: 57), 
Weiss and Hobson (1995: 170), and Evans (1995). 
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the dense state–Chaebol linkages under the civilian governments, this study focuses on 
the following indicators:  
 
• The inner structures of the policy consultation bodies created for the information 
superhighway project will be investigated to reveal the pattern of linkages among 
industry representatives and public officials and to examine the efficiency of their 
dense linkages. This chapter uses data from in-depth interviews with sixteen 
informants (see Chapter 3.4, discussing sampling selection) from the MIC, the NIA, 
and the telecom companies of Korea Telecom (KT) and Dacom, and using official 
documents on the KII project published by the MIC and the NCA that contain 
organizational charts and describe the major stakeholders’ relationships and the 
changes in their policy network based on the shifts in specific policy goals. This 
chapter also uses the official documents about the four policy initiatives (the BPIP, 
CK21, eKV06, and BK07) in order to investigate the policy rhetoric. 
 
Third, B includes the infrastructural desire of government elites to control the 
citizens through spatial rezoning such as through the use of a dispersed digital network —
Chapter 7 discussed the third research question. Along with the ever-expanding state 
intervention in the economy, the state’s desire for control is closely related to a shift of 
the state power from coercive discipline to a digital grid of control at the institutional 
level. This study defines social control as control of individual citizens by government on 
behalf of society as a whole. As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, the use of this term 
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will be limited to the context of the government’s control of information on individual 
citizens based on digital technology and electronic networks, rather than the context of 
physical force. B-1 represents how the nationwide electronic network has embedded in it 
the positive techniques of institutional power. Since the launching of the KII project in 
1995, there have been a series of controversial laws and policy initiatives enacted which 
have enabled government elites to perform electronic network-based censoring or control 
of citizens. To examine the institutional desire for control through spatialization, this 
study focuses on the following indicators:  
 
• For reading the new techniques of social control based on the electronic 
infrastructure, this study examines the policy conversation about the nationwide 
introduction of the National Education Information System (NEIS) of 2003. The 
NEIS is a nationwide database system aimed at managing more than 200 pieces of 
personal information about each of the eight million students in the primary and 
secondary schools through a central server computer operated by the Ministry of 
Education and Human Resources (MEHR). This policy initiative could not have been 
conceived without the material existence of the KII. This chapter investigates the 
confrontation over the NEIS between the proponents (the government and the 
MEHR) and the anti-NEIS groups (parents, teachers, and the civil rights groups), by 
using the Korean newspaper digital archive service operated by the Korean Integrated 
News Database System of the Korea Press Foundation.  
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• The study also investigates the government’s attempts at social control by examining 
the privacy-sensitive provisions of such legislation as the Framework Act for the 
Establishment of Public Order in Telecommunications of 2001 and the Act for the 
Promotion of Information and Telecommunication Network Use of 2005, which 
created the Enforced Real-Name System for the purpose of forcing citizens to use 
their real names and resident ID numbers whenever posting messages on the Internet.  
• The study supplements the investigation of the NEIS and other relevant laws with 
archival data from press conference reports, documents on public hearings, written 
reports of events, and policy analysis reports, all of which have been published by the 
JinboNet and the Citizens’ Action Network, organizations defending citizens’ cyber-
rights in Korea.  
 
As suggested in the research design, the following sections describe the detailed 
data collection procedures needed to successfully investigate these factors. 
 
3.2. SETTING 
The site for this study is South Korea, a prototype of the East Asian 
developmental state model. South Korea is transforming itself into the first tier of next-
generation IT businesses. For instance, the number of mobile phone users in Korea is 
rapidly growing — as of June 2007, there were over 42 million registered users in Korea, 
a population of 48 million — and the high-speed data communications of mobile phones 
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and the Internet utilize seamless multimedia services throughout the country. South 
Korea is an optimal site to critically read the new “challenge of Asian IT activity” (Boyd-
Barrett, 2006).  
Seoul, the biggest metropolitan area in Korea, is the seat of public institutions 
directly related to the national IT project such as the MIC and the NIA, as well as the 
headquarters of the telecom companies such as KT and Dacom. The researcher has 
chosen these public and private institutions as the site for gathering documents and 
conducting informant interviews. Seoul is a knowledge-intensive city where the 
researcher has easy access to the relevant data.  
This study investigates Korea’s nationwide high-speed backbone network plan 
over a decade-long period divided into three evolving phases, based on the shifting of 
specific policy goals:  
 
1)  The first phase (1995–1997) aimed at improving network connectivity among 
public institutions: the government upgraded the intelligence and police network 
lines to interconnect 4,000 public institutions with the optical network. 
• Interconnected some metropolitan cities with the optical broadband network 
(with the transmission capacities of 155Mbps to 2.5Gbps).  
• Launched the Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) switching system. 
• Established the Korea Public Sector Network for the Internet (PUBNet-I).  
2)  The second phase (1998–2000) aimed at creating a business model from the KII 
network:  
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• Established the nationwide service of ATM network. 
• Installed the nationwide optical infrastructure network (155Mbps to 5Gbps). 
• Established the ATM-based Internet network (PUBNet-II). 
 
3)  The third phase (2001–2005) was an expansion of the second phase. 
• Upgraded the nationwide service of ATM Network from 622Mbps to 40Gbps.  
• Introduced MPLS networking technology into the ATM exchange network.  
 
3.3. DOCUMENTATION AND ARCHIVAL RECORDS 
This study gathered the primary data from the documents and archival records. 
Documents play an explicit role in the data collection in doing this case study (Yin, 2003: 
87). This study collected the documentary information — such as agendas, 
announcements, and other written reports of events, closely related to the special 
committee’s activities for the KII project. Secondly, government reports and white papers 
— such as Past and Present of Korea’s High-speed Backbone Network and Past and 
present of Korea’s IT policy (MIC & NIA, from 206 and 2005 in Korean), 
Informatization White Papers (NCA, from 2002 to 2007 in Korean), and White Paper 
Internet Korea (NCA, 2005) — were used as the guidebook for understanding the general 
vision and effect of the KII project and the Korean government’s push to transform the 
industrial structure into the new economy. Thirdly, the secondary documents from the 
news agencies — such as newspaper clippings and other articles appearing in the mass 
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media, and online administrative resource pages — was beneficial to understand the dark 
side of the IT development (specifically, the analysis of the NEIS case) in society at that 
time.  
This study also used archival records — such as organizational records 
(organization charts and budgets over eleven-year project) and survey data (such as 
census records or data showing the quantitative IT index), in order to describe the 
longitudinal trends in the policymaking process closely related to installing the KII.  
The researcher gathered the copies of documents and records from the Library of 
the National Parliament and of internal government reports on policies from public 
institutional archives.  
 
3.4. INTERVIEWS: ACCESS AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
In order to explore stakeholders’ different points of view and interests related to 
the backbone network construction project, the researcher performed in-depth informant 
interviews with key actors from the regulatory bodies and the telecom business who were 
involved in the KII project. The researcher obtained permission for in-depth informant 
interviews with officials of two government agencies, the MIC and the NCA, and 
executives from KT and Dacom in May 2007. The interviews were conducted in Seoul 
during the period from May to June, 2007. After these interviews, informants were 
contacted by e-mail and by telephone during the period from August to December 2007 
for any follow-up questions that arose.  
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The primary sample of four informants was drawn from those directly involved in 
the KII project, and, by using snowballing sampling, I asked the primary informants to 
refer me to other officials whom I could interview. In order to make sure that my contacts 
are not limited to the members of a single social network, I chose “starter” informants 
with multiple starting points (Baxter & Babbie, 2004: 313). Sampling of interviewees 
includes the following:  
 
• Three past and present government officials from the MIC;  
• Six representatives from the NIA;  
• Five executives from the telecom industry (KT and Dacom);  
• One executive from the Electronics and Telecommunications Research 
Institute (ETRI) who developed the national equipment and networking 
technology (especially, the ATM Switching System); and 
• One activist from Cultural Action the online civil rights movement group. 
  
These different informants offer a variety of insights due to their unique 
perspectives on various aspects of the decision-making processes (Lindlof, 1995: 171). 
Focusing on these significant informants helps to investigate the concrete components of 
the object under investigation (Pauly, 1991). The four informants primarily selected for 
this study and other 12 informants who are nominated through referral were the actors 
involved in the process of the KII project and were therefore sufficient to support the 
findings.  
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The in-depth interviews are intended mainly to explore the unique perspective of 
each informant on the nationwide information superhighway project under the material 
conditions of networked mobility. The researcher employed a semi-structured 
interviewing technique by combining an open-ended informal questionnaire (see 
appendix page) with a fairly open format of conversation, in order to sketch the dynamic 
processes of conflict and alliance among actors involved in this decade-long project.  
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Chapter IV: From a Physical Infrastructure to a Virtual Infrastructure 
in Modern Korea 
 
[s]peed in transport and communication has practical political and economic uses: 
it not merely confirms the authority of the ruling elite but make it possible for 
them to exert more effective control over distant territories, tributaries, and 
markets. From the eighteenth century on, power and speed became the chief 
criteria of technological progress, along with quantitative productivity. […] [t]he 
power complex today is preoccupied only with acceleration; and cannot concede 
that it may be necessary, for the preservation of life, to reduce the tempo, to alter 
the direction, or to bring a profit-making but dangerous process to a halt. 
(Mumford, 1970: graphic section I-4)  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This chapter traces the historical and geographical processes of installing the physical and 
IT infrastructures throughout the country from the colonialist era (1910–45) through the 
post-Korean War period (1953–62) and the military dictatorships (1963–92) to the 
civilian governments (1993–present). This chapter aims to situate the KII project not only 
within the succession of past administrations’ infrastructure plans, but also within the 
response of Korean government and business to the new digital mode of capitalism.  
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4.1. GEOGRAPHICAL RECONFIGURATION AND NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE  
As the background for investigating the major driving forces that conditioned the 
birth of the Korean Information Infrastructure (KII) project in the early 90s, this chapter 
describes South Korea’s historical and geographical processes of installing physical and 
IT infrastructures throughout the country from the colonialist era (1910–45) through the 
post-Korean War period (1953–62) and the military dictatorships (1963–92) to the 
civilian governments (1993–present). The addition in spatial mobility from the 
configuration of the physical infrastructure (such as power lines, railroads, highways, and 
telephone lines) to that of the virtual infrastructure (such as electronic optical backbone 
networks and mobile telephony antennas) from the early 1990s onward represents a new 
stage of economic mechanisms in Korea. This chapter focuses on how in each era the 
government’s plans to install a national infrastructure have been closely tied to its 
economic goals: 1) The Japanese colonial government mobilized Koreans to build the 
physical infrastructure across the peninsula in order to reach the enormous Chinese 
market during the early 20th century; 2) the military regimes renovated the national 
physical infrastructure in order to subsidize the domestic heavy and chemical industries 
under the banner of industrial modernization; and 3) the civilian governments sought to 
construct the national IT infrastructure (KII) in order to foster new actors of the digital 
age and enlist Korea as an Asian hub of global capitalism. This chapter notes that, to 
Korea, the spatial re-zoning based on virtual geographies was a driving force both to 
promote an information economy and to achieve a “functional” position as one nodal 
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point in the global networks. The state chose the development of a virtual infrastructure 
(KII) as the strategic plan for survival in the digital mode of global capitalism.  
 
4.1.1. Overview of South Korea 
A brief overview of South Korea will be useful before discussing the historical 
development of the national infrastructure in South Korea. The Republic of Korea 
(commonly known as South Korea) is on a peninsula that lies between China to the west, 
Japan to the east, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the north (also 
known as North Korea). North Korea is a nation of 23.5 million people in a mostly 
mountainous area, with a land mass of 120,420 sq. kilometers, or 74,826 sq. miles (CIA, 
2008). North Korea shares a border on the north with China and, for a few miles on the 
northeast, with Russia (Jeong, 2004). South Korea’s only land border is with North 
Korea, along the 38th parallel. On the left, Figure 4.1 left shows the geographical position 
of South Korea, while on the right it shows a detailed map of South Korea including 
major cities such as Incheon (or Inch’ón, the population of 2.6 million), Busan (or Pusan, 
3.5 million), and Gwangju (or Kwangju, 1.4 million).  
In 2007, South Korea’s population was 48.46 million with a land mass of 99,678 
sq. kilometers, or 61,937 sq. miles. The capital city, Seoul, is the biggest metropolitan 
city having a population of 10.1 million. Out of the total South Korean population, the 
economically active population is 24.2 million, the gross domestic product (GDP) was 
$969.9 billion, and the per capita gross national income (GNI) was $20,045, as of 2007 
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(according to Korea.net, the official website of the Republic of Korea). The Korean 
economy relies on the export of industrial products such as semiconductors, automobiles, 
ships, consumer electronics, mobile telecommunication equipment, steel, and chemicals. 
Politically, South Korea is a republic which elects a president to a single 5-year term by 
direct popular vote. Since the launch of a republican system of government in 1948, 
South Korea has benchmarked the Anglo-Saxon political traditions emphasizing the 
balance and division of powers among the executive, the legislature (the unicameral 
National Assembly), and the judiciary.  
 
Figure 4.1. Location of Korean peninsula (left), South Korean map (right) 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2001) and The World Factbook, the US Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA, 2008, July 24), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html  
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Historically, an independent Korean state or collection of states has existed almost 
continuously for several millennia. From its initial unification under the Silla dynasty in 
676 CE through the Goryeo (918–1392) and Chosun dynasties (1392–1910), Korea 
existed as a single independent country.  
The next section surveys the development of the national infrastructure from the 
late-19th century when the Korean state confronted the Western nations’ technology and 
“civilized” power.  
 
4.1.2. Geographical rescaling under the Japanese colonial rule  
In Korea, the development of communication in the modern sense can be traced 
back to the end of 19th century. At that time, the issue was centered on the ideal of 
Dongdoseogi,17 which was directed at maintaining East Asian values while adopting 
Western technology. Embracing Western technology, especially a communication 
infrastructure, was considered to be a path to modernization. In an endeavor to escape the 
pre-modern age of the Chosun Dynasty, on November 18, 1884, young reform-oriented 
politicians launched the Woo Jung Chong Guk (the Directorate General of Postal Service) 
for the first time, and released the first Korean stamp, the so-called Moon-wi, which was 
used for mail delivered between Seoul and Incheon. This postal service, however, 
                                                 
17 At the end of the 19th century, East Asia responded to the inflow of Western power equipped with 
modern science and technology with the philosophy of Dondosoegi (東道西器, a Korean version of a 
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survived for only three weeks, because the reformists’ coup d’état (the Gap Sin Jung 
Byun) on December 8 of the same year failed to unseat the royal family (Korea Post, 
2006). Nevertheless, the royal family could not stem the advancing tide of Western 
technology. In 1885, the Chosun dynasty established a central telegraph office and began 
the first telegraph service in Korea between Seoul and Incheon. The telegraph service 
was extended to link Seoul to Eujoo (a Korean city bordering Manchuria) and then to 
Busan (currently the second largest city and the biggest port city of South Korea) with the 
technical assistance of American and British engineers, respectively. In the same year, 
railroad service linking Seoul and Incheon was also launched, and in 1896 intra-city and 
intercity telephone service began18 (Kim, 2002; IEEE Region 10, 2006).    
Despite the Chosun Dynasty’s pragmatism in voluntarily importing Western 
technology, following the Dongdoseogi philosophy, after the outbreak of the Russo-
Japanese War in 1905, Japanese troops seized Korean telegraph and telephone networks 
by occupying Korea’s central telegram office. With the Japan-Korea annexation treaty in 
1910, Korea entered into the period of Japanese forcible occupation (1910–1945), and 
between 1910 and 1919 the Japanese colonial government expanded the existing 
telecommunication networks to nearly the entire peninsula; it also created its own 
telegram bureau as well as the Chosun Postal Shipping Co., which monopolized the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Chinese term). This ideology, popular among the intellectuals, held that East Asians should embrace 
Western technology but temper it with East Asia’s superior spirituality (Oh, 2004). 
18 According to the IEEE Region 10 report (2006), the first telecommunication in Korea was recorded as 
being on March 20 of 1902, but Kim (2002) refutes the date with the archival evidence of the Baekbum 
Diary (1947), a well-known manuscript written by Goo Kim, who was first Minister of State while the 
Korean government was in exile in Shanghai during the period of Japanese imperial rule. The diary states 
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wartime postal service between the Japanese mainland and colonial territories (KADO, 
2007). In 1927, the colonial government launched a national radio broadcasting station in 
Korea to justify their imperialist warfare in Asia under the aegis of a “Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere,” a slogan suggesting that Japan would lead a geographical bloc of 
Asian nations set free from Western powers (Yang, 2006).  
The Japanese colonial government made substantial investment in the 
construction of Korean infrastructure, with more than 67% of total government 
expenditure from 1911 to 1938 going to transportation and communication sectors such 
as roads, railways, and the postal system (Kim, 2006). The colonial government 
mobilized Koreans to build a national road and railway network across the Korean 
peninsula, but rather than connecting Korean cities based on regional needs, it 
reconfigured the national geographies according Japan’s imperialist desire: S. Minobe, 
one of the Japanese imperialists who governed the Bank of Chosun, describes vividly the 
role of railways in creating the market value for colonialism, and of the Korean peninsula 
as a gateway to further riches: 
 
Its easy access to the most promising markets in the world, China, Manchuria, and 
Siberia, is in itself a great economic asset. A railway line now connects this once 
“Hermit Kingdom” [Korea] with the heart of Europe, passing through the whole 
of northern Asia, the economic possibility of which no one can fathom, while by 
another line the peninsula is connected with China and its numerous cities 
offering immense tradal [sic] prospects. (Bank of Chosen [sic], 1920: 5) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
that on August 26, 1896, the telephone line linking Seoul and Incheon was used by the last emperor of the 
Chosun Dynasty. The KADO report (2007) agrees with Kim as to the date. 
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To fulfill this function, the Japanese colonialist government constructed a military 
infrastructure crossing the peninsula vertically by focusing on the South-to-North axis 
(from Busan–Seoul–Pyongyang–Shinhwju onward to Manchuria and China) in order to 
transport munitions, soldiers, commodities, and natural resources.  
Korea regained its independence following Japan’s surrender in 1945. After 
World War II, a Republic of Korea was set up in the southern half of the Korean 
Peninsula while a Communist government was installed in the north (the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea [DPRK]). The first elections in Korea were carried out on 
May 10, 1948, in the areas south of the 38th parallel and Syngman Rhee was elected as 
the first President of the Republic of Korea. Meanwhile, north of the 38th parallel, a 
communist regime was set up under the leadership of Il-sung Kim (CIA, 2008, July 24). 
During the Korean War (1950-53), US and UN forces fought alongside South Korean 
soldiers to defend South Korea from DPRK attacks supported by China and the Soviet 
Union. After massive casualties on both sides, an armistice was signed in 1953, dividing 
the peninsula along a demilitarized zone at about the 38th parallel.  
The Korean War destroyed almost two-thirds of the nation’s productive capacity. 
Throughout the 1950s and the early 1960s, a massive inflow of foreign aid, mainly from 
the US and the UN, was a significant source for sustaining the postwar national economy 
and reconstructing national infrastructures such as energy facilities (19% of US aid and 
development loans went to this sector of the economy), manufacturing (26%), 
telecommunications (3%), and transportation (28%) (Mason, et al., 1980). Despite a 
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reconstruction program massively funded by foreign aid,19 Korea’s economy and major 
information and transportation infrastructures were still devastated and in chaos. 
Furthermore, the split of the Korean peninsula into two countries completely bisected the 
national backbone infrastructures that had previously allowed flows of transportation and 
communication to cross the entire peninsula. 
 
In sum, the Japanese colonialists forcibly reshaped the peninsula as a base for 
imperialist troops — through the expropriation of land for military use, the seizure of 
Korea’s transportation and communications facilities, and the exploitation of concessions 
in agriculture, forestry, mining, and fisheries (National Assembly, 2006). Although the 
peninsula was liberated from the Japanese occupation in 1945, shortly thereafter the 
Korean War substantially damaged the nation’s transport and communication facilities 
such as railroads, highways, and ports and harbors. With the help of foreign aid, up until 
the early 1960s the reconstruction of the infrastructure proceeded, but very slowly. 
 
4.1.3. Physical infrastructure as the means of industrial modernization  
From the time of General Cheong-hee Park’s coup d’état, which precipitated more 
than three decades of military rule,20 the major concerns of the ruling regimes were 
                                                 
19 During 1953–1960, financial assistance amounted to US $120 million provided by the UN Korea 
Reconstruction Agency and about US $1.7 billion provided by the US government (Kim & Roemer, 1979).  
20 Park was a Japanese-trained major general when, on May 16, 1961, he overthrew the administration of 
President Po Sun Yun and Prime Minister Chang Myon (the cabinet system having been introduced for the 
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economic independence from foreign debt and a total disciplinary control of society; this 
has been described as “developmental dictatorship,” focused on the dual aims of 
economic development and political control. The Park administration (1963–79), the first 
in a line of military dictatorships, was ambitious to escape Korea’s third world status and 
to promote industrial modernization, especially by constructing transportation and 
information infrastructures across the nation.  
The Park regime built the major backbone transportation infrastructure — the 
national highway and railway system — to promote his export-oriented industrialization 
policy: several major backbone highway and railway lines were built, such as the 24-
kilometer (15-mile) Kyong-In expressway linking Seoul and the satellite city of Incheon 
in 1968, the 425.5-kilometer (264-mile) Kyong-Bu highway line between Seoul and 
Busan in 1970,21 and the railway line transporting commuters from Seoul and Incheon in 
1971. Overall, in 1966 the total length of roads in Korea was 28,144 km (17,488 miles) 
with a 5% concrete pavement rate, while in 1971 total road length was 40,635 km 
(25,249 miles) with a concrete pavement rate of 14.2% (Kim, 2005). The transport 
infrastructures were closely tied to the regime’s project of economic modernization, to 
facilitate speedy flows of transporting goods and services and to maximize workers’ 
mobility between Seoul and its satellite cities.   
                                                                                                                                                 
first and last time in Korean history during the years 1960–62) and seized power, although Park did not 
formally assume the presidency until 1963 (Kristof, 1995, November 24).  
21 The Kyong-Bu Highway was a riskier enterprise, at least from the perspective of the late 1960s. This 
project to connect the capital, Seoul (on the northwest coast), with Busan (in the southeast), was an attempt 
to drive economic activity rather than a response to demand. Moreover, the project encouraged the 
involvement of Chaebols in the construction industry (Mody, 1997).  
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In Korea, the earliest computerization policy was directed primarily at gathering 
and storing information about citizens so it would be immediately available both to the 
national and the local authorities (see Chapter 7.3, discussing the combinative effect of 
the national ID system, which already existed for identifying each Korean, and the 
resident computer databases, which enabled to centralize all the information, potential for 
abuse); mandated by Park’s order of administrative computerization in January of 1975, 
this computer database system facilitated the government’s control by sorting out the 
residents’ profiles at the national level (NCA, 2005a). The purpose of the Basic Plan for 
Administrative Computerization, which the government implemented between 1978 and 
1987,22 was to introduce personal computers into each governmental agency and to 
transform public and residential archival documents into electronic databases (MOGA, 
1979). The Park regime used the computer system as no more than a technical tool to 
supplement the bureaucratic control of the citizens’ data. The computer system enabled to 
accumulate 140 different pieces of personal profiling information — which include 
detailed personal data such as permanent and current address, military record, criminal 
records, political activities, photographs, family relations, and all ten fingerprints (see 
Chapter 7.3). 
It was in the 1980s that the following military regime, that of Doo-hwan Chun, 
first conceived of information and technology as a new tool of bureaucratic efficiencies 
                                                 
22 The Basic Plan for Administrative Computerization was created in 1978 and revised in 1979 by the 
Ministry of Government Administration (MOGA), for the purpose of introducing computer hardware and 
the electric database of public documents in government agencies. In February of 1998, as a result of the 
merger with the Ministry of Home Affairs, MOGA became the Ministry of Government Administration 
and Home Affairs (MOGAHA). 
 76 
that could rationalize the organizational structures of the public sector through the use of 
a backbone network. To implement the National Basic Information System (NBIS), a 
national computerization project, the regime passed the Act on Promotion of Computer 
Network Expansion and Usage23 in 1986. Then, in January of 1989, the NBIS Steering 
Committee — the inter-ministry agency to resolve potentially controversial issues 
affecting several governmental departments — designed the Basic Plan for the NBIS 
(No. 93100-452). The government planned to construct five major information networks: 
the National Administrative Information System, the Financial Information System, the 
Education and Research Information System, the National Defense Information System, 
and the National Security Information System. The Chun regime desired not only to 
upgrade the administrative systems through the NBIS but also to promote an electronic 
network as a national infrastructure to enhance economic efficiencies, especially, the 
financial flows. Nevertheless, the first state-led investment plan for building the 
electronic network system failed to reach its goals for reasons such as a decrease of 
government funding in the final phase of the NBIS, a failure to boost IT demand from 
private sector, and the lack of a nationwide broadband backbone network.  
The NBIS project prompted a rapid increase in computer use and in inter-ministry 
electronic networks going beyond telegraph and telephone service. Despite its stated 
goals of using IT development to increase bureaucratic efficiencies, in the early 1990s, 
                                                 
23 In Korea, the legislation governing the communication services until the early 1980s was the 
Telecommunications Act of 1961. In 1983, to separate the two functions of policy formulation and business 
operations, the Act was divided into the Telecommunications Basic Act and the Telecommunications 
Business Act. In 1986, the two Acts were integrated into the Act on Promotion of Computer Network 
Expansion and Usage, in order to facilitate the NBIS project (Jeong & King, 1996). 
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the government contributed a very small amount of investment to the IT sector, only 
3.8% of the total GDP. The overall IT index of Korea at that time was also far behind that 
of the advanced countries, and even behind that of Taiwan and Singapore (MIC, 2005). 
 
To sum up, the Japanese colonialists considered the Korean peninsula to be the 
base camp from which to launch their thrust into Manchuria and China. The postwar 
governments were desperate to rebuild destroyed facilities with the help of foreign aid 
and grants. The military regimes strove to modernize the national economy through 
constructing a nationwide transport infrastructure, thus saving on the costs of transporting 
goods and services and increasing the mobility of the labor population. In their turn, the 
civilian governments have built the nationwide electronic backbone networks as an 
engine of economic efficiencies and growth in the digital mode of capitalism. Through 
the state’s strong interventionist and export-oriented policies based on the labor-intensive 
industries, the Korean “economic miracle” was accomplished during the 1970s and 
1980s. During this period, the driving force behind the state-led development of physical 
infrastructure was the military elites’ desire to improve transportation and communication 
efficiencies in order to catch up the advanced economies. Further, the NBIS was the first 
policy plan under a military regime in which the electronic network was designed to 
enable economic efficiencies as well as bureaucratic ones, although failed to achieve 
either of those goal. Since the civilian governments (1993–present) took power, their 
focus has been actively directed at establishing a virtual infrastructure as the material 
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basis for the economic growth that would permit faster flows of capital and information 
at the national level. 
 
4.2. THE BIRTH OF THE NATIONWIDE ELECTRONIC BACKBONE NETWORK 
The major concerns under the military regimes that ruled Korea from the 1960s to 
the early 1990s were based entirely on economic development policies promoting heavy 
and chemical industry and the construction industry. Using interventionist, government-
driven economic policies, the country was escaping the underdevelopment typical among 
the developing countries. Korea’s per capita gross national income (GNI) was less than 
US $100 from 1945 up to the early 1960s, but had increased to US $7,000 by 1991, when 
the sixth Five-Year EDP was completed, to US $11,400 by 1995, and to US $16,000 by 
2005 — the latter two being the years when the KII project was launched and completed, 
respectively.  
Figure 4.2 shows how two major economic forces — industrial modernization and 
digital economy, respectively — co-occurred with an increase in the national income 
during the first period from 1962 to 1991 and the second period between 1993 and 2005, 
even though the 1997 financial crisis put a downward spike in the sharp rise of the 
growth curve. Since the launching of the civilian government in the early 1990s, the 
Korean economy has been losing its privileged export status based on low-wage labor in 
textiles and heavy industry due to the emerging digital economy and the limited world 
market and more competition in low-tech products. 
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Figure 4.2. National income growth, 1945–2005 
 
 
Source: Kim (2007) 
 
Figure 4.3. Composition of Korea’s exports 
  
Note: (1) High-tech & ICT products include aircraft, spacecraft, computers, office products, 
semiconductors, electronic valves, radio, TV, communication equipment, and optical instrument; (2) 
medium-high technology covers electrical machinery, chemical products, motor vehicle, home appliance, 
and machinery equipment; (3) medium-low technology covers shipbuilding and repairing, coke and 
petroleum, rubber and plastic products, and basic and fabricated metal products; and (4) Low technology 
covers textile, apparel, footwear, food, beverages, tobacco, wood, and paper products. 
Source: data from OECD (2007: 49)  
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As shown in the Figure 4.3, up through the early 1990s, low and medium-low technology 
products accounted for 56% of Korea’s exports — However, by 2004 low and medium-
low technology products had shrunk to just over 26% of Korea’s exports while high-tech 
and ICT products accounted for more than 39%. The stagnation of the Korean export-
oriented economy based on heavy industry reflects the changing patterns of international 
trade, which evidence an increasing share of high- and medium-technology products 
(OECD–World Bank Institute, 2000).  
The World Trade Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization, and 
the information superhighway plans in the advanced countries all prompted Korean 
officials to rethink the economic growth plans. The KII as a state-led electronic 
infrastructure plan was an active response by the civilian government to the challenges of 
the new environment as it sought to expand Korea’s economic growth from the 
traditional factory systems cultivated during the military regimes into the new digital 
sphere. After Young-sam Kim took office as the first democratically-elected civilian 
president, the civilian government retained its desire to upgrade the transportation 
infrastructure: As the highway system built under the Park regime was no longer able to 
support the heavy traffic it spawned, the civilian government built a high-speed rail link 
between the two biggest metropolitan cities. Despite the financial crisis of 1997, the main 
drive for unrestrained economic growth was to mobilize the citizens towards high-speed 
physical mobility and connectivity throughout the country (e.g. Kim, 2006; Jin, 2005). 
For instance, with heavy involvement from France’s Train à Grande Vitesse (TGV), 
Alstom, and the French transportation engineering firm Systra, in 2004, Korail, the state-
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owned national railway monopoly, built a high-speed eXpress railway line from Seoul to 
Busan at a total cost of US $16.3 billion. Its transport speed of 300 kilometers (186 miles) 
per hour amounts to a speed more than one hundred times faster than that of the first 
railway in Korea.24 Connectivity was also important in terms of communication systems.  
Under the Kim administration, the Ministry of Communications (MoC) was asked 
to draw up an IT policy program for building a “New Korea” in 1993. The Korea 
Information Society Development Institute (KISDI), one of the government-funded IT-
related think tanks, released a policy report entitled “A New IT Policy Direction for the 
21st Century,” which suggested developing the IT sector as a survival strategy for the 
nation. This “new IT policy” supplied ideas later incorporated in the Korean Information 
Infrastructure (KII) project. The same year, the Kim administration issued its “Five-Year 
Plan for a New Economy” (No. 93100-380: MoC, 1993, July 2), a plan intended to 
integrate Korea into global capitalism. In this plan, the government officially designated 
IT as crucial to economic growth. To develop a national IT-intensive economy, the plan 
included government support for the asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) switching 
system to create local autonomy for the telecom equipment industry and provided a basic 
plan for the construction of a nationwide backbone network (MoC, 1993: 25–27). Based 
on this plan, the government roughed out the “Basic Plan for the KII” (No. 93100–452, 
1993, August 21), and the government finally announced the “Master Plan for the KII” 
(MoC, 1994, March), which was to be implemented in three phases. 
                                                 
24 See the following site describing South Korea’s high-speed railway: http://www.railway-
technology.com/projects/koreatgv/ 
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To emphasize its new role of directing IT policy at the national level, the Ministry 
of Communications (MoC) was renamed the Ministry of Information and 
Communication (MIC) in 1994, at which time it also absorbed the IT-related 
administrative functions of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy, the Ministry 
of Science and Technology, and the Korean Overseas Information Service. The master 
plan for the KII was legally supplemented with the 1995 “Framework Act on 
Informatization Promotion” (FAIP, Act No. 4969). The Korean government’s basic 
information policy was oriented toward setting up economic “efficiencies” in the national 
and global market (see Chapter III, Article 18–25 of the FAIP, entitled “Laying 
Foundation for Information and Communications Industry”). By encouraging the 
Chaebols to launch into the new IT sector, the FAIP was used to provide sources of profit 
for them to increase their market share with the formal support of the Korean 
government, 25  primarily through building the backbone of a national high-speed 
broadband network (see Chapter IV, Article 26–32 of the FAIP, entitled “Advanced 
Infrastructure of Information and Communications”).26 The FAIP thus meant that the 
government would directly intervene at the policy level in the nascent market of IT 
industries and encourage them to restructure themselves toward IT competitiveness in 
both the local and the global knowledge market. The ostensible purpose of the FAIP is to 
prescribe government support and investment for making public IT investment seen as 
necessary to the success of the KII plan. The Act was intended to provide a stable, secure 
                                                 
25 Chapter III, Article 18–25 of the FAIP, designate how to promote private investment through the 
support of the government’s various policy measures. 
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source of public funding from government investment and loans, the telecom 
incumbents’ financial contributions, dividends from shares of the state-owned Korean 
Telecom (KT), and the frequency allotment charges (see Chapter V, Article 33–35 of the 
FAIP, entitled “Public Funding of Informatization Promotion”).27 
 
4.2.1. The state-led development of the KII project 
The KII Planning Board was organized in August of 1994 to assign the main roles 
such as designing the master plan, gathering public funds, and implementing network-
related technology to each government agency. The Board consisted of six divisions, 
which included officials selected from the following: the MIC; the Ministry of Finance 
and Economy; the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy; the National 
Computerization Agency (now the National Information Society Agency) and the 
Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI);28 and the telecom 
companies Korean Telecom, Dacom, and Korean Mobile Telecom (now SK Telecom). 
                                                                                                                                                 
26 Chapter IV, Article 26–32 of the FAIP, for the first time suggests the concrete vision of the Korean 
Information Infrastructure.    
27 Chapter V, Article 33–35 of the FAIP, designates the method and sources of public funding. This aimed 
to ensure that the policy failures of the final phase of the National Basic Information System (NBIS) plan, a 
nationwide computerization project from 1991 to 1996, would not be repeated. Under the military regime 
the NBIS was the first state-led investment plan to integrate economic production and an electronic 
network, but it failed to reach its goal because of a decrease of government funding in the final phase and a 
failure to boost IT demand from private sector. 
28 Established in 1976, the ETRI is a non-profit, government-funded research organization that has been at 
the forefront of developing global technological standards. The ETRI has successfully developed 
information technologies such as TDX-Exchange, High Density Semiconductor Microchips, Mini-Super 
Computer (TiCOM), ATM switching technology, and Digital Mobile Telecommunication System 
(CDMA). 
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The Planning Board29 directed the main KII-related project from its inception until 1995, 
when its affairs were transferred into the Informatization and Planning Office30 at the 
MIC (NCA, 2005: 64). A bidding process among the private telecom vendors for the KII 
project never occurred; rather the Korean government granted exclusive rights in the 
construction of the KII-G backbone network to two facility-based telecom service 
providers: Korean Telecom (KT) was given a 70% share and Dacom a 30% share. 
 The KII project was subdivided into three separate networks: the KII-Government 
(KII-G), KII-Public (KII-P), and KII-Testbed (KII-T or KOREN — the Korea advanced 
Research Network). KII-G is a nationwide backbone network which interconnects more 
than 30,000 public administration and agencies and 10,000 schools using ATM switches, 
which had been developed in 1996 and began to be installed from 2001 onward, on high-
speed fiber optic cables (155Mbps–410Gbps) in 144 metropolitan and small cities 
nationwide (NCA, 2004: 27). KII-P, constructed by the private sector, is a home and 
business network for nationwide broadband access and high-volume data transmission 
(1.5–2Mbps) encompassing more than 1,400 localities. KII-T, also called KOREN, is a 
testbed network for the purpose of developing telecom devices and network facilities; 
KOREN also serves as a research network linking Korea with such Asian-Pacific 
networks as the Asian-Pacific Information Infrastructure and the Trans-Eurasia 
Information Network. A total of US $22.7 billion was invested to construct the KII 
                                                 
29 Chapter IV, Article 27 of the FAIP, entitled “Designation of Exclusive Institution,” requires to establish 
the board anew responsible for the KII tasks. 
30 The Informatization and Planning Office no longer exists; its functions were divided among several 
Divisions in the MIC.     
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network: The government invested US $6.2 billion in the major backbone networks (the 
KII-G), as public seed money to encourage the private sector’s active participation, and 
the private sector expended US $16.5 billion for the “last miles” of the network (this 
figure includes the private sector investment in the KII-P, the commercial network, as 
well as in the KII-G, up through 2005, the year of the KII’s completion).     
To avoid redundant investment in installing the KII, the government mandated 
that KT install the fiber-optic networks along the highways and Dacom along the 
railways (NCA, 2006: 63). The construction of the KII-G ensured that public agencies 
and educational institutions would subscribe to broadband service from the telecom 
service providers. Based on the stable rate of subscription from the KII-G, the private 
telecom sector was able to expand its broadband service into homes and businesses. By 
June 2003, the number of subscribers had reached 14 million households, and there was a 
nearly complete penetration level even in rural and suburban areas (NCA, 2003: 29–30). 
Both KII-P and KII-G broadband services promoted rapid private sector growth in IT 
production: for instance, IT-related revenue in 2004 was US $20.7 billion in e-commerce 
and US$ 78.7 billion in online securities trading (NCA, 2004), while total revenue in the 
infrastructure-related network industry was US $4.7 million (Monthly Report of Korea 
Association of Information and Telecommunication; KAIT, 2004, December).  
While the KII-G and the KII-P serve as governmental and commercial networks, 
respectively, the KII-T serves as the optimal high speed R&D and testbed network for 
research institutes and universities for the testing of new telecom network technologies 
and applications developed by research centers such as the ETRI. 
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Table 4.1. Korean Information Infrastructure (KII) project 
 KII-Testbed    →  KII-Government   →  KII-Public 
Role of each infrastructure Development & testing of technology  Application of technology Diffusion of technology 
Main user Research institutions Government Home and business 
Investor Government and private sector Government Private sector 
Main target Testbed Backbone Access 
Budget Gov’t and KT  Gov’t (reimbursement of budget from private sector) 
Management NCA (NIA) NCA (NIA) 
Proce-
dures 
Network builder KT KT (70%), Dacom (30%)  
Separately operated and 
implemented by 
telecom service 
providers 
Phase 1 (1995–1997) 2.5Gbps between Seoul and Taejon 
Built 80 call zones linking 
14,955 public institutions 
(45Mbps), US$ 157 
million publicly funded  
Fiber optic lines to high 
density buildings 
Phase 2 (1998-2000) 2.5Gbps connecting 5 metropolitan cities 
Connecting all 144 call 
zones including 28,686 
public institutions and 
schools with ATM 
switches (155Mbps), US$ 
238 million publicly 
funded 
30% of total household 
with ADSL and CATV 
Phase 3 (2001-2005) 40Gbps optical Net 
Linking 32,000 public 
institutions with ATM-
MPLS high quality IP 
service (1Gbps), US$ 338 
million publicly funded 
Over 20Mbps service to 
homes 
 
Source: compiled from NCA (2006), MIC (2004, December) 
 
To set the technological standards in the global market, the Korean government 
supported the ATM network switching technology implemented by the ETRI and applied 
it to the backbone networks from the second phase of the project onward. While the three 
KII network structures were separately operated by the stakeholders such as research 
institutions and universities, the government, and private sector, they become closely 
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linked to each other by the evolving processes of broadband technology from KII-T to 
KII-P by way of KII-G (see Table 4.1): the KII-T contributed to the “creation” of new 
telecom network technology, the KII-G served as the “application” of technology tested 
by the KII-T, and the KII-P promoted the “diffusion” of network technology to business 
and home. 
Unlike the other two infrastructures, the KII-G was developed in three phases, 
based on the shifting of specific policy goals. The first phase of building a backbone 
network (1995–1997) aimed at improving network connectivity among government 
agencies: the government first upgraded the intelligence and police network lines, which 
are part of the KII-G, and the optical networks interlinking these 4,000 agencies, and 
constructed the main backbone network connecting 80 call zones. Some metropolitan 
cities were interconnected to the optical broadband network with transmission capacities 
of 155Mbps to 2.5Gbps. In the second phase of backbone network completion (1998–
2000), the nationwide optical infrastructure network (155Mbps to 5Gbps) connecting 144 
call zones with ATM-based switching technology was established. The third phase 
(2001–2005) was an expansion or advancement of the second phase. As of September 
2005, 32,000 public institutions were able to access the nationwide broadband service, 
and the ATM switching network was upgraded from 622Mbps to 40Gbps (NCA, 2006: 
68-107). As shown in Figure 4.4, total broadband connection capacity in Korea has been 
improved to 51.3Gbps at the national level and 18Gbps at the international level, 
respectively. 
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Figure 4.4. Traffic capacity of the Korean broadband network 
 
 
Note: “International connection capacity” is defined as the data-processing bandwidth in the domestic 
online nodal points that are linked to the foreign countries’ network lines.    
Source: data from NCA (2006) 
 
 
In effect, the KII project became the material basis for creating the nation-wide 
interconnection of government agencies and public institutions through the optical 
networks. As an executive principal researcher of the National Information Society 
Agency (NIA) noted, the KII project, especially, the KII-G, has contributed to “saving 
the cost of data usage by the government agencies and enhancing the civil service 
through the Internet-based system” (Hur, 2007, May 28). The successful story of the KII 
was due to “the efficient management of public investment led by the government” (Kim, 
2007, June 26).   
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4.2.2. Evolution of the backbone networks after the KII project  
The government offered incentives to the telecom service providers at the beginning of 
the KII-G project by putting up the initial public funding and also by partly subsidizing 
the subscription costs of the broadband services to non-governmental and educational 
institutions. This government assistance made it possible for the two dominant telecom 
service providers, KT and Dacom, to lower the subscription price for network use, thus 
creating a rising number of subscribers from public, non-profit, and educational 
institutions until the end of the project in 2005. As a new administration — that of Moo-
hyun Noh (2003–2008) — took power and the KII project came to an end, the 
government began to focus on how to keep the service price low after the network’s 
completion. The government’s plan was to introduce two emerging facility-based 
telecom providers, Hanaro Telecom and SK Networks, into the public information 
infrastructure market.  
The government aimed to bring more market competition in price and service 
among the four providers and to take the initiative in negotiating subscription prices. 
Moreover, with the completion of the nationwide backbone network, the government 
began to shift its policy from the facility-based supply system to the service-based 
system, which it hoped would be improved by means of competition among service 
providers. As part of this shift in focus, in September 2005, the government divided the 
KII-G network into two network architectures: the e-Government Telecom Network 
(eGTN), which interconnects the 16,000 government agencies and local governments and 
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institutions, and the National Information Service (NIS),31 which provides the service to 
15,000 non-governmental and educational institutions. This allowed NIS service users to 
negotiate subscription prices through a group contract with the telecom service providers 
independently.32  
 The division of the KII-G network into the eGTN and the NIS was intended to 
secure and renovate the core of the eGTN as the governmental network. Separation of the 
governmental network from the NIS was reaffirmed by the establishment of the 
Government-wide Integrated Computing Center (GICC) in October of 2005. By utilizing 
the Computing Center, the MIC planned to share information resources, secure 
interoperability, and optimize the governmental network by efficient management and 
operation. The GICC is the most significant project among the Noh administration’s “31 
E-Government Roadmap Tasks”; it divides the information systems of the 48 government 
agencies into two separate computing centers: Center 1 is located in a government 
building in Daejeon which houses 24 government agencies including the MIC, the 
MOGAHA, and the Korea Customs Service. Center 2 is located in another building 
which houses another 24 government agencies, including the Ministry of Construction 
and Transportation, and the National Tax Service. The initiative to upgrade the e-
government telecommunication network is intended to establish a total IT infrastructure 
                                                 
31 The NIS program in Korea is quite similar to the Federal Technology Service (FTS), which is a division 
of the US General Services Administration (GSA). The FTS provides a digital fiber-optic network with 
voice, video, e-mail and high-speed data communications for the US government through a contract with 
the major telecom equipment providers such as AT&T, Sprint, and Worldcom which sets a standard fee for 
these services. 
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exclusively for government agencies.  
 The KII-P, the private sector network, has also been evolving: in 2004 it became 
the Broadband convergence Network (BcN), 33  which merges communication, 
broadcasting, and Internet, and will provide 50-100Mbps level broadband services to 20 
million wireless and fixed-line subscribers by 2010. To this end, the service providers, 
with the technical support of the KII-T, have developed a multistage plan for the BcN, 
and also created a BcN transmission network which ensures Quality of Service (QoS),34 
security, Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6),35 and open service, while upgrading the 
wireless and fixed-line subscriber network and allowing the use of seamless BcN service 
(NIA, 2007).  
 In sum, the 11-year state-led KII project has been evolved into the eGTN, the NIS, 
and the BcN, which have been instigated by creating competition within the private 
sector. In the process of building national information infrastructure, the government, 
especially the MIC, took a leading role in setting out a coherent and comprehensive 
communication policy plan. Under the increasingly laissez-faire wave of the national IT 
                                                                                                                                                 
32 The four facility-based telecom service providers, KT, Dacom, Hanaro Telecom, and SK Networks, 
jointly operate the eGTN system, and all of the service providers except KT are involved in the NIS system 
(December 2006, Public Infrastructure Division, NIA: unpublished paper).  
33 In January of 2004 the government passed the Act on Internet Address Resources in order to provide 
essential infrastructure for the implementation of the BcN, and to resolve the issue of insufficient Internet 
addresses. 
34 QoS refers to the ability to provide better service to certain flows. This works by either raising the 
priority of a flow or limiting the priority of another flow. QoS is important if network capacity is limited, 
especially for real-time streaming multimedia applications such as Frame Relay, ATM, Ethernet, 802.1 
networks, SONET, and IP-routed networks such as voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and IPTV. 
35 IPv6 is the “next generation” protocol designed by the Internet Engineering Task Force of the Internet 
Society (ISOC) to replace the current version of Internet Protocol, IPv4. Currently, there is a growing 
shortage of IPv4 addresses, which are needed by all new machines added to the Internet. IPv6 fixes a 
number of problems in IPv4, such as the limited number of available IPv4 addresses (NIA & MIC, 2006). 
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market, Korean society would hardly see the state-led “robust” IT policy plans such as 
the KII project, because the state no longer has the power to intervene in the market in the 
same way that it once did. A fact was signaled by the dissolution of the MIC early in 
2008 (Korea IT Times, 2008, April 8) and the distribution of its remaining functions 
among other agencies.36  
 Having surveyed the historical background of the KII project, the next chapter turns 
to an analysis of the global factors that conditioned the creation of the national backbone 
network. 
                                                 
36 Since the launch of the present Myung-bak Lee administration in March of 2008, the MIC’s major 
functions were absorbed into the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy, and finally shut down. 
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Chapter V: Locating Korea’s Telecommunications Policy within the 
Digital Mode of Global Capitalism  
  
 
ABSTRACT 
This chapter investigates the dynamics of the global–local nexus in South Korea’s 
information and telecom infrastructure development. The goal of the study is to examine 
the external factors that led South Korea’s government to design the Korean Information 
Infrastructure (KII) project. The present study focuses on the global–local dynamics of 
structural adjustment to global constraints (This study defines a constraint as an external 
force that influences the Korean government’s policy action) seen in the Korean 
government’s construction of the KII, which was designed and implemented during the 
period of the civilian governments (1993–present). In this study, structural adjustment in 
Korea is regarded not merely as an aspect of globalization, linking localities into global 
processes, but also as the active expression of local autonomy. Based on these research 
findings, theoretically, this chapter examines the strong trends of localization in the 
processes of economic globalization (global networked mobility), trends seen most 
clearly in the active role of the Korean state as an agent of local and global capital. As 
regards globalization theory, this chapter confirms a theoretical thesis that even the 
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denationalizing force at the global level also feeds the localizing mechanisms of the 
economic sphere in a nation, as well as socio-cultural spheres. Since the late 1980s, 
global constraints imposed on the Korean government had forced it to deploy new policy 
plans for domestic structural adjustment; these are explicit in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Agreement on Basic Telecommunications — which includes 
regulatory measures such as requirements of non-discrimination, regulatory transparency, 
and openness to international markets — and implicit in the information superhighway 
experiments of the US and Japan in the early 1990s. This chapter also explores the inner 
mechanisms of national sovereignty in terms of the government’s KII project, which 
functioned as a safety valve in order to minimize the external pressures in advance and to 
create new conditions for economic growth, with the consistent support of the private 
sector. The present study, therefore, examines the KII project as a unique state-led IT 
plan brought forth by a compromise between international pressure for market 
liberalization and domestic pressure for economic reforms.      
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5.1. INTRODUCTION  
During the 1970s and 1980s, South Korea was largely successful in transforming 
itself from one of the world’s poorest agrarian societies into a state of late-
industrialization. At the beginning of 1990s, once again, the Korean government was 
forced to decide whether to remain as a member of the second-tier countries under the 
digital mode of capitalism or find a way to make a leap forward. The government chose a 
shift of the nation from a labor-intensive economy to a “knowledge-based” economy and 
segyehwa (globalization), as the foremost goals of state affairs (e.g., President Young-
sam Kim’s New Year speech, Office of the President, 1995; President Dae-Jung Kim’s 
inaugural speech, 1998, 25 February; also see Chapter 5.3.2). 
To succeed in the second phase of “catching up” — the digital phase — the 
government noted how advanced countries such the US, Japan, and the EU achieved 
economic reconfiguration by means of high-speed telecommunication networks and 
benchmarked their changes based on the new economy (e.g., MoC, 1993, July 2; 1994, 
March). Moreover, increased international pressures for market openness in bilateral and 
multilateral negotiation settings such as those with the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
regulations and the International Monetary Foundation (IMF) — through its bailout 
program after the 1997 crisis — affected Korea’s telecom companies by forcing the 
country to open its markets, and eventually led the Korean government to deploy new 
policy plans of “structural adjustment.” The Korean Information Infrastructure (KII) plan 
was a result of these direct and indirect global pressures. The KII project was a strategy 
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to enable a nation-state to survive in the digital mode of global capitalism. The main goal 
was to interconnect the public agencies through a fiber-optic electronic network, and 
eventually to gear up IT productivity and efficiency in private sector through this 
network.37  
The present study accentuates the intertwining of global constraints and the 
Korean government’s restructuring of the national economy through the KII policy 
experiment, which has essentially created the nationwide backbone network of the 
government agencies and public institutions. To explore the dynamics of the global-local 
nexus in Korea, this study examines the influence of the new material conditions of 
network-based global capitalism and the national telecommunications reforms imposed 
by the WTO regulation. This chapter seeks to answer the following question: What 
international forces affected Korea’s information superhighway project of 1995 to 2005? 
Specifically, what external factors brought about the implementation of the nationwide 
information infrastructure project, and how did the project adapt to these factors?  
The present study sees the contextual factors surrounding the KII project through 
a localized prism. For instance, the WTO’s influence on the Korean telecom market since 
the early 90s, culminating in the 1997 WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications, is 
one of the external constraints that forced Korea to open its telecom market, and 
indirectly conditioned the state-led KII policy planning. This study details the dynamics 
of WTO regulations at the local level, such as influencing the government-driven R&D 
                                                 
37 For instance, time series analyses of US data over thirty years found a positive relation between 
investment in telecommunications infrastructure and economic growth (Cronin, et al., 1991).  
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plan to develop the asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) switching system for promoting 
the national telecom equipment industry. Further, this study also interprets the flurry of 
“wired” capitalism in the early 90s as seeking to transform the capitalist economy into 
network-based systems. The Korean government saw the geographical reconfiguration in 
advanced countries, such as information superhighway policy experiments in the US, 
Japan, and the EU, as benchmarks for its own IT project. This study regards the influence 
of global standards as the “hegemonic” effect of the advanced economies on post-
industrialization at the local level.   
This study posits these two globalizing patterns — externally-imposed regulation 
and external examples — within the localized reform programs of the Korean 
government, and then situates the state-led policy drive to undertake the KII project as 
part of the structural adjustment in the national telecom market. The local response to 
global pressures resulted in domesticating the global force in the local market. The study 
concludes that the KII project over eleven years was actively conducted on the basis of a 
model similar to that of the state-planned “catching up” of late-industrialization in the 
1980s, which is very different from the governmental model in the advanced countries, 
where the government’s role is largely that of an assistant of or mediator for the private 
sector. The irony, then, is that Korea’s state-led information infrastructure plan has been 
dramatically more successful than the private sector-led plans of more advanced nations 
such as the US and Japan (see Figure 5.1). 
As to the scope of the research, this chapter focuses largely on the state-driven 
policy plan for installing the backbone networks to facilitate administrative affairs, such 
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as the KII-Government (KII-G), rather than on the KII-Testbed (KII-T) and the KII-
Public (KII-P), which are separately operated and were developed by the government-
funded research institutes and by the private telecom sector, respectively. To understand 
the significance of the KII in the Korean economy, it is necessary to look at the current 
state of informatization in Korea and how it attained a status that exceeds that of most 
advanced nations in a brief period. 
5.2. A “NEWLY ADVANCED ECONOMY”? 
In the forefront of the global IT competition, the Korean government recognized 
the importance of information and telecom infrastructure as the conduit of capital, 
service, and information (e.g., Chapter 4 of the FAIP). It saw that extensive and high-
quality infrastructure reduces the effect of distance between regions, with the result of 
integrating the national market and connecting it to the global market (FAIP). Due to the 
active involvement of the government in building the IT infrastructure since the mid-
1990s, Korea’s economic efficiency in infrastructure is ranked 16th out of 131 countries 
on the basis of the global competitiveness index released by the World Economic Forum 
(2007). As shown in Table 5.1, Korea invested heavily in virtual infrastructure 
throughout the 1990s, an average investment of 0.8% of GDP in the first half of the 
decade that more than doubled to 1.85% in the second half. Korea’s investment rate in 
virtual infrastructure was almost double that of Hong Kong and more than five times that 
of Japan in the second half of the 90s. Another distinguishing feature of Korean 
investment is that a high percentage of funding came from the government in the form of 
 99 
public sponsorship. In many OECD countries, the public share in investment was zero in 
the late 1990s, while for Malaysia, Singapore, and the United Kingdom, the public share 
was 5% or less, whereas in Korea, 25%–48% of investment came from the public sector. 
 
Table 5.1. Korean investment in information infrastructure, 1991–1999 
 
 Investment/ GDP (%) Public Investment (% of total) 
 Average 1991–95 Average 1996–99 Average 1991–95 Average 1996–99 
Hong Kong 0.58 0.98 0 0 
Japan 0.14 0.34 0 0 
Korea 0.80 1.85 48 25 
Malaysia 1.12 1.04 6 5 
Singapore 0.35 0.57 38 4 
UK 0.23 0.35 2 2 
US 0.58 0.52 0 0 
 
Source: OECD-World Bank Institute (2000: 82) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. OECD broadband penetration and GDP per capita 
 
 
Note: Broadband networks include all DSL lines, cable modem lines, fiber-optic lines, and fixed wireless 
technologies such as satellite, MMDS, LMDS, WiMAX, and other fixed-wireless transport technologies.  
Source: data from OECD (2007, June) 
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Despite its relatively low rank in GDP per capita among the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, Korea was ranked fourth, 
with 30 broadband lines per 100 households as of June 2007, far ahead of the US and 
Japan (see Figure 5.1; in 2004 Korea was ranked number one). Further, according to the 
information and communication indicator index of the World Bank (2008, June), in 
which variables are normalized or rescaled onto an interval between 0 and 10 using the 
Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM), in the IT sector Korea comes very close to 
filling the “circle” within a spider chart reaching toward the maximum value of 10 which 
implies that it is better positioned in terms of the knowledge economy, comparable to the 
normalized values of the G7 countries and the average of the high-income countries.  
Figure 5.2. Information and communication indicator in Korea, 2005–06 
 
* Comparison group: 140 countries, type: weighted, and data: 2005–06  
* High-income countries: 39 countries, including South Korea, which earned more than US $11,116 in 
2006 Gross National Income (GNI) per capita 
Source: Author’s graphic based on data from the World Bank (2008) using the Knowledge Assessment 
Methodology (KAM). http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/kam 
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Among other indicators, the KII directly contributed to increasing values in the IT areas 
such as e-government services, Internet users and bandwidth, e-commerce, and Internet 
banking, as shown in the Figure 5.2 and Table 5.2. For instance, by reaching more than 
14 million broadband Internet household out of a total population of 45 million, the 
nationwide construction of the high-speed broadband network was physically 
completed.38  
 
Table 5.2. Current status of informatization in Korea 
 
Category 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 July 2007 
Broadband Internet subscriber 
(10,000 households) 1.4 37.4 401 781 1,041 1,118 1,192 1,219 1,404 1,444 
Internet user (10,000 persons) 310 1,080 1,904 2,438 2,627 2,922 3,158 3,301 3,412 3,443 
Internet usage rate (%) - - 44.7 56.6 59.4 65.5 70.2 72.8 74.8 75.5 
Mobile phone subscriber 
(10,000 persons) - 2,344 2,682 2,905 3,234 3,359 3,659 3,834 4,020 4,232 
Transaction 
volume 
(KRW trillion) 
- - 58 119 178 235 314 358 414 - 
e-Commerce 
Transaction rate 
(%) - - 4.5 9.1 12.8 15.1 19.3 19.8 21.2 - 
Internet Banking subscriber 
(10,000 persons) - - 409 1,131 1,771 2,275 2,427 2,674 3,591 4,011 
 
Source: NIA (2007) 
 
 
With the extension of fiber optic cables into individual houses, isolated areas, and small 
islands, the major bottleneck in completing broadband networks usually referred to as 
                                                 
38 The US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) defines broadband as an Internet connection 
capable of traffic capacity of 200Kbps, as of 2005; however, the FCC has recently redefined “basic 
broadband” as the range from 786Kbps to 1.5Mbps (C/net News.com, 2008, March 19). Otherwise, most 
Korean subscribers (84% of households) already have broadband service of 20Mbps (NCA, 2005: 75).   
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“the last mile” 39  was finally overcome. The high-standard index of information 
infrastructure is largely due to the Korean government’s leading role in guiding the IT 
development.40 
The KII-driven IT growth in Korea is favorably appraised by US journalism as 
one of the most successful government-led projects of modern times. For instance, The 
New York Times (Belson & Richtel, 2003, May 3) described Korean society as the 
realization of “America’s broadband dream,” Fortune (Lewis, 2004, September 20) even 
glorified South Korea as “leapfrogging the US to become the planet’s pacesetter in high-
speed Internet.” A scholars’ conference even formulated a new terminology describing 
Korea as moving from the status of a “newly industrialized economy” to that of “a newly 
advanced economy,” which employs growth strategies in a less exploitative and more 
market- and technology-driven manner that transcends the catching-up growth model 
(Mahlich & Pascha, 2007: 2). Thus the Korean government has succeeded in getting high 
praise from the outside world, and has persuaded those countries that pervasive 
broadband, actively subsidized by government, will increase industrial efficiency, create 
e-businesses and jobs, improve global competitiveness, and increase family incomes.  
                                                 
39 In contrast to “last mile” issues in building broadband networks, Strover (2000) suggests that from the 
subscriber’s perspective, “first mile” issues are of equal concern. Broadband connectivity, she argues, 
should have capabilities that extend users into the networked nation, rather than being merely a stretch of 
wire originating from vendor-related concerns. In Korea, the government’s approach to broadband has 
focused on both a “war of speed” (the expansion of traffic capacity) and “last mile” issues, rather than the 
“first mile” issues delineated by Strover. This is because speed and “last mile” issues can be easily 
quantified in order to exhibit, nationally and internationally, the success of the bandwidth increase and of 
overcoming the “digital divide” in providing access to the Internet.   
40 In contrast to the rapid expansion of broadband Internet in Korea, the US has suffered from high prices 
and underdeveloped technology in broadband network due to the monopolistic structure of the local 
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Academic scholars have also focused mainly on the factors that have contributed 
to Korea’s becoming the most wired nation in the world — a vigorous and effective 
government-led policy,41 the introduction of competition into the telecom market, the 
cultural attitudes of the Korean people,42 a dense and urbanized population,43  the 
cooperative relationships among the public, private, and R&D sectors, and so on (see 
Picot & Wernick, 2007; Shin & Park, 2007; Yang & Olfman, 2006; Frieden, 2005; Lee & 
Chan-Olmsted, 2004; Townsend, 2004, May 31; ITU, March 2003; Han, 2003; Lee, et 
al., 2003; Jeong & Kim, 2004; Kim & Ahn, 2003; Jeong & King, 1996). Although the 
global constraints were highly significant during the greatest phase of 
telecommunications liberalization in the early 90s, most research focused on the 
                                                                                                                                                 
telephone and cable companies seeking to protect old ISDN technology and delay the IT infrastructure 
investment of the fiber-optic lines (Bearn, 2004, May 31). 
41 Sawhney (1993) noted that the US telecom infrastructure was created in a very decentralized manner, 
quite unlike the state-sponsored “centric” model in other countries. Writing about the public telephone 
system, he urged that US telecom policy refrain from “copying the success formula of the state-driven 
policy model” (515) and instead encourage a “bottom-up” or “polycentric” strategy to interconnect the 
infrastructural network. Sawhney is certainly right that the policy model of each country should be 
formulated on the basis of its own political, geographical, and cultural situation; nevertheless, the failure of 
the market to achieve widespread broadband Internet access in the US, as well as the consequent debate 
about “Net neutrality” (cf. PBS, 2007, October 18), make it clear that the US policy approach of a 
“polycentric model” which limits federal policy interventions and leaves users at the mercy of telecom 
conglomerates has delayed US citizens’ having equal access to broadband Internet.    
42 Many scholars describe Korean society, like most Asian societies, as a collectivistic culture, in contrast 
to America’s individualistic culture. They cite the nationwide diffusion of the physical and virtual 
hypermedia spaces, such as the culture of the “PC-Bang” (Internet café), online computer game rooms, and 
“Cyworld,” a popular web-community site, as examples of the Korean users’ “demand-pull” through which 
the government’s rapid “supply-push” of information infrastructure was completed. Interestingly, 
American IT-related business journals have given rosy news coverage about Koreans’ hyper-social culture 
greatly affecting how people connect in virtual space and transforming the nation into the “most connected 
and Net-addicted country on Earth” (e.g., Taylor, 2006, June; Herz, 2002, August, 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/10.08/korea_pr.html). 
43 Most Koreans live in apartments or multi-dwelling units. The geographical density of the population 
helps the facility-based telecom service providers to terminate their fiber-optic lines in a central 
telecommunications exchange or main distribution frame (MDF). The apartment builder is usually 
responsible for the “last mile” to each household. 
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“broadband heaven” created by the KII project and ignored the global-local nexus that 
had forced Korean government to restructure the national economy in response to the 
changing mode of global capitalism. Those IT policy studies that did mention the global 
constraints on the KII project tended to consider them a minor factor among various 
contextual elements such as the active public investment, the Korean-specific 
collectivistic culture, and the close public–private partnership (see Lee, et al., 2007; Lau, 
et al., 2005; Lee & Jung, 1998; and a series of IT-related policy reports released in 2005 
and 2006 by the National Information Society Agency [NIA] and the Ministry of 
Information and Communication [MIC]). Some studies have examined how the external 
challenge in the mid-90s led to the Korean telecom restructuring and have chronicled the 
history of the US- and WTO-driven regulations and regulatory reforms in the Korean 
telecom market (see Tcha, et al., 2000; Hyun & Lent, 1999; Hong, 1998; Cho, et al., 
1996; Kim, 1993; Kim & Ro, 1993), but these studies did not focus on the KII project 
itself. The present study, therefore, investigates the factors that led to “the broadband 
nation” by scrutinizing the historical contexts surrounding the KII project.       
 
5.3. GLOBAL PRESSURE OR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY? 
What factors impelled the Korean government to design the KII project at the beginning 
of the 1990s? In this section we examine both the global pressures to liberalization and 
the desire of the Korean government for economic growth. This study examines the three 
 105 
external factors that led to the KII project — the US-led information superhighway 
initiative and its global extension by the Global Information Infrastructure (GII), the 
Korea–US bilateral negotiations and the WTO regulatory system, and the multinational 
telecom corporations — as well as the three inner mechanisms reacting to these external 
factors — the interventionist role of the Korean government, the telecom reform plans as 
a structural adjustment between 1990 and 1995, and the government’s desire for 
technological independence from foreign telecom companies. The state-led KII project 
arises from the dynamics of the interaction between global pressures and Korea’s internal 
drives to escape technological dependency.  
 
5.3.1. “Learning effects” from advanced countries  
In the early and mid-90s, one of the most important international influences on Korea 
was the advanced countries’ rapid reconfigurations of their national infrastructures based 
on electronic networks. For instance, a “Commentary for the KII Master Plan” (KAIT,44 
1995, March) described external threats to Korean society as being largely derived from 
the rise of multilateral trade systems such as the WTO, regional economic blocs such as 
the NAFTA and the EU, and the IT infrastructure plans implemented by the US, Japan, 
and the EU. South Korea’s national telecom policy, then, was at best an “unfiltered, 
imitative hybrid of policy measures borrowed from the advanced countries” (Kim & Ro, 
                                                 
44 Since 1992, the KAIT (Korea Association of Information and Telecommunication) has supported the 
MIC’s IT policy from the private sector’s perspective.   
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1993: 485), such as the US, Japan, and the UK.45 The global economic changes driven 
by the advanced countries had a “learning effect” upon the Korean government such that 
it copied their policy programs.         
In the US, the Clinton administration’s Information Infrastructure Task Force 
(IITF, 1993, September) issued a report entitled “National Information Infrastructure 
(NII): An Agenda for Action,” which was to be implemented by private sector leadership 
with the federal government’s guidance. In a similar move, the Japanese government’s 
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (now the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications) issued the policy report, “Reforms towards the Intellectually Creative 
Society of the 21st Century” (Telecommunications Council, 1994, May). Through the 
investment of JP ¥50 trillion, the Japanese government planned to develop a “high-
performance info-communications infrastructure” by 2010, so as to build an 
“intellectually creative society,” which was directed toward the economic shift from 
“conventional industry to new info-communications Industry” (Section 1). Through this 
infrastructure plan, Japan expected to create a JP ¥123 trillion multimedia market and 2.4 
million new jobs (Igarashi, 2004).46 Singapore’s government in 1993 announced the “IT 
2000 Vision” (Choo, 1997), which set forth an “Intelligent Island” program aimed at 
                                                 
45 For example, the artificial duopoly system imitated the UK’s deregulation plan, the classification of the 
carriers by facility-based ownership came from Japan’s policy model, and the idea of competition and 
various measures to protect the market from anticompetitive behavior were derived from US policy.   
46 Based on this backbone infrastructure, since 2001 Japan has developed the “e-Japan Strategy” and “u-
Japan Promotion Program” for integrating wired/wireless, mobile, and multimedia communications over 
the Internet Protocol (IP) based architecture, similar to Korea’s BcN project. 
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completing a national information infrastructure within 15 years.47 In 1994 the British 
government issued a report entitled “Creating the Superhighways of the Future: 
Developing Broadband Communications in Britain,” and in European countries such as 
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, national infrastructure programs 
interconnecting the government agencies, educational institutions, and firms also became 
pervasive (Siochru, 2004).  
These policy experiments of information superhighway emerging in the US, the 
EU, Japan, and Singapore influenced Korea at that time. Both the 1993 Basic Plan and 
the 1994 Master Plan for the KII specify “the new economy as the major motive for 
constructing the backbone networks,” (MoC, 1994: 29) and urge “Korean society to 
pursue the new international trends toward network-based capitalism” (30). In a network-
based economy, an infrastructure plan was essential to establishing an international 
market share (Jeong & King, 1996). Among the IT plans of the developed countries, the 
American NII initiative greatly influenced the launching of the KII project. The 
government officials whom I interviewed specifically mentioned the US government’s 
lead in creating the network-based economy. For instance, one of the key actors in 
implementing the KII project, noted that both the NII initiative submitted by the US Vice 
President Al Gore and the liberalization of the national telecom market brought about by 
the bilateral negotiation between the US and Korea motivated the Korean administration 
to plan the construction of the information infrastructure in the early 90s (Lee, 2007, June 
                                                 
47 In 2006, the Singaporean government’s “IT2000 Vision” evolved into “Singapore One Network for 
Everyone,” which was directed to promote the network-based economy and join in the OECD membership 
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7). Other interviewees of the NIA regarded the KII as “a voluntarily prepared government 
project benchmarking the US and Japan initiatives for the optical network” (Hur, 2007, 
June 7) or “a Korean-style NII project” (Lee, 2007, May 28).   
 During the presidential campaign of 1992, Bill Clinton first presented the economic 
value of the electronic backbone network for the US economic growth:  
 
In the new economy, infrastructure means information as well as transportation. 
More than half the US workforce is employed in information-intensive industries, 
yet we have no national strategy to create a national information network. Just as 
the interstate highway system in the 1950s spurred two decades of economic 
growth, we need a door-to-door fiber optics system by the year 2015 to link every 
home, every lab, every classroom, and every business in America. (Clinton, 1992, 
April 16) 
 
In their 1993 “Agenda for Action” report, Vice President Gore and Secretary of 
Commerce Ron Brown offered a blueprint for the NII based upon a public-private 
partnership. The NII initiative sought to establish a “seamless web of communications 
networks, computers, databases, and consumer electronics that will put vast amounts of 
information at users’ fingertips” (1993: 3). The NII initiative expressed the Clinton-Gore 
administration’s desire to restore America’s technological and economic leadership 
through investing in the nationwide information infrastructure and through promoting a 
more deregulatory climate in the national and international telecom market. Following up 
on the NII initiative, Gore expanded the administration’s policy plan into a global scale 
by introducing the Global Information Infrastructure (GII) initiative at the first World 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Low, 2003).  
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Telecommunication Development Conference in March of 1994. The Conference, held in 
Buenos Aires, Argentina, signaled a new order of the world economy in which 
everything would be connected by a grid of electronic networks. At this meeting, Gore 
called upon every nation to establish an ambitious agenda to build the GII, under the 
following basic principles: the encouragement of private sector investment, more 
competition, easy access to the network, a flexible regulatory environment, and universal 
service. World leaders incorporated these five principles into the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU, 1994, March 21)’s “Buenos Aires Declaration on 
Global Telecommunication Development for the 21st Century.” In May of that year, 
Japan also proposed the Asian Information Infrastructure (AII) initiative as part of the 
GII at the ITU meeting in order to facilitate the regional bloc of the electronic network 
among the Asian countries (Igarashi, 2004: 17). In February of 1995, the Group of Seven 
Nations’ (G-7) Ministerial Conference on the Information Society in Brussels reaffirmed 
the main goals of the GII initiative led by the US administration (EFF, 2003).   
The GII principles and the G-7 affirmation share the WTO’s regulatory principles 
on basic telecommunications, which focused on the openness of local telecom markets. 
For examples, based on Gore’s suggested GII principles, G-7 leaders proposed 
international principles of market liberalization such as promotion of interconnectivity 
and interoperability, developing global markets for networks, services, and applications, 
and protecting intellectual property rights (G-7 Chair, 1995). Despite differences in the 
scale and size of the local telecom market in developing countries, international pressures 
for network-based market liberalization such as GII initiatives and the WTO agreements 
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led by the US administration also forced the Korean government both open its telecom 
market and embrace the new world order of digital capitalism (Chapter 5.3.2 discusses 
the WTO pact’s global regulatory force as it relates to the development of the KII 
project). The government was urged to contribute to the US-led GII initiatives and the 
WTO agreements enacted in 1997 at the global level, and simultaneously to meet the 
benchmarks of Gore’s NII project at the local level. In response to the US-led NII and 
GII initiatives, at the 1994 APEC Summit in Bogor, Indonesia, Asian countries, including 
South Korea, agreed on introducing the Asia Pacific Information Infrastructure (APII) for 
the purpose of promoting the free flow of information throughout the region (Kim, 2003). 
As regards the WTO agreements, the Korean government actively responded to these 
global pressures by opening the domestic telecom market and by launching the KII 
project, as shown in the following section 5.3.2. 
At the start of his presidency in 1993, the first civilian President, Young-sam 
Kim, popularized the discourse of “globalization” (Shegyehwa). His motto of a “New 
Korea” (Sin Hanguk) aimed to persuade people to voluntarily adopt “a market 
liberalization policy that was required by the ‘globalization’ of capital in order to become 
a member of the OECD” (Kang, 2000: 451). To become a member country of the OECD 
by 1996, the Korean government sought to be rapidly incorporated into the multilateral 
trade organizations such as the WTO system and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), in conjunction with a new liberal economic policy whose slogan 
was “small but strong government.” Thus in 1995, in his New Year’s Message to the 
Nation, President Young-sam Kim offered the following advice to his people:  
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On the threshold of 21st century, the contemporary world confronts a new order. 
Along with a new year, the WTO system will be launched. This signifies an era of 
dog-eat-dog competition between nations and regions. A new era is coming when 
we must confront the unstable future of this new world. We should embrace the 
tide of globalization, reorganize our government to be “small but strong,” and 
begin again from scratch. Shegyehwa is the only way we can interact with the 
outside world and move towards its center. (Office of the President, 1995, my 
translation)   
  
President Kim’s message about how Korean society could become a winner under 
globalization’s law of the jungle was accompanied the government’s active 
interventionist policy of redefining its developmental strategies by IT plans. Kim’s 
rhetoric, which merged “particular interests” of private sector with the “general interest” 
of the nation-state, Kim succeeded in persuading Koreans that these policies were 
necessary for their very survival in the endless competition of a globalized world. One of 
the survival strategies in the age of globalization was a shift in the government’s policy 
interest from industrialization to informatization. The government actually proposed its 
own vision of a cooperative Asia–Pacific Information Infrastructure (APII) at the Asia–
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit meeting held in Indonesia in 1994 
(Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the USA, 2005, November 14), and it also issued 
the Master Plan for the KII (MoC, 1994, March) the same year. Electronic networks 
became appealing to the government (e.g., see the public reports released by the MoC 
[1993, August 21; 1993, July 2; 1994, March]) because of the economic possibilities 
available if domestic capital were able to efficiently plug into the global and regional 
infrastructure networks. The government responded vigorously to the new mode of global 
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capitalism by building the national broadband backbone network.  
As Figure 5.3 shows, since Kim’s presidency, the government has raised 
investment in the IT sector in order to shift the nation from a labor-intensive industry to a 
knowledge-based one. In the early 90s, the amount of the government’s telecom-related 
investment rapidly increased, except for the fluctuation during the 1997 IMF financial 
crisis.  
 
Figure 5.3. Annual government telecom investment in Korea 
 
Source: Data from ITU (2005) 
 
 
Korea’s energetic state-led telecom investment was the response to a series of global 
influences such as the early 90s US-led flurry of construction of information 
infrastructure in various countries. Further, as discussed in the next section, it was a 
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response to external constraints from the late 1980s up to the mid-90s such as the US’s 
designation of South Korea as a Priority Foreign Country (PFC), which resulted in trade 
sanctions, the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade negotiations, and the WTO 
negotiations on basic telecommunications. During this period, the government began not 
merely to install the nationwide information infrastructure which would electronically 
interconnect government agencies and educational institutions but also launched a 
national mobile telephony market which allowed Chaebols, Korea’s family-owned 
monopolies, to take advantage of the “trickle-down” effect from the state-led IT boom.  
The logic of the Global Information Infrastructure (GII) initiative was directed 
toward expanding access to foreign markets for America’s high-tech companies and 
enabling global telecom conglomerates to attain “hegemonic” power, transforming the 
mode of capitalism. Behind the GII’s rhetoric of one world interconnected by electronic 
networks lay the US-led WTO regulatory system establishing telecom liberalization as a 
universal policy — specifically, as regards Korea, in terms of removing any trade 
restrictions to its domestic telecom market. The next section investigates the global 
influences of the WTO regulatory system on Korea’s domestic IT policy.  
 
 
5.3.2. The global regulatory system as an impetus of the KII project 
Since the late 80s, under the new network-based economic order of globalization, global 
regulatory institutions such as the Uruguay Round and the WTO have gradually become 
the new “global quasi-governments” (Hardt & Negri, 2004: 175). Korea was forced to 
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prepare itself for a global challenge from the regulatory system of these quasi-
governmental centers by integrating its local networks into the global electronic matrix. 
Most of my interviewees felt that the WTO regulatory system was a minor factor in the 
birth of the KII project; instead, they felt that the early 90s’ upsurge of information 
infrastructure projects in the advanced countries was a strong motivator for the KII. In 
other words, they perceived a direct cause and effect relationship between two policy 
events — the American NII project and the KII project — and minimized the influence of 
any pressure to liberalize the national telecom market. However, although the US-led NII 
and GII initiatives laid the ideological and material foundations for the KII project, the 
US government’s trade sanctions and the WTO-based multilateral trade negotiations 
meant that, in order to join the global telecom market, Korea would have to open its 
national telecom market, and it was this which drove the Korean government to 
accelerate building the national information infrastructure so as to shield itself from 
completely opening its telecom market.  
The KII arose out of the structural adjustment programs of 1990, 1994, and 1995, 
which the government launched in order to enhance the competitiveness of the national 
telecom market. Even though within the WTO framework the government was forced to 
completely open the domestic telecom market to international competition, it granted two 
domestic incumbents, KT and Dacom, the right to build the nationwide information 
infrastructure and thus protected the business rights for the KII-G project from foreign 
investors (the government had less control over the KII-P, since, as a commercial 
network, it was open to foreign investors). The KII project, thus, was the Korean 
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government’s most significant response to a series of global pressures such as the 
multilateral and bilateral negotiations (Figure 5.4 describes the moments of the global 
events and in turn the local adjustments since the late 1980s).  
The first threat to the Korean telecom industry came with the trade sanctions 
imposed by the US Trade Representative (USTR) (Hyun & Lent, 1999).48 The USTR 
designated Korea as a priority foreign country (PFC) in 1989, based on Section 1377 of 
the US Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. That means the USTR would 
treat Korean telecom market as being in violation of a trade agreement under the Act, for 
which retaliation with trade sanctions is mandatory. The conflict centered on the 
anticompetitive practices of Korean telecom equipment and services; after ten rounds of 
bilateral negotiations between the US and Korea from 1989 to 1992, the Korean 
government agreed to lift investment restrictions on US value-added network business 
beginning in 1994 and to open government procurement bidding at the level of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Hyun & Lent, 1999). During negotiation with 
the USTR, the Korean government in July of 1990 announced the first telecom reform 
plan. The government introduced Data Communications (Dacom)49 as a second service 
provider into the international voice telephony market previously served by KT as the 
incumbent and common carrier, and initiated competition in the radio paging market, 
                                                 
48 The USTR emerged as part of an informal “Washington Consensus,” which also embraces the US State 
Department, the US Treasury, the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD, and the WTO. All of these institutions 
favor the ideas of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization (Amsden, 2007: 128). 
49 Dacom was created by public-private investment in 1982. By acquiring the licenses of international and 
long-distance telephony services during the national telecom reform programs from 1990 to 1995, and also 
by becoming the selective operator of the KII project, Dacom rapidly emerged as the second largest 
facility-based telecom service provider in Korea, after KT.     
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Figure 5.4. The Korean telecom market: global constraints and local adjustment 
 
 
Source: adopted from Frank (2007), Kim (2003, June), Hyun & Lent (1999), Lee & Jung (1998, 
November), and Cho, et al. (1996)
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which would be operated by SK Telecom and eleven local service providers. This reform 
aimed to enhance the competitiveness of the domestic telecom carriers by creating a 
limited competitive market. Further, as a result of negotiations with the USTR, the 
government agreed to abolish major regulations for the value-added service market and 
partially lifted market entry barriers to the foreign investors.50  
 Since the early 1990s, another global pressure toward telecom liberalization 
stemmed from multilateral negotiations such as the Uruguay Round and the WTO 
Agreement on Basic Telecommunication Services. The Uruguay Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations for the first time recognized services, especially, telecom services, as 
an important item on the agenda of liberalization based on cross-border trade (Blouin, 
2000). Through the Uruguay Round negotiations, the General Agreement for Trade in 
Services (GATS) in 1994 was created in order to promote the borderless flow of data in a 
new age of digital capitalism. At the end of the Uruguay Round in May of the same year, 
to realize the GATS framework on telecom services by means of a more systematic 
regulatory power, the Negotiation Group on Basic Telecommunications (NGBT) was 
created under the auspices of the WTO; this was extended in 1996 as the GBT. Through 
                                                 
50 The 1990 reform package divided the traditional common carrier model into three service classes — 
two kinds of NSPs (GSPs and SSPs), and VSPs — based on the ownership of telecom network facilities. 
Network Service Providers (NSPs) are telecommunication service providers who own their own network 
facilities. NSPs were divided into two classes, General Service Providers (GSPs), which supply nationwide 
wire-line services, and Specific Service Providers (SSPs), which supply telecom services in geographically 
limited areas or provide selected types of services such as wireless services. Value-added Service Providers 
(VSPs) offer database and data processing services through NSPs. The government partially opened the 
SSP market, which allowed foreign ownership up to 33%, or up to10% in the case of government-owned 
corporations, and opened up the VSP market to full-blown competition (Cho, et al., 1996). The second 
telecom reform plan of 1994 integrated the subdivision of GSPs and SSPs into one division, NSPs. The 
third reform of 1995 divided the national telecom service classification into NSPs, VSPs, and Special 
 118 
the long WTO/GBT negotiations up to 1997, 72 member states finally agreed to open 
their basic telecom market to foreign competition from February 1998 onward. The 
WTO/GBT agreements included specific commitments regarding market-access and 
national treatment of foreign telecom service providers as set out in the WTO 
agreement’s regulatory codes, termed the Reference Paper (RP). The RP aimed to further 
the actual market access of foreign investors and to weaken the incumbents’ control of 
local telecom networks (Blouin, 2000).51 The WTO agreements ultimately brought basic 
telecommunications under an “internationally accepted enforcement mechanism” (Drake 
& Noam, 1997: 808). The WTO became a convenient forum through which the US-led 
foreign telecom carriers, who looked to foreign markets to create new business 
opportunities, legitimized a removal of major barriers to their entry into local telecom 
markets through a consensus about free trade (Cowhey & Klimenko, 2000).  
 To obtain membership in the OECD, the Korean government during the early and 
mid-1990s had to accept a wave of competition and liberalization of the telecom market, 
mainly forced by the WTO negotiations  (Cho, et al., 1996). In June 1994, the 
government announced a second reform program to introduce more competition into 
national market. The reform plans included lifting the line-of-business restriction on 
wire-line and wireless service providers, creating one category of network service 
                                                                                                                                                 
Telecommunications Service Providers (STPs), who provide services such as voice resale, Internet phone, 
international call-back, and so on.  
51 The Reference Paper (RP) of the WTO pact sets forth the basic regulatory rules for so-called fair 
competition in local telecom policies. The RP includes issues of interconnection, requiring the incumbent 
to provide competitors or new entrants non-discriminatory equitable network access to public networks; the 
prevention of anticompetitive practices in telecom such as cross-subsidization and the withholding of 
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providers; introducing Dacom into the long-distance telephony market of KT monopoly; 
creating a duopolistic competition system in the mobile phone market between SK 
Telecom and Shinsegi Telecom; and allowing up to 33.3% of foreign ownership in the 
wireless service market. Nevertheless, the government was still hesitant to introduce full-
blown liberalization in national telecom market, and thus it authorized the duopolistic 
competition in long-distance telephony and the foreign ownership ceiling of only 10% for 
telephone service.     
 In 1995, Korea’s “discriminatory procurement practices” were once again cited 
by the USTR, and the government was forced to allow one major US telecom company to 
bid in the 1995 procurement cycle (Hyun & Lent, 1999). Confronting the rise of both US 
pressures to liberalize and a WTO-led new world order, the Korean government finally 
set forth a third reform plan in order to further open the telecom market. Unlike the two 
previous reform programs, the third reform plan was unanticipated and was carried out in 
a covert manner (Cho, et al., 1996). The third reform’s timing — in 1995, three years 
ahead of the full-scale market opening required by the WTO pact — suggested the 
government’s desire to minimize the impact of full-blown competition. The third telecom 
reform plan licensed 27 new service providers across seven service areas, including new 
types of telecom services such as PCS, TRS, CT-2, and wireless data communications 
(Hong, 1998), and also aimed to provide licensing rights for new profitable IT services 
both for potential entrants represented by the Chaebols and for national incumbents such 
                                                                                                                                                 
technical specifications on network access; universal service obligations; and the independence or 
impartiality of signatories’ regulatory bodies (see Blouin, 2000; Fredebeul-Krein & Freytag, 1999; 1997). 
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as KT and Dacom. Further, the third reform plan induced the private sector to join in the 
KII project by offering the domestic incumbents special service licenses for services such 
as PCS, as well as by sponsoring the incumbents through seed money to build the 
nationwide fiber-optic lines (Cho, et al., 1996).  
 In 1996, the USTR once again designated Korea as a PFC. The Korean 
government reacted strongly against the USTR, pointing out that Korea’s trade deficit in 
the telecom equipment sector had increased since 1993, and in fact had reached a deficit 
of US $403 million by 1995 (Hyun & Lent, 1999). The US finally withdrew the PFC case 
without an agreement and instead settled on a compromise within the boundary of the 
WTO/GBT agreements. Since 1997, pursuant to the WTO pact, the Korean government 
once again lifted the foreign ownership ceiling to 49% in both wired and wireless 
services, and allowed the Korean company Hanaro to enter the local telephone service 
market, in which KT had been previously the dominant service provider (Tcha, et al., 
2000). The Korean economic crisis of 1997 accelerated the government’s liberalization of 
the national telecom market. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), through its bailout 
program after the 1997 crisis, urged the government to eliminate foreign ownership 
restraints in all areas. Pressured by the IMF bailout program and the WTO/GBT 
agreements, the government raised KT’s foreign ownership ceiling to 33% in 1999 and to 
49% in 2002 and completed KT’s privatization by 2002 (Jin, 2006). Figure 5.5 shows the 
degree to which the WTO/GBT agreements have forced the government to increase the 
foreign ownership ceiling in the national telecom sector. Since the enactment of the WTO 
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pact in 1998, foreign ownership has gradually increased and, during the period from 2003 
to 2006 it reached the government’s ceiling of 49%. 
Figure 5.5. Foreign ownership in Korea’s major network service providers, 2003–06 
 
 
* The largest foreign shareholder of Hanaro Telecom is AIG-Newbridge-TVG consortium, which owns 
39% of the entire stock and thus has a controlling interest. 
Source: data from KERI (2007), MIC (2005, December), and Yahoo Finance (2006) 
 
In the mid-90s, therefore, knowing that the WTO pact would come into effect in 
1998, the Korean government could foresee the difficulty of launching state-led IT 
policies once foreign investors dominated the national telecom market.52 It could be 
predicted that foreign capital flooding into the telecom sector of a developing country 
                                                 
52 Up to the mid-90s, Korean society in general, as well as the government, was quite negative and even 
fearful about the entry of foreign investors into the domestic market. For instance, one Korean economist 
described the situation thusly: “[D]ominance of the Korean financial market by foreign institutions was 
abhorred, as it would diminish authority over various instruments of monetary control, weaken many 
customary, informal practices associated with industrial policy, and might also alter the public-good nature 
of the financial system” (Lee, 1993: 7). 
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would create a cascade of negative effects, such as an outflow of locally created profits, 
the pursuit of short-term profits, apathy to new IT-facility re-investments derived from 
capital outflow, the destabilization of capital composition by international speculative 
capital, the destabilization of labor conditions, and potential national security problems 
arising from foreign ownership of basic infrastructure, as well as foreign capital’s inertia 
to state-led IT projects such as the KII.53 The KII project, therefore, which needed the 
collaboration of the private sector, was an urgent task that the government had to 
complete before full-blown liberalization arrived. Pressure from the US and the WTO 
thus was an indirect but powerful influence on the KII project. 
5.3.3. Escape from dependency through R&D: The broken dream  
In the mid-80s, Korea’s telephony system had relied exclusively on costly telecom 
switches from foreign manufacturers. The three major “old” network equipment 
manufacturers — Alcatel (France), Lucent Technologies (USA), and Nortel (Canada) — 
then controlled almost half of the world telecom equipment market share.54 To secure its 
                                                 
53 These predictions have come to pass: for instance, Hanaro Telecom, the second-largest broadband 
Internet and local call service provider, handed over its management control to a group of foreign investors 
led by the American International Group (AIG) and Newbridge Capital (Kim, 2003, July 3). As of 
December 2007, Hananro’s largest stakeholders, the AIG-led consortium, have made a backdoor deal with 
SK Telecom, the largest wireless service provider, to sell out all Hanaro stock. And the rise of foreign 
ownership in the national incumbents has indeed made it difficult for the government to persuade the 
telecom sector to cooperate in state-led IT projects; for example, Hanaro relinquished its participation in 
“Wibro,” part of a government-driven IT initiative, IT839.  
54 Korea divides the infrastructure industry into three categories: hardware, software, and network service. 
Hardware is divided into two subcategories: terminal equipment (e.g., cell phones, PDAs, and laptops) and 
network equipment. Network equipment includes exchange/switch technology (infrastructural, private), 
pair cable transmission systems (xDSL), coaxial cable transmission systems (e.g., cable modem termination 
systems [CMTS]), optical transmission systems, signal converters, multiplexers, wire and optical fiber 
optic cables, LAN equipment (e.g., NICs, routers, switches, hubs), home network equipment (e.g., 
subscriber modems, cable modems, and xDSL modems), and wireless LAN equipment. “Network service” 
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own core telecom technology, the Korean government successfully developed a digital 
switching system called the Time-Division Exchange (TDX) through a ten-year state-led 
R&D project launched in 1986, and already by 1990 the proportion of TDX switches 
internal to Korea had risen to 47.8% (Kim, 1993). For the Korean procurement market, 
the TDX switch became a shield providing technological independence from the 
transnational telecom conglomerates (Hyun & Lent, 1999). By the end of 1997, Korea 
had exported more than US$ 800 million worth of 3.7 million TDX lines to 26 countries 
(Lee & Jung, 1998). By 2003, KT as the common carrier was able to replace 76% of 
imported switches with domestically produced ones (Mani, 2007: 271). Korea thus 
became the 10th nation in the world to develop and export its own telephony switching 
system. The process of technological innovation that created the TDX switch has become 
the prototype of Korea’s developmental mechanism.55 This successful mechanism was 
based on structural cooperation between specialized R&D institutes such as ETRI and 
domestic telecom manufacturers such as Samsung and LG under the strong leadership of 
the government. Castells (1998: 252) points out that “an emphasis on science and 
technology, and the upgrading of products and process in Korean industry, have been the 
obsession of the South Korean state since the 1960s.” This “obsession” is in fact 
indicative of the state’s desire to escape being technologically dependent upon the 
advanced countries and their economic mechanisms. The desire to be independent has 
                                                                                                                                                 
includes the Internet backbone service, subscriber connection service, facility leases, and operation 
outsourcing, and so on (NCA, 2005: 28).  
55 However, since the US forced KT to open their equipment procurement market, the TDX system has 
gradually weakened in competition with AT&T’s SESS in the large-capacity switching system market. 
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continually haunted Korea’s developmental mechanisms since the time of the military 
dictatorships.  
 The success of the collaborative model in creating the TDX led to its being 
applied to the next project on the government’s agenda, the High Advanced Nation 
(HAN)/B-ISDN project,56 which aimed at developing the asynchronous transfer mode 
(ATM) switch, then a critical component of the high-speed information network.57 The 
government invested US$ 856 million in this project between 1992 and 1998. In fact, the 
HAN/B-ISDN project provided the technological basis for building the KII. In addition, 
prior to the launch of the KII project, Korea had completed the development of optical 
transmission systems at the 155–565 Mbps and 2.5Gbps levels between 1991 and 1995, 
and the mainframe computers TiCOM I, II, and III between 1988 and 1994. With the 
successful completion of the HAN/B-ISBN project, the government expected to improve 
Korea’s telecom technologies up to the G7 level, to create new telecom industries, and to 
construct a national backbone network.   
The ATM switching technology was an advance on the TDX switch, both of 
which were heavily supported by the government’s concessionary financing (Ingelbrecht, 
                                                                                                                                                 
AT&T, the only foreign firm invited, succeeded in open bidding in gaining a 38% share of KT’s digital 
switching systems in 1994 (Ro & Kim, 1996). 
56 According to a principal researcher at the ETRI, the HAN/B-ISDN project planned to “develop network 
integration technologies such as a commercial ATM switching system, 10 and 100 Gbps optical 
transmission systems, a broadband network termination system, and terminal adapters to support the 
nationwide information infrastructure.” In this R&D project, the government’s main concern was “the 
development of the ATM switch” (Song, 2007 July 17). 
57 “ATM is a cell-switching and multiplexing technology that combines the benefits of circuit switching 
(stable capacity and constant transmission delay) with those of packet switching (flexibility and efficiency 
for intermittent traffic). It provides scalable bandwidth from a few Mbps to many Gbps. Because of its 
asynchronous nature, ATM is more efficient than synchronous technologies, such as time-division 
multiplexing” (Cisco, 2006). 
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1995; Lee & Jung, 1998). The government forecast the economic benefits of developing 
the ATM switching technology. First, the basic goal of the R&D investment was to 
escape technological dependency on foreign telecom equipment.” As the national 
telecom service and equipment market was about US $60 billion in 1995, the 
development of core technology was critical to protecting the national telecom market 
from the dominance of the foreign telecom industry. Second, the ATM switch, like the 
TDX switch, was anticipated to have spill-over effects on the economy by its application 
to the KII project (Tcha, et al., 2000). Third, as with the TDX, the R&D collaboration on 
the ATM technology was effective in speeding up the circuit from investment to 
application: The government — specifically, the MIC — invested the funds, the ETRI 
was responsible for developing the TDX, the four major domestic telecom equipment 
manufacturers — Samsung, LG, Daewoo, and Hanhwa — produced the switches, and the 
wire-line incumbents — KT and Dacom — installed them in the process of building the 
backbone network. As an official at the National Information Society Agency 
commented,   
 
In 1986, Korea entered into the age of universal service in landline telephony. At 
that time the foreign-produced telecom equipment entirely dominated the national 
market. With the goal of promoting the domestic telecom equipment market, the 
government developed the first TDX switch by assigning the enormous public 
funds to KT, then a state-owned company, and then KT assigned the R&D 
responsibility to the ETRI. The ETRI transferred the tested TDX technology over 
to Samsung and LG, both of which were involved in producing the TDX switch. 
The R&D collaboration in the TDX switch has historical continuity with the 
process used for developing the ATM for the optical transmission network. 
(Interview with Jang, 2007, June 07)   
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Due to the HAN/B-ISDN project developed by the ETRI, the domestic telecom 
manufacturers began producing ATM switches in 1996, and significantly increased their 
production rate in 2001 (phase 3 of the KII project) so that they accounted for almost 
three quarters of public switching production in Korea (Mani, 2007). Most of the ATM 
equipment was used for building the KII rather than for export. The TDX was highly 
profitable, since an investment of US $133 million in the R&D produced total sales of 
US $6.3 billion, whereas the ATM switching system was relatively unprofitable, since an 
investment of US $200 million in its R&D led to total sales of only US $250 million. 
This result was dissatisfying, because the government was unable to make the ATM 
technology competitive in the foreign market nor to escape technological dependency on 
the transnational telecom conglomerates. An NIA official observed that, in contrast to the 
commercial success of the TDX switch, 
 
The ATM switch was limited to domestic consumption, and thus the 
[commercial] application was negligible. […] At that time, Korea was focused 
very one-sidedly on the development of the ATM switch, and, as a result, turned a 
blind eye to the [Internet-based] router equipment used for VoIP. (Interview with 
Jang, 2007, June 7)   
 
Another NIA official was even more pessimistic: 
 
While the information infrastructure enhanced the citizens’ access right [to digital 
information], the project to develop the core technology, the ATM switch, was an 
unsatisfactory policy to some degree. Because of the expansion of the Internet 
since the mid-90s, the dominance of the established telecom equipment 
manufacturers such as Lucent and other major foreign conglomerates has 
gradually collapsed, and the IP router equipment manufacturers led by Cisco have 
taken a lead in the world market. The new paradigm was unforeseen by our 
government. Under the present conditions of market control by foreign router 
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equipments, the government terminated or downscaled R&D policy plans to 
develop core technology for the backbone network. At present, Cisco’s advanced 
telecom equipment is completely dominant in the market. Meanwhile, Korea has 
developed only low-tech access equipment connecting a telephone base unit to 
subscribers. (Interview with Lee, 2007, June 7) 
 
The director of the Presidential Advisory Council on Science and Technology, which was 
directly involved in the KII project from 1997 to 2000, also pointed out that “the Korean 
policymakers could hardly foresee the Internet architecture at that time [in the early 
1990s] and thus regarded the ATM as the most advanced network switching technology” 
(Oh, 2007, June 11). Since 2002, however, the national telecom companies “ceased to 
produce and install the ATM switch and have replaced many of the ATM switches with 
foreign IP-based router equipment” (Rha, 2007, June 7). Interestingly, a manager of KT’s 
Network Engineering Department notes the WTO pact as a factor in the failure of the 
ATM technology:  
    
The opening of national telecom market [by the WTO pact] contributed greatly to 
giant foreign companies like Cisco entering into Korean market and replacing our 
own ATM technology with the IP-based technology. This openness of the 
domestic market has resulted in it being overwhelmed by foreign advanced 
technology. […] If Cisco had not existed at that time, Korea might have been able 
to develop the ATM as the core technology for major parts of the telecom 
equipment market. (Lee, 2007, June 11) 
 
The story of the ATM highlights two problems: first, the shortcoming of the state-
led R&D policy plans, in which the technocrats tried to set out a broad picture of 
development and technological innovation at the very beginning and did not build in 
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enough flexibility to deal with technological shifts that may occur over a decade-long 
project.58  It ended with a “broken dream,” because the ATM technology became 
outmoded by the IP-based router. Second, the ATM story points out the difficulties that 
developing countries will always have in attempting to catch up to advanced ones, due to 
the head start they inevitably possess.  
 
5.4. A DIALECTICS OF EXTERNAL-INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE KII PROJECT 
 
[E]xternal causes are the condition of change and internal causes are the basis of 
change, and […] external causes become operative through internal causes. In a 
suitable temperature an egg changes into a chicken, but no temperature can 
change a stone into a chicken, because each has a different basis. (Mao, “On 
Contradiction,” [1937] 2007) 
 
Although it became a worn-out inscription on the gravestone of the demolished socialist 
systems of the last century, Mao’s remark on the dialectics of external-internal causes 
surrounding the nation-state gives some hints on how to untangle the external and 
internal constraints that conditioned the KII project. First, in regard to the national 
infrastructural development by the civilian governments, this chapter has shown that the 
government launched the KII project under the “hegemonic” influence of IT policy plans 
                                                 
58 One of the interviewees (Song, 2007, May 29) assessed the ATM as technologically competitive in the 
aspects of security and QoS, despite its minor impact on economic growth. He said that 70% of government 
agencies still favor the ATM technology over any other equipment. 
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elsewhere in the early 90s, such as the US-led NII and GII initiatives.59 In addition, 
however, the MIC needed to respond to President Kim’s rhetoric of globalization by 
setting forth an IT-driven policy plan to catch up to the advanced countries’ push to 
create the information superhighway. The government-led KII project was also in 
historical continuity with the series of economic industrialization plans under the military 
governments, as seen in the developmental strategies of the national infrastructure in each 
era, for the purpose of boosting national economies (Chapter 4.1.2). The “economic 
miracle” created by these state-led industrial plans motivated the civilian government to 
seek to revive its economy through an IT policy plan emulating those of the advanced 
countries. From this perspective, “internal causes,” such as the robust leadership of the 
government, were stronger than “external causes,” such as the advanced countries’ IT 
plans, which merely served as a model for Korea’s efforts.   
Second, it is clear that the US-led WTO agreements directly triggered the 
structural adjustments in the national telecom market. Meanwhile, by granting the 
licenses of the special telecom services under the third reform plan, the government 
motivated the incumbents KT and Dacom to be involved in launching the KII project, 
which itself became a growth engine for those companies, especially Dacom (the details 
of this are discussed in Chapter 6). To weaken the impact of foreign investment, the KII 
project was timed to launch prior to the advent of the full-fledged openness of the 
national telecom market. The government wanted to protect the KII project from the rush 
                                                 
59 Even though the NII was strictly a US domestic IT initiative and not even a true policy, its effect on 
Korean telecom policies was powerful in both “symbolic” and “real” senses; in fact, the NII can be seen as 
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of foreign investors who tend to be uncooperative in state-led IT plans. In this case, 
however, the “external causes as the condition of change,” represented by the US-led 
WTO pact and the inflows of foreign investment generated by it, were stronger than the 
national goal of protecting the telecom economy, even though Korea has successfully 
launched a digital phase of the national economy, as was its goal, with the KII.  
 Third, in addition to these implicit and explicit external constraints, there was the 
government’s own desire to escape technological dependency on outsiders through its 
R&D project for the ATM switch system. Despite the success in employing the 
technology to build the KII, the HAN/B-ISDN project ultimately failed to accomplish all 
that the government had hoped. The broken dream of independence through innovation in 
the high-tech industry revealed not only the myopic zeal of the technocrats but also the 
overwhelming power of the foreign telecom equipment manufacturers in core 
technology. Despite the massive R&D expenditure — Korea ranked first in R&D 
expenditure among the developing countries from 1996 to 2002, allocating 2.5% of its 
GDP to R&D (World Bank, 2005) — the government has succeeded only in catching up 
in low- and mid-tech telecom sectors. Korea’s “internal causes as the basis of change” 
were robust, but they were ultimately trumped by the accumulated wealth, power, and 
technological capital of the advanced countries and by technological change that 
outmoded ATM switches.  
                                                                                                                                                 
the ideal model for future economy for the Korean government to overcome the early 90s’ economic 
recessions. 
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Between the dialectic mechanisms of global pressures and national aspirations, 
the Korean government functioned in several roles: by its promotion of structural 
adjustments, it acted as a mediator between the homogenizing power of liberalization and 
the protection of the local telecom market; by providing incentives for the private sector, 
such as sponsoring seed money and new telecom licenses, it acted as an initiator; and 
overall, it acted as a leader who drove the KII project forward by enticing and persuading 
the participation of the various stakeholders. The KII project is thus the manifestation of 
a unique mixture of national sovereignty and foreign influences (see Figure 5.6).  
Figure 5.6. The dynamics of the global-local nexus surrounding the KII project 
 
Source: author’s diagram  
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While the government was forced to accept the terms of the global hegemonic order, it 
laid the foundation for a “second-stage catching-up” system (Chang, 2006), following the 
precedent of late-industrialization under the military regimes. To put it another way, 
when heated to “a suitable temperature” by the dynamics of the early 90s’ external 
constraints and internal desires, “an egg finally changed into a chicken” — a chicken that 
found itself trapped in the snares of the global network of empire. 
While this chapter focused on the dynamics of external–internal factors that 
conditioned the KII project, the next chapter examines the Korean-style “second-stage 
catching-up” model, which enabled the launch the KII project through the state’s 
symbiosis with the domestic conglomerates, the Chaebols.
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Chapter VI: The State–Business Symbiosis in Korea’s IT Project: A 
Final Flowering of the Developmental State 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
In contrast to the private sector development of the national backbone network 
exemplified by the US Information Superhighway initiative in the early 90s, the Korean 
government was in the forefront of directing the Korean Information Infrastructure (KII) 
project, which was aimed at building a nationwide broadband backbone network. This 
chapter surveys how the “developmental state” model — a term referring to the 
centralized economic development of the East Asian states — was employed in South 
Korea by the authoritarian state under the military regimes. It then looks at how the 
developmental mechanism of Korea during period of the KII project was challenged by 
contextual factors such as market liberalization, the growth of the domestic 
conglomerates, and the social democratization that had occurred since the mid-80s and 
had led to the transition from military to civilian governments in the early 90s. This 
chapter then shows how in the KII project, the state, rather than asserting its dominance 
over business entities, served primarily as a moderator mediating conflicts between the 
private sector and the relevant public agencies. To describe the close state-capital 
 134 
linkages in the KII project, this study focuses on the government’s financial investment 
system for enticing the private sector to install the infrastructure, the neatly coordinated 
policy networks between the public and private entities, and the policy discourses by 
which the government achieved a national consensus on IT-driven economic 
development. Theoretically, this chapter aims to critically read the developmental state 
theories which have failed to perceive the dark side of the symbiosis between the state 
and the Chaebols. Further, by perceiving the state as situated within class and society (the 
state-in-society approach), this chapter examines the evolutionary phases of the state’s 
power from the military regimes to the civilian governments, which have been influenced 
chiefly by two factors: the emergence of Korean civil society and the Chaebols’ growth 
in the market.     
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6.1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the late 80s, the Korean government had to rapidly transform its 
developmental mechanisms in response to external pressures such as the WTO 
Agreements and the US–Korea bilateral trade negotiations and internal ones such as the 
mass protest against the authoritarian state since 1987, the growth in power of the elite 
Chaebols, and the decline of the foreign market due to the Korea’s export-oriented 
manufacturing industry. Driven by the global-local dynamics, the “strong state” model in 
Korea has gradually withered and been replaced by the “flexible state” or “market-driven 
state.”    
The Korean Information Infrastructure (KII) project was designed during this 
decline in the power of the state. Imitating the US National Information Initiative (NII), 
the KII’s main goal was to interconnect the nation through a high-speed broadband 
network, and eventually to promote IT productivity in the private sector and to create a 
larger job market through this network. In contrast to American NII initiative, which was 
led by the private sector, in Korea the government took the leading role in guiding the 
KII from start to finish. Through the KII project, the three major stakeholders — the 
state, the national telecom duopoly (KT and Dacom), and the Chaebols — have become 
deeply interpenetrated, by means of state financial support, organizational collaboration, 
and a hegemonic consensus manufactured by the government’s IT-related rhetoric. The 
KII project represents a newer developmental state model which is characterized more by 
the collaborative ties between the state and the private sector, in contrast to the older 
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model of the state’s dominance over the private sector. Inheriting the legacy of the old 
developmental state, the KII project was a final example of the state’s ability to launch, 
guide, and complete a major national IT policy initiative — final because, as will be 
evident by the end of this chapter, the state no longer has the power to intervene in the 
market in the same way that it once did.   
This study, therefore, regards the KII project as an example of an evolving phase 
of the developmental state model. To investigate the symbiotic relationship between the 
state and the private sector in the KII project, this study first explores the scholarly 
literature based on the developmental state theories that has described the patterns of such 
collaborative ties. The study then focuses on the prior-investment system led by the 
government, the policy consultation bodies created for the project between the state and 
the telecom incumbents, and the government’s IT policy rhetoric for creating a 
hegemonic consensus. This study then critiques the logic of inclusion/ exclusion in the 
KII project by evaluating the degree to which the project had a transparent and 
consultative policy setting that included other stakeholders such as the public and the 
small- and middle-sized firms and concludes that the denser the network of state–
business alliances or linkages becomes the more citizens are excluded from the decision-
making processes. 
As to methodology, the present study uses data from in-depth interviews with 
government officials from the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC), the 
National Computerization Agency (NCA — now the National Information Society 
Agency), and the telecom companies KT and Dacom, as well as official documents 
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relating to the project published by the MIC and the NCA that contain organizational 
charts and describe the major stakeholders’ relationships and the changes in their policy 
network based on the shifts in specific policy goals. 
 
 
6.2. THE TRANSFORMATIVE PHASES OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN KOREA 
6.2.1. The era of economic growth through dictatorship 
In modern Korea, the concept of the developmental state arose under the first 
military regime (1963–79), that of Cheong-hee Park, who came to power by coup d’état. 
Park achieved rapid economic growth by upgrading the import-substitution economies60 
of the Syngman Rhee (1948–60) and Po Sun Yun (1960–62) administrations, which were 
largely dependent on US aid, to export-oriented economies through the state-bank-
Chaebol nexus. Park’s regime is commonly described as kaebal-dokjae, which means 
“economic growth through dictatorship.” During the Park regime, government–business 
relationships were formed under the “overall guidance of a pilot planning agency” 
(Johnson, 1987: 145), such as the Economic Planning Board (EPB), which set forth a 
socialist-style national plan for industrialization.  
Throughout the nation, the Park regime propagated the motto, “Export is the only 
way to survive!” To accomplish this agenda, Park created five key government planning 
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bodies to direct the nation’s economic activity: the EPB, which reinforced its control over 
the economy through the management of the national budget and foreign borrowing; the 
President’s Economic Secretariat, which exercised considerable influence over economic 
decision-making up through the Doo-hwan Chun administration (1980–88); the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry, which was crucial to implementing economic policy; the Ministry 
of Finance, which was responsible for regulating and supervising all domestic and 
foreign financial institutions operating in the country; and the Ministry of Construction, 
which developed an aggressive policy program of infrastructure expansion. In addition, 
to promote its export-oriented growth policy, the Park administration encouraged the 
private sector to launch quasi-governmental trade organizations, such as the Korea Trade 
Promotion Agency and the Korea Foreign Traders’ Association (Hart-Landsberg, 1993).  
Relying on these governmental bodies and quasi-governmental organizations, the 
Park administration launched the first Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962–66), 
which was the first of six successive Five-Year EDPs set forth between 1962 and 1991. 
The basic objective of these EDPs was to industrialize the domestic economy and 
maximize economic growth through export.61 According to a national economic index 
released by the Bank of Korea in 1991, due to Park’s growth policy, heavy industry in 
manufacturing and exports grew rapidly until, by the late 1970s, it occupied nearly 50% 
of the Korean economic structure, and 65% by 1991. 
                                                                                                                                                 
60 Under Rhee’s administration, the state granted the monopoly of the “three white industries” — the 
processing of cotton, flour, and sugar from the US — to the burgeoning domestic businesses that later grew 
to be the family-owned Chaebols such as Samsung and Hyundai.  
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The Park administration’s export-oriented industrial policy promoted the 
emergence of the Chaebols in the early 1970s. To expand the heavy and chemical 
industries (such as steel and iron, nonferrous metal, machinery, shipbuilding, and 
petrochemical refineries), the government supported selected large domestic corporations 
such as Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo, 62  Lucky Goldstar (LG), Ssangyong, and 
SunKyong; these top six corporations (listed in descending order) showed an average 
annual capital growth rate of more than 30% during the period from 1971 to 1983 (Koo 
& Kim). These firms’ share in GDP reached 17.1% in 1978, up from 9.8% in 1973, and 
by 1978 the top 46 Chaebols were responsible for nearly 60% of value creation in 
manufacturing (SaKong, 1993). The military regime’s inability to control the Chaebols’ 
growth led to endemic overcapacity in automobile production: Hyundai Motors’ 
passenger car production operated at 52% of the market capacity in 1969 and at 61.8% by 
1979, when Kia and Daewoo operated at 55.4% and 24.6% capacity, respectively (Kang, 
2006). The government expanded the highways to boost domestic market demand as an 
answer to the overcapacity of the Chaebols such as Hyundai, Kia, and Daewoo. The 
crony capitalism between the state and the Chaebols since the time of the Park 
administration has became typical in the rent-seeking relationships that tie the two 
together, in which political funds are traded for economic favors. The military junta also 
made clear that since they held the banks in their hands, it was easy for them to regulate 
                                                                                                                                                 
61 At that time, the objectives of Korean and Japanese industrial policy were different in that Japan desired 
to catch up the advanced countries’ economies, while Korea hoped to surpass North Korea’s lead in 
industrialization (Harvie & Lee, 2003). 
62 In the midst of the 1997 financial crisis, the US auto maker General Motors absorbed the Daewoo 
Group. Since then it has been named GM Daewoo. 
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the Chaebols. The military authoritarianism of the Park regime became the impetus to 
initiate the Korean-style “developmental state” model through the so-called “state-bank-
Chaebol nexus.”  
Industrial modernization mixed with Park’s economic interventionism deeply 
wounded both urban and rural life in Korea. For instance, in the metropolitan areas, 
concrete multi-dwelling units and high-rise apartment complexes began replacing green 
zones and inflated the price of housing rapidly by unleashing speculation in the market,63 
while in the rural areas from 1970 onward the Saemaul Undong (“new community 
movement”) swept across farming villages in the name of modernizing and enhancing the 
lives of farmers. The village restructuring project initiated by the military junta rapidly 
“modernized” rural areas through village relocation and redevelopment up into the mid-
80s. What the regime actually contributed to the movement was 800 free bags of cement 
in 1971 and 1972,64 along with an indoctrination of villagers with ascetic ideals such as 
diligence, austerity, thrift, and mutual cooperation. As a typical side effect of 
industrialization, a rural exodus caused massive depopulation, leaving households behind 
in the villages. The Saemaul Undong was in fact accomplished by the labor of elderly 
villagers and by their own financial contributions, rather than by the government’s 
investment: For this project, the farmers were responsible for 70% to 80% of the total 
amount of financial investment between 1972 and 1978 (Moon, 1991), and the average 
                                                 
63 The construction market in Korea was, and is, dominated by five main construction and engineering 
firms which are subsidiaries of Chaebols (Samsung, Daewoo, Posco, Hyundai, and Kumho) and which also 
dominate the private participation in infrastructure (PPI) projects (Noumba UM & Dinghem, 2004). 
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debt per farm household was approximately US $ 3,500 by 1988 (Lie, 1991). Every 
household in rural areas has been in debt since then, still paying the price for obtaining 
modern amenities such as electricity, telephony, and cement-roofed housing.  
The Saemaul Undong did contribute to renovating the poor conditions of land use 
in such aspects as irrigation, farm feeder roads, small bridges, and farm equipment. In 
urban areas, high-rise apartments lowered the cost of installing electric and telephone 
lines, and electrical and communication infrastructure was expanded in both urban and 
rural areas under the Park regime: Telephone facilities were expanded from 120,000 lines 
in 1961 to 1.7 million nationwide in 1977 (Kim, 1993). Owing to the housing renewal 
project, by 1982, rural electrification and the installation of a telephone system were 
almost completed (Moon, 1991). Nevertheless, the modernization programs directed by 
the military junta destroyed the traditional and nature-friendly living environment in 
South Korea: Under the rubric of “sanitation,” roads paved in concrete or mortar and 
houses roofed in slate or cement replaced the “pre-modern” country lanes and traditional 
gray, straw-thatched roofs of farmhouses, leaving the countryside faded and desolate. As 
the expansion of electric and communication networks modernized the living conditions 
of villagers it also created new consumer demand for home appliances such as TV sets, 
refrigerators, electric cookers, and electric irons, as well as an increase of telephony 
subscription, in rural areas. The rural demand played a significant role in increasing the 
consumption of electric products supplied by Chaebols such as Samsung, Daewoo, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
64 The Saemaul Undong was initiated by the so-called “Cement Project” spearheaded by the military 
regime, which provided all 33,267 villages with 335 cement bags during the winter of 1970–71 and an 
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LG, which from the early 80s onward succeeded in launching an electric home appliance 
business not only domestically but also internationally, well beyond their successes in the 
heavy, chemical, and shipbuilding industries during the 1970s. Nevertheless, up into the 
80s and even the early 90s, the Korean economy was based on a labor-intensive 
economy, far behind from the technology-intensive economies of the advanced countries. 
As shown in Table 6.1, despite Park’s industrial modernization project, high-tech 
products accounted for less than 3% out of Korea’s total exports in the mid-80s.  
 
 
Table 6.1. Export shares of technology-intensive products (%)  
 
Country    1965 1975 1984 
France  7.3 8.4 7.7 
Germany  16.9 16.8 14.5 
Japan  7.3 11.6 20.2 
Korea 0.0 0.5 2.9 
United States  27.5 24.5 25.2 
 
Source: Leipziger & Petri (1993: 11) 
 
The Park administration thus became an archetype of the developmental state which 
successfully accomplished industrial modernization in the shortest time. The Park regime 
was based on a strong repressive state, the state’s dominance over the private sector, and 
growth-oriented interventionism involving labor exploitation and suppression. 65  As 
                                                                                                                                                 
additional 500 bags in 1972 (Moon, 1991).   
65 As an example of how Korea’s political-bureaucratic elites maintained their dominant power over the 
interests of big business, Johnson (1987: 157) describes the establishment of the Korean Central 
Intelligence Agency (KCIA), which was founded as an independent government agency, originally built 
around a 3,000-man cadre from the existing Army Counter-Intelligence Corps, which had expanded to 
some 370,000 employees by 1964. The KCIA’s original mission focused on counter-communist activities 
and fighting military corruption. Under the military regimes, the KCIA was used as a domestic surveillance 
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regards of the control of labor, for instance, the Park regime established a “ghost” national 
labor union, the so-called Federation of Korea Trade Unions, in order to moderate local 
union demands, prohibit any potential labor disputes, and discipline recalcitrant workers 
(Han & Ling, 1998). Further, comparisons of the Gini coefficient66 of inequality for 
income between 1965 and 2007 in Figure 5.7 can be viewed with skepticism: The Gini 
coefficient value of over .40 signifies that income inequality is very significant 
nationwide, and the Figure 6.1 shows that, during the period of industrial modernization 
under the Park regime, the Gini values reached over .40, even though it has fallen below 
.40 (average of .35) since the early 90s.  
 
Figure 6.1. Income inequality in Korea, 1965–2007  
 
Source: Data from Leipziger, et al. (1992) from 1965 to 1988, and from the National Statistical Office 
(2008) from 1990 onward. 
                                                                                                                                                 
and spying agency to collect, analyze, and monitor intelligence data on businesses and the citizenry. The 
intelligence agency enabled the development of a “Big brother”-type disciplinary society which monitored 
not only any citizen critical of the government but also overall business activities.  
66 The Gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality, with a higher value indicating greater inequality 
The Gini coefficient ranges from 0.0 (perfect equality) to 1.0 (perfect inequality, that is, all income accrues 
to one household) (Leipziger, et al., [1992]). 
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This income inequality level of the Gini coefficient around .35 is a phenomenon that 
prevails in most capitalist societies. Nevertheless, Korea shows Gini coefficient values in 
gross personal wealth (.62), and real assets (.64) including housing, are double that of 
income (.35) as of 2006 (National Statistical Office, 2008). These high indicators of 
inequality reveal the cumulative effects of developmentalism through a number of the 
national construction and urban planning projects since the Park regime.  
 Even after Park’s assassination in 1979 by his intelligence chief, the military-
backed interventionism in the market by the administration of General Doo-hwan Chun, 
who once again came to power in a military coup, was extensive until the 1987 pro-
democracy movement forced him to introduce a direct presidential voting system. After 
taking power, Chun appointed technocrats who had earned doctoral degrees in economics 
in the US and were known as followers of the neoliberal Milton Friedman (Kim, 1999). 
This hardly means, however, that the Chun administration whole-heartedly embraced 
laissez-faire economics. Despite being somewhat influenced by the global trend of 
neoliberalism promoted from the early 1980s onwards by Reagan in the US and Thatcher 
in Britain, Chun still intervened directly in the market.  
 Chun always saw Cheong-hee Park as his role model, and his regime was the 
embodiment of the strong, repressive state. For instance, under the Chun administration, 
“labor-management councils” were mandated for all enterprises, effectively destroying 
autonomous union activities (Han & Ling, 1998). Korean corporations’ strategies to 
weaken workers’ militant temper have ranged the gamut from dirty tricks such as 
detention, verbal abuse, and demotion all the way to the use of the latest computerized 
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surveillance devices. By dividing workers into spatial, gender, educational, and 
occupational strata, both the government and the private sector have joined to manage 
them, “who should be trained like lambs,” according to a Confucian managerial ideology 
(Lie, 2006). Furthermore, in December of 1980, to silence voices critical to his regime, 
Chun enacted the Basic Press Act67 and forcefully conducted the eonron-tongpaehap, the 
“compulsory reform of the media.” Chun commanded KBS, the state-owned broadcaster, 
to absorb the TBC television network, which was owned by Samsung Corp. He also 
ordered the pro-government newspaper, Kyonghyang Shinmun, to absorb Shin-A Ilbo, a 
daily newspaper, and forced at least six local newspapers to close their business 
permanently. Over 700 journalists were dismissed from their jobs and the remaining 
newspapers were subjected to a high degree of government control (Billet, 1990). As 
another example of his use of state power against the Chaebols, in 1985 Chun dismantled 
the seventh largest conglomerate in the nation, the Kookjae group, which had around 200 
subsidiaries at that time, merely because it refused to donate “political funds” (protection 
money, in essence). This example shows that regime had the power to punish the 
Chaebols for the slightest disobedience, and also illustrates the rent-seeking relations 
between the ruling junta and the business elites.  
Since the changing political climate brought about by the democratization 
                                                 
67 The Basic Press Act of 1980, the legal cornerstone of General Chun’s media censorship and control, 
was the successor to the Standards for Implementation of the Press Policy of 1962, a decree formulated and 
enforced by Park’s Military Revolutionary Council. The Basic Press Act, like its predecessor, prescribes 
standards for publication facilities, and in effect functions as a regulatory force, limiting the growth of 
existing newspapers as well as the entry of new papers without a solid financial basis (Youm, 1986). The 
Act was repealed in November 1987 and replaced by the Act on Registration of Periodicals and the 
Broadcast Act (Youm & Salwen, 1990). 
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movement of 1987, the public began to critique the symbiosis between the government 
and the Chaebols. The domestic conglomerates themselves began to demand a market 
economy free from the government’s direct intervention (Ko, 2001). Due to the rapid 
growth of the Chaebols and the rising political pressure from below, the government 
could not wield absolute power over the private sector any more. During the presidency 
of Tae-Woo Noh (1988–93), Chun’s designated successor, the technocrats chose a via 
media approach between direct interventionism and deregulation, one in which the 
Chaebols were supported by being granted lucrative business licenses, special loans and 
other financial benefits from government agencies, and contracts to build the national 
infrastructure to promote market efficiencies. For instance, in 1992 the Noh 
administration licensed SK (Sunkyong), the sixth largest Chaebol in the nation, as the 
cellular phone provider over the other more competitive bidders because the son of SK’s 
owner was married to President Noh’s daughter (Mobile Phone News, 1992, September 
12; Ko, 2001). Although the license was ultimately withdrawn due to the public’s 
growing antipathy, the case was a typical example of Korea’s crony capitalism.  
 
6.2.2. The era of big capital’s ascendancy over the state 
Throughout the period of rapid IT growth owing to the state-led IT policies and 
initiatives, the civilian governments have continued and in some ways even expanded a 
crony relationship with the Chaebols, which have grown since the Park’s regime through 
the state’s financial sponsorship, exclusive grants of business licenses, and selection of 
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major actors in a newly emerging economy. Under the administration of Young-Sam 
Kim (1993–1998), the first democratically elected president, the government endorsed 
the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), an organization largely representing the 
Chaebols’ interests, to select the assignees for the telecom licenses during the telecom 
reform of 1993. In 1995 the government allowed the Chaebols to enter the media and IT 
industry by granting them profitable new licenses for cable television services (Shim, 
2002). The Chaebols became the largest recipients of the lucrative profits stemming from 
the state’s permission to launch new business in the telecom and media sector. 
Responding to the shift of the world economy into the digital mode of production, 
the Chaebols began to abandon exports of low and medium-low technology products in 
order to create new profitable sources from the high-tech industry, while adjusting their 
activities to cooperate with the government’s IT policy plans. This foray by the Chaebols 
into the new IT sector represented the creation of the so-called “e-Chaebols” (Chang, 
2003): In the broadband Internet service market (the KII-P), KT is the national incumbent 
with a 50% market share, and LG’s subsidiaries LG Dacom and LG Powercomm together 
comprise a second ranked provider with a market share of 14%, as of 2007, even though 
several small service providers have now entered into that market (NIA, 2007). The 
Chaebols have also extended their market dominance into the new mobile telecom 
service business where they are the dominant vendors of cell phones. Moreover, 
technological convergence in the mobile telephony market has legitimated the 
deregulation of the domestic mobile telecom market in such a way as to further extend 
the Chaebol-owned mobile network operators’ dominance into other broadband 
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communications and multimedia content services through acquiring stocks in younger 
companies (see Figure 6.2): SK Telecom, a subsidiary of Sunkyong, now dominates over 
half of the Korean mobile telecom market, while KTF, a subsidiary of KT, has a market 
share of 32% and LG Telecom of about 17% (Electronic Times, 2006, December). The 
mobile telephony market is “the goose that lays the golden eggs” for the Korean 
government and industrial conglomerates. The Korean government rapidly created a 
profitable new market for the Chaebol-owned mobile network providers. In other words, 
the government created the new market — or rather, they structured a new market in such 
a way that only the Chaebols could benefit from it.  
Figure 6.2. The Chaebols’ entrance into the domestic telecom service market 
 
Unit: Stock shares (%)  
Source: Data from the company’ websites (as of December 2006) 
 
 
Owing to their privileged position in the domestic market, the Chaebols, 
especially Samsung and LG, were enabled to expand into a variety of other IT sectors, 
such as their global sales of mobile handsets, flat panel displays, and semiconductors. For 
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instance, as of 2001, Korea’s share of the global semiconductor market was 5.7%, but its 
market share of dynamic random access memory (DRAM) chips totaled 41.5%, with 
27% going to Samsung and 14.5% to Hynix (formerly known as Hyundai Electronics); 
Samsung and Hynix were ranked in the first and the third, respectively, among global 
producers of DRAM chips. As of 2000, Samsung Electronics and LG Philips LCD (a 
joint venture of the Chaebol LG and the Dutch company Philips) were ranked first and 
second, respectively, in the market for large-size TFT-LCD screens, with a combined 
market share of 32% (Hong, et al., 2004). As of February 2007, the Korean production of 
mobile handsets and system facilities makes up almost 30% of the global market share 
and accounts for about US $17 billion of exports (among global mobile handset 
manufacturers, Samsung Electronics is currently ranked third and LG Electronics, fifth). 
The export of mobile handsets alone is about 10% of total national exports (NIA, 2007). 
The typically duopolistic structure of the Chaebols can be observed in the equipment 
market for broadband Internet network, where ADSL hardware and modem production is 
dominated by LG Electronics and Samsung (Jeon & Bae, 2007).  
The state’s crony relationship with the Chaebols, while it has produced dramatic 
economic growth, has also produced negative effects on many economic actors. The IT 
industry is capital-intensive and R&D-intensive, compared to other low and medium-low 
technology sectors. As with the export-oriented policies under the military regimes, the 
civilian government has strategically favored the large conglomerates both for building a 
new economy and for enhancing the export of high-tech products. By doing so, they have 
put Korea’s small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in IT manufacturing far behind the 
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Chaebols: the employment share of SMEs in IT manufacturing is 41.0%, while their 
share in the non-IT sector is still very high at 77.9%. The value-added share of SMEs in 
IT manufacturing is only 14.5%, while it is 58.3% in the non-IT sector. In other words, 
SMEs obtain their revenues from the medium-low technology products and also have a 
very low level of productivity in IT manufacturing. Meanwhile, the largest five Chaebols 
contributed to one-half of Korea’s GDP as well as one-half of all exports in 2001 
(Campbell II & Keys, 2002).   
The situation under the civilian governments has not been much different from the 
disciplinary control of workers under the military regime. According to a survey 
requested by the Joint Committee to End Surveillance of Workers (Hangil Research and 
Consulting, 2003), almost 90% out of a random sample of 207 Korean workplaces had 
monitored workers with a variety of surveillance devices including web log-files, email 
programs and computer hard drives, telephone conversation recordings, closed-circuit 
television (CCTV) camera systems, electronic ID cards for gate passes, and the 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system.68 In this survey, Korean workers expressed 
increasing anxiety about the conditions of workers burdened by the installation of refined 
surveillance devices for labor control and complained about such reactionary effects of 
surveillance as weakening the unionized actions of workers, intensifying the labor load, 
making job status more unstable, and increasing managers’ abuse of power.  
                                                 
68 The enterprise resource planning (ERP) system has been rapidly introduced to control activities in 
many institutions, such as hospitals, in Korea. The ERP system refers to managing and integrating logistics, 
accounting, and human resources by means of concentrated database system software. Head (2003) 
describes the ERP system as a digital control mode of the new ruthless economy similar to the industrial 
assembly line in that it allows managers to manage workers’ activities in as much detail as they want. 
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Table 6.2. The rate of unionization in OECD countries, 1970–2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD (2003), Visser (2003), Kong (2000: 97), and for Korea, Shin (2006, March 25), followed in 
parentheses by figures from the Yearbook of Labor Statistics (Ministry of Labor, 1991), which are thought 
to be inflated. 
 
As evidence of the poor labor conditions in Korea, Table 6.2 shows that Korea has the 
lowest rate of unionization among the OECD countries from 1970 to 2000, even when 
viewed in the context of the worldwide decline in the rate of unionization. As regards the 
bargaining power of the workers, at 14% Korea also has the lowest rate in the Table 5.2. 
In the mid-90s, the domestic Chaebols also expanded their scope into the global 
market through building subsidiaries and investing the capital. Further, the Chaebols 
borrowed low-interest foreign loans — as of 1996, the average debt ratio of the 30 top 
conglomerates reached 450% — without screening by the government. The Chaebols’ 
dependence on foreign financial capital accelerated the 1997 economic crisis due to 
volatile foreign hedge funds, speculative capital, and international lending. Under the 
pressure of the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications and the IMF bailout 
program — in which Korea obtained US $58 billion of emergency loans — the Kim Dae-
Country 1970 1980 1990 2000 Bargaining coverage rate 
Australia 44 48 40 25 80 
Belgium 41 54 54 56 90 
Canada  32 35 33 28 34 
Denmark 60 79 75 74 69 
Finland 51 69 72 76 95 
France 22 18 10 10 95 
Germany 32 35 31 25 73 
Japan 35 31 25 21 20 
Korea, Rep of 13 (20) 15 (21) 17 (18.4) 11 14 
Mexico - - 43 18 n/a 
Portugal - 61 32 24 80+ 
United Kingdom 45 51 39 31 36 
United States 27 22 15 13 15 
OECD Average 42 47 42 34 60 
 152 
Jung administration (1998–2003) privatized KT, the state-owned telecom incumbent, and 
fully opened the domestic banking, media, and telecom market, among others, to foreign 
investors.69  
The government’s dominance over the Chaebols has gradually waned, while the 
larger Chaebols have accumulated even more power as the medium-sized ones have 
declined or been absorbed.70 President Moo-hyun Roh (2003–08) confessed the state was 
losing its power to regulate the Chaebols when he commented, “We have already entered 
into the age of big capital having the upper hand over the state” (Kim, 2005, May 16). 
The Samsung bribery scandal provides an illustration of how widespread the Chaebols 
power may be: in January of 2008, at the insistence of civil rights groups, the Roh 
administration launched an investigation of Samsung centered on whether it had amassed 
slush funds, peddled influence by routinely bribing government officials, the media, and 
members of the judiciary, and engaged in shady stock deals to pass control of the group 
from its chairman, Kun-hee Lee, to his only son. Courageous whistle-blower Yong-cheol 
Kim, the former head of Samsung’s legal affairs team, joined by members of the Catholic 
Priests Association for Justice, told a radio station that “the list of bribe-takers includes 
not just top prosecutors and ministers in the Roh administration, but also people recently 
nominated or mentioned as possible members of the cabinet or high-ranking staff 
                                                 
69 In the aftermath of 1997, a discourse about oeja yuchi (“the enticement of foreign capital”) has 
dominated Korean society as it seeks to recover from the recession (Lim & Jang, 2006). This discourse was 
used to legitimize the full-fledged opening of the domestic market to foreign investors. 
70 Since the 1997 financial crisis, the concentration of power in the hands of the larger Chaebols was 
accelerated by such events as the collapse of the Daewoo Group, the divestiture of the Hyundai Group, the 
change of the LG Group into a holding company, and foreign investors’ takeover attempt of SK and KT&G 
(Lee, 2006). 
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members of the Blue House [the Korean White House]” (Korea Times, 2008, January 
10). The public, therefore, is skeptical that the “Republic of Samsung” can truly be 
brought to justice considering the extent of Samsung’s power in Korean society (Asia 
Sentinel, 2008, March 2).71 This scandal reveals that the parasitic bond between corrupt 
state bureaucrats and monopoly capitalists is still very much alive even under a politically 
progressive administration and that the balance of power has rapidly shifted towards the 
latter since 1997 financial crisis.  
 
In sum, Korea’s democratic turmoil in 1987 began the momentum to weaken the 
absolute power the state had enjoyed since 1963, while the 1997 financial crisis under the 
civilian government remarkably enhanced the Chaebols’ power through their alliance 
with foreign capital; once dominated by the state, it is the Chaebols that now dominate it. 
In responding to shifting external and internal factors, the evolving relationship between 
the state and the conglomerates has transformed the developmental state model from that 
                                                 
71 In the financial crisis of 1997, when the IMF forced the Korean market to follow its structural 
adjustment program, many Korean mega-conglomerates collapsed in the re-structuring of the domestic 
economy that ensued, but Samsung seized its opportunity and jumped into first place in the domestic 
market. The different divisions of Samsung are now a set of huge monopolies, and the corporation as a 
whole ranks as number one among Korea’s ruling conglomerates, accounting for one-fifth of the country’s 
exports. Samsung Corporation encompasses almost every profitable industry under its business logo 
(Samsung Group, 2006): Samsung Electronics, Samsung SDI, and Renault Samsung Motors, as well as 
Samsung Securities, Life Insurance, Credit Card, Heavy Industries, Engineering, Everland Theme Park, 
Advertising, Petrochemicals, Shopping, Cable Channels, and so forth. Samsung’s rapid capital 
accumulation has been made possible by its omnipresent power in the Korean economy and society — 
described by such common terms as “Samsung’s way” and “the Republic of Samsung” — and by its 
collaboration with the state in controlling the labor market. While Samsung contributed significantly to 
promoting Korea’s national economy in the global market, its dominant market power, with a total of 62 
subsidiaries and a sales record of US $1.39 trillion, as of April 2005 (Samsung Group, 2006), makes it a 
pervasive and overwhelming force in both the Korean economy and Korean society.  
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of the strong and repressive state through that of a limited or flexible state to that of the 
market-driven state.  
The state’s symbiosis with the Chaebols signifies the retrogressive aspects of the 
Korean economy even in the era of the new economy. Castells (2000a: 190–205) 
describes the Korean Chaebols as far more “hierarchical, authoritarian, and patrilineal” 
than the Japanese keiretsu and the Taiwanese guanxiqiye networks, 72  because, in 
addition to being controlled by a central holding company owned by an individual and his 
family, the Korean Chaebols’ rapid development was enabled by an anti-labor business 
climate and the denial of SMEs’ entry into new markets.  
 
6.3. THE KII PROJECT AS A LEGACY OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE MODEL 
The close relationship between the state and economic conglomerates in Korea 
has often been termed jeongkyong yuchak (“the symbiosis of two entities”), which has a 
negative connotation.73 In this symbiosis, the government granted moneymaking licenses 
to, and invested public funds in, the largest conglomerates, and in return the Chaebols 
donated large sums to political slush funds. A unique mechanism of the developmental 
state is to transcend simple rent-seeking links between the two dominant elites and to 
                                                 
72 In other Asian countries, business groups guided by a single entrepreneur have been dominant, similar 
to the Korean Chaebols, which historically were inspired by the Japanese zaibatsu (ざいばつ, large 
family-controlled monopolies which were dismantled in the late 1940s); in contemporary Japan, the 
keiretsu (系列) is a business group vertically integrated through majority and minority holdings, while the 
kigyoshudan (企業集団) is a business group horizontally aligned through reciprocal shareholdings (Scott, 
1991; Castells, 2000a: 190). The kigyoshudan resembles the Chinese guanxiqiye (關係業, “related 
enterprises”) found in Singapore and Taiwan (Guillén, 2000). 
 155 
transform their symbiosis into a mechanism for economic growth. Although 
developmentalism, promoted under the slogan of national modernization, conceals such 
chronic problems as an unethical business culture, power elitism, cronyism, corruption, 
corporate suppression of labor, deep class divisions, and the public’s exclusion from the 
decision-making process, nevertheless, the unethical mechanisms of jeongkyong yuchak 
have been a driving force for economic growth, curbing the excessive penetration of 
foreign capital and enhancing the market competitiveness of domestic conglomerates. 
Many scholars have explored the transformations of state–business relationships 
in Korea, focusing on cross-regime variations in economic development, specifically, the 
shifting balance of power between the two. Analyses of Korean state–business relations 
include a shift “from dominance to symbiosis” (Kim, 1988); “governed interdependence” 
(Weiss, 1988); a “pragmatic mix of government guidance with private initiative” (Jeon, 
1994); the “patron-client relation” (Nam, 1994); a shift from “the stern but stable state-
directed symbiotic partnership to a more unruly and erratic partnership” (Moon, 1994); 
“embedded autonomy” (Evans, 1995); “public-private reciprocity” (Fields, 1997); the 
shift from the developmental state to the “post-developmental” or “market-driven state” 
(Kim, 1999; 2005); “path dependency” (Jang, 2000); the “state production of 
oligopolistic capitalism” (Castells, 2000b); an “eclecticism beyond orthodoxies” (Clark, 
2002; Clark & Jung, 2004); a “state–Chaebol alliance based on a more populist social 
contract” (Hundt, 2005); a “transformative state in which the state acted as senior partner 
                                                                                                                                                 
73 In addition to jeongkyong yuchak, under Park’s junta, the term gwanchi gyeongjae, or “state-controlled 
economy,” was commonly used to denounce the military elites’ intervention in the market. 
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rather than commander-in-chief” (Cherry, 2005); and the demise of “Korea, Inc.” (the 
state–banks–Chaebols complex) and the rise of “neoliberal consensus” (the coalition of 
Chaebols, technocrats, politicians, economic experts, and NGOs) (Lim & Jang, 2006; Lee 
& Han, 2006).  
Despite their slightly different foci and analyses, most studies note the major 
contextual factors weakening the state’s power, such as the growing Chaebol-dominated 
economy, increasing democratization, and global pressures for liberalization. They also 
agree that the Korean state’s modus operandi has changed considerably from the military 
regimes to the civilian governments. Some of the studies (e.g., Kim, 1999, 2005; Lim & 
Jang, 2006; Lee & Han, 2006) further subdivide their analyses into periods marked by 
such historical events as the citizens’ uprising of 1987 and the IMF financial crisis of 
1997. Some scholars (e.g., Jeon, 1994; Nam, 1994) describe the shifts in the state–
Chaebol relationship as if the older relationship has been completely annulled by the 
new. The present study, in contrast, sees the state-business linkages as transformative and 
continuously evolving, while retaining embedded traces of the past. As shown in Figure 
6.3, the KII project, which extended from 1995 to 2005, was accomplished during 
Korea’s evolution from a limited or flexible development state to a market-driven or 
post-development state. These phases of evolution are quite distant from the strong state 
model exemplified by the first two military regimes (those of Park and Chun). Initiated 
during the flexible state phase, the KII project involved coordinate state–business 
relationships which were maintained through continuous negotiation processes carried 
out by a series of intermediary committees. Nevertheless, the entire project was initiated, 
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developed, and guided by the state — a situation which would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to replicate in Korea’s present post-developmental state phase of evolution. 
In other words, an explanation of the KII’s success requires consideration of the 
“Chaebol-governance process and the political institutional arrangements for the state-
firm relationship based on the ‘politics of reciprocal subsidy’” (Mansell & When, 1998: 
123, italics in original).  
Figure 6.3. The evolving phases of the developmental state and the KII project 
 
 
 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
 
 
6.4. THE CLOSE STATE–BUSINESS LINKAGES THROUGHOUT THE KII PROJECT 
The major goal of Young-Sam Kim’s administration was to shift Korea away 
from its export-centered economy, which had been the major mechanism of market 
productivity under the military regimes, and search out a new source of profits for the 
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domestic conglomerates. Kim favored the affiliation of Korea with the global economy 
and regarded the KII as a powerful engine to drive the nation’s economic structure 
towards the knowledge-based economy. By interconnecting government agencies and 
public institutions with high-speed broadband networks, he sought to upgrade the 
nation’s infrastructure and expand its capacities to create a new IT-driven market. In 
1994, the Kim administration announced the broad master plan for the KII and launched 
the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC), which absorbed the major IT-
related administrative functions from other ministries. In 1995, the government also 
issued the “Framework Act on Informatization Promotion” (FAIP, Act No. 4969) which 
included the legal provisions for conducting the KII policy plan which set forth the R&D 
goals to be met, provided the funding for the long-term IT project, and established the top 
decision-making committee and its subsidiary bodies. 
 The KII project has been highly praised as a successful policy experiment by 
government officials, policymakers, scholars, and journalists from foreign countries, who 
focus on Korea’s attainment of “broadband heaven” through vigorous state leadership 
and corporate cooperation (see Chapter 5.2). Few, however, have examined the inner 
mechanisms of the KII project’s success such as the state-led funding structure, the 
special steering and intermediate committees, and the consensual dynamics of IT 
discourse. This section investigates the mechanisms that made the eleven-year state-led 
project viable, and examines how the state-business linkages have became more flexible 
and less consistent since the demise of the strong, repressive state.     
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6.4.1. Taming the telecom incumbents with the carrot, not the stick  
Information infrastructure projects such as the KII are typically burdensome to the private 
sector, and corporations are therefore usually less than enthusiastic about such plans, 
which involve massive, long-term investment, high risk, and uncertain returns. To 
involve Korean Telecom (KT) and Dacom in the KII project, the Kim administration 
offered a variety of enticements: preferential tax treatment, the granting of new licenses, 
and investment loans underwritten by the government. As one manager of KT’s Network 
Engineering Department noted, KT, the domestic telecom incumbent, “was relatively 
favorable to the government, which was its dominant stockholder until KT was 
completely privatized [in 2002]” (Kang, 2007, June 5). The government had also allowed 
Dacom to acquire licenses for international and long-distance telephony services during 
the national telecom restructurings of 1990 and 1994, respectively, which were initiated 
for the purpose of curbing the international pressure for telecom market liberalization, 
and Dacom had rapidly emerged as the second largest telecom company in Korea. As a 
result, the government was able to gain the cooperation of the two telecom incumbents 
without any great conflict. A deputy director of LG Dacom described the situation this 
way: 
 
The KII project was very supportive for the private partners in that the 
government minimized our business risk by its public investment. At that time 
nobody dared to invest the enormous funds for it; through the public funding, 
Dacom was able to leapfrog ahead by facilitating the nationwide optical networks. 
The contribution from public investment was highly significant. (Song, 2007, 
May 29)    
 
A manager of KT’s Network Investment Planning Department also agreed on the effect 
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of the state-sponsored investment: 
 
It is obvious that the state-led “investment first, construction next” policy plan 
gave KT and Dacom the incentive to participate in the KII project without a great 
business risk, and also minimized the potential friction between the government 
and us throughout the project. In those days, KT, as the first partner in the 
government project, benefited from the immense state-led investment that allowed 
us to expand the optical networks. (Kim, 2007, June 1) 
 
The “investment first, construction next” principle was the telecom companies’ major 
incentive to join in the KII project, allowing them to minimize their investment risk and 
cost at the earlier stage of the project. KT and Dacom also regarded the huge project as a 
chance to upgrade their copper lines to high-speed fiber optic networks.  
  In the building of the backbone networks connecting the public agencies and 
institutions — the so-called KII-G — KT was allotted a 70% share and Dacom a 30% 
share. The KII-public (KII-P) was independently built as a commercial network through 
the budget of the telecom companies themselves, and the KII-testbed (KII-T), the optimal 
high speed R&D network, was built by the public-private partnership. For the KII-G, its 
most important backbone network, the government invested a total of US $6.2 billion 
over the three phases. At the beginning, the government as the major stakeholder aimed 
to own the backbone network directly and grant the telecom companies a 25-year lease to 
it. The government — specifically, the MIC as funding distributor and the National 
Computerization Agency (NCA, now the National Information Society Agency) as 
funding manager and coordinator — also pressured the telecom operators to apply an 
80% or 90% discount to the proposed online service charges for public agencies that 
would become subscribers in September of 1997. As Che-Hyun Jo, the Deputy Director 
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of Dacom and one of the key actors in the KII-G project, noted in his official interview 
with the NCA (2005), the discount rate requested by the government was burdensome, 
and the mood became very dark within the telecom companies. The sensitive issues of 
the KII-G network ownership and service charges triggered critical conflicts between the 
government and the private sector (MIC & NCA, 2006: 130). In addition, the Board of 
Audit and Inspection’s questioning of the MIC’s funding method for installing the optical 
lines in 1996 jeopardized the completion of the project itself (131).  
This crisis at the early stages of the project (1995–1997) finally caused the MIC to 
change the subscriber costs and ownership structure: It decided to transfer ownership of 
the fiber-optic backbone lines to KT and Dacom and to establish a joint public-private 
sector KII fund (a so-called “bilateral netting account”) out of which the KII-G would be 
built and out of which the government would subsidize 40% of the service charge for 
subscribers in government agencies and public institutions. In return, the two telecom 
companies agreed to reimburse the joint fund a portion of their profits year by year until 
their government loans were paid off, and to offer a 40% discount rate to KII-G 
subscribers. As an interviewee who was an official at the NCA, which managed the cost 
system between two entities, commented, the new cost mechanisms for the KII-G 
enabled by the government subsidies led to a breakthrough in the conflicts between the 
government and the private sector (Rha, 2007, May 28). Further, since a 40% discount 
and a 40% government subsidy was applied to the service charges, government agencies 
and public institutions were able to receive broadband Internet for 20% of the actual cost, 
and institutional users grew rapidly — from 2,184 subscriber lines in 1996 to 30,137 lines 
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in 1998 (Lee, et al., 2007). Once a critical mass of subscribers had been reached, the 
government was able to complete the KII-G phase of the project without further 
difficulty; the KII-G recorded the highest growth rate (789%) of subscribers in 1997, as 
compared in 1996, the first year of service, and the growth rate then stabilized to an 
average rate of 20% growth annually from 1998 to 2005. As of September 2005, 32,000 
public agencies and institutions are subscribers to the KII-G (MIC & NCA, 2006).   
 The increase in subscribers from public institutions and agencies brought a more 
stable flow of profits to the telecom companies, and this, in turn, furthered the 
development of the KII-P, the commercial network. At this point, the government could 
not overtly intervene in guiding the KII-P because of external pressures brought to bear 
on the government. As an official of the NCA (now the NIA) describes it,  
 
In the mid-90s, the government had no choice but to leave the KII-P’s 
development in the hands of the private sector. Under strong global pressure to 
liberalize the telecom market, the government could not intervene in the market or 
lead the KII-P directly, but could only recommend the government’s roadmap to 
the private sector. Otherwise, it might cause serious friction in US–Korea trade 
relations. (Jeong, 2007, June 5) 
 
Despite this, since 1997 the government has successfully stimulated private investment in 
the local loop and facility-based competition by introducing the so-called “cyber-building 
certificate program” into the KII-P. Through this certificate program, apartments and 
buildings were ranked according to their capacity to handle high-speed Internet. As a 
public official who worked for the KII project pointed out, because South Korea’s 
population is largely located in a few large urban areas and because most residents live in 
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large apartment buildings, the MIC’s facility-based Internet promotion policy was 
effective in expanding the penetration of high-speed Internet service into the general 
public. He added that, in the early stages of this program, the certificate system also 
allowed construction companies to raise the mortgage price on new government-certified 
“Internet-ready” apartments (Moon, 2007, June 7). The demand created through the 
indirect promotion of broadband Internet assured the telecom companies and the 
construction companies — the latter of which were mostly owned by the Chaebols — a 
steady stream of new customers. Further, since 2001 the Ministry of Construction and 
Transportation (MCT) has required that all new apartments or multi-dwelling units have 
broadband Internet connections (Falch, 2007; Lee & Chan-Olmsted, 2004).  
Most of my interviewees, who were directly involved in implementing the KII 
project, agreed that the KII-G was the significant factor in the KII-P’s development and 
furthered network-based economic growth. As Yeong-Ro Lee, executive director of the 
NIA, noted,  
In the 90s, the Korean economy was competing in very few areas of the world 
market, such as shipbuilding and microchips; due to the KII project, it is now 
ranked first in the telecom service market for the first time. It would have been 
impossible without the construction of the KII to reach the current state where IT 
represents 30%, of foreign exports. In my personal view, the industrial 
repercussions of the KII go well beyond our imagination. Think about these: the 
world-class digital services such as Internet banking, “CyWorld” [a popular 
Korean web-community site], and web portal service are all products of the KII 
project. (Lee, 2007, June 7)  
 
A Deputy Director of LG Dacom described the “spillover effect” of the KII-G (the public 
network) to the KII-P (the commercial network) this way: 
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Although the two projects [KII-G and the KII-P] were separately operated, each is 
closely related to the other in the way in which the KII-P has been developed on 
the basis of the electronic network built by the KII-G. Dacom’s broadband 
transmission lines for commercial users “technically” overlap those [of the public 
network], even though the two networks are “logically” separated. (Song, 2007, 
May 29) 
 
A manager of KT also agreed on the infrastructure effect of the state-sponsored 
investment:  
 
It is obvious that a part of the backbone networks was used for the commercial 
network. Both overlap in some ways. In that sense, the KII-G contributed [to the 
development of the KII-P] to some degree. (Kim, 2007, June 1) 
 
The two interviewees from the facility-based telecom service providers (KT and Dacom) 
directly involved in constructing the KII consider the commercial network to be 
underpinned by the KII-G’s optical lines, which were mostly supported by the 
government’s prior investment. Further, open access to the already-built cable and high-
speed optical networks and the competition between various forms of service within the 
KII-P are influential factors that enhance commercial networks. The broadband open 
access to commercial broadband networks (through a regulatory process known as “Local 
Loop Unbundling,” or LLU) allows any carrier to provide service over networks such as 
cable. For this reason new entrants into the market, such as Hanaro Telecom, Thrunet, 
Dreamline, Onse Telecom, and other private vendors, can provide service nationwide and 
using multiple technologies, even if they have no physical network presence in the area 
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(see Table 6.3). For instance, a carrier such as Hanaro has open access to KT’s broadband 
network as well as to Thrunet’s extensive cable network (ITU, 2005, April). 
 
 
Table 6.3. Broadband Internet service providers and their subscribers in Korea  
June 2007 Provider 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total xDSL HFC LAN FTTH Satellite 
KT 4,992,395 5,589,058 6,077,694 6,241,789 6,352,542 6,522,631 4,267,828 - 1,869,480 384,211 1,112 
Hanaro 
Telecom 2,872,351 2,725,563 2,748,934 2,773,213 3,612,749 3,678,403 505,153 2,028,043 996,930 148,277 0 
Thrunet 1,301,620 1,293,364 1,287,916 836,625 - - - - - - - 
Dreamline 169,529 149,598 133,927 99,723 28,370 4,576 330 1,751 2,495 - - 
Value-added 
carrier 367,135 619,103 857,026 1,154,506 - - - - - - - 
Non-facility 
based carrier 174, 012 177,047 218,456 256,666 179,621 175,972 32,909 - 143,063 - - 
LG Dacom 146,336 201,704 206,197 213,272 111,905 86,844 3,902 24,986 58,056 - - 
LG 
Powercom - - - 261,916 1,204,293 1,489,695 - 753,350 736,335 - - 
Onse 
Telecom 452,109 423,062 391,289 353,001 220,156 9 0 7 2 - - 
CATV 
system 
operator 
- - - - 2,262,403 2,410,117 59,698 2,244,142 106,277 - - 
CATV relay 
operator - - - - 15,251 16,004 2,181 7,275 6,548 - - 
Network 
operator - - - - 55,408 57,546 7,056 44,250 6,240 - - 
Total 10,405,486 11,178,499 11,921,439 12,190,711 14,042,698 14,441,687 4,878,857 5,103,804 3,925,426 532,488 1,112 
Note: Powercom launched broadband service in September of 2005, and Hanaro Telecom acquired Thrunet 
in 2005 
Source: NIA (2007) 
  
The open access and competition in the broadband market in Korea has given rise to 
more technological choices for consumers, such as Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line 
(ADSL)-based Internet service (currently used by 34% of total broadband subscribers), as 
well as cable modem service (Hybrid Fiber Coaxial [HFC] service, used by 35% of 
subscribers), apartment Local Area Network (LAN) service (used by 27%), and other 
broadband services such as FTTH (fiber to the home), wireless LAN, satellite, and 
WiBro. 
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In sum, the domestic telecom companies were fully supported by the state, first 
through the immense financial underwriting of the KII-G and the assurance of fixed 
subscribers and then through the MCT’s promotion of the KII-P through the certificate 
system together. Underpinned by the KII-G’s optical lines and by the open access to and 
competition in the broadband market, the KII-P has experienced rapid growth. With 
regard to the KII-G, rather than the state dominating the private sector by top-town 
command, as in an earlier period, disagreements between the two were settled by a series 
of bilateral negotiations between the state and the telecom companies. The commercial 
telecom market of the KII-P was managed by a combination of limited state intervention 
and market competition. As a principal researcher at the NIA notes, “These close public-
private relationships reflect the specific political system of Korea” (Jeong, 2007, June 5). 
The KII project, thus, is a prime example of the limited or flexible state model — of the 
shift in state–capital relations “from dominance to symbiosis” (Kim, 1988). 
 
6.4.2. Intermediary organizations for the KII project 
In the early 90s, before the launch of the KII project, the Economic Planning Board 
(EPB) — which then regulated the national budget office — was hesitant to allocate the 
immense public funds necessary for the project because its cost–benefit justification was 
weak. Further, the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE) argued that most 
equipment for the networks fell under its jurisdiction and thus that the MOTIE was 
responsible for the KII project, whereas the MIC’s focus was on the regulatory aspects of 
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the network-based telecom market (Jeong & King, 1997). The KII project, however, was 
seen as the engine in a plan for national economic growth, and neither bureaucratic 
gridlock nor budgetary concerns could long be sustained in the face of such a vision.  
Just after the Basic Plan for the KII project was announced in 1993, the 
government organized the KII Taskforce to draw up a more concrete roadmap for the 
project. The Taskforce was made up of officials from the MIC and the NCA, from the 
telecom provider KT, and from the Electronics and Telecommunications Research 
Institute (ETRI), which is the government-sponsored R&D institute. Based on the 
Taskforce’s preliminary investigation into the viability of the KII project, in May 1994 
the government created the KII Steering Committee (Presidential Order No.14275), 
which was composed of the Prime Minister, as the chair, and twelve relevant cabinet 
ministers. Under the KII Steering Committee, the government appointed the KII Working 
Committee, chaired by the Vice-Minister of the Korea Development Institute (KDI, a 
semi-governmental think tank), and high-ranking officials of the relevant government 
agencies. Under this KII Working Committee, the government organized the KII 
Planning Board to carry out such concrete tasks as designing the master plan, gathering 
the public funds, and developing the technologies to be employed in the backbone 
network. 
As shown in Figure 6.4, the IT Policy Chief at the MoC (now MIC) is the head of 
the Planning Board, which was made up of six divisions, each related to some aspect of 
the project’s scope: the KII Coordination & Planning Division, the KII-G Planning 
Division, the KII-P Planning Division, the KII R&D Division, the KII Management 
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Division, and the KII Market Support Division. The members of these six divisions were 
selected from the following: the public officials of the MIC, the MOTIE, the KDI, and 
the Ministry of Finance and Economy; experts and researchers from the ETRI and the 
NCA; and officials from the telecom companies of KT, Dacom, and Korean Mobile 
Telecom (now SK Telecom). With the help of the KII Advisory Committee, set up for the 
purpose of policy advice, the Planning Board directed the KII project from its inception 
until 1995, when its affairs were transferred to the Informatization and Planning Office at 
the MIC (NCA, 2006; MIC & NCA, 2006). 
 
Figure 6.4. Organizational chart of the KII Planning Board 
 
  
 Source: author and mostly MIC & NCA (2006: 61) 
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From early in the national IT project, therefore, the government ensured the 
interconnection of the private sector and the relevant public agencies through this 
Planning Board. 
The KII was developed in three phases, based on the shifting of specific policy 
goals. During the first phase of building a backbone network (1995–1997) and the second 
phase of backbone network completion (1998–2000), the KII-G Steering Council and the 
KII-G Service Council — which succeeded the KII Planning Board in 1995 — were 
assigned to monitor the ongoing probable issues and discuss the service cost, quality, and 
upgrade, with the private sector representatives. These Councils mediated a series of 
conflicts between the state and the private sector in the earlier phase of the project. In 
contrast to the KII-P, which was mostly left to the self-ruling mechanisms of market, the 
government steadily steered the KII-G project to completion by means of these 
intermediary organizations. By the beginning of the second phase of the KII project, 
President Dae-Jung Kim was politically overburdened with managing the IMF financial 
crisis and the WTO agreements, both of which occurred in 1997. The government 
considered requesting the National Assembly to reduce the budget allotted to the KII 
project but decided to maintain the pre-assigned quotas of the KII infrastructure 
investment. On the threshold of the third and final phase of the KII project (2001–2005), 
the Kim administration began to focus on the backbone network as a significant catalyst 
for market development. 
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Figure 6.5. Organizational chart of the Committee for the KII Advancement 
 
 
   Source: NCA (2003, January) 
 
To comply with Kim’s ambitious vision, in 2001 the government organized the 
Committee for the KII Advancement, which included the major private actors and public 
institutions involved in building the three backbone networks — the KII-G, the KII-P, 
and the KII-T. Figure 6.5 shows the organizational chart of the Committee for the KII 
Advancement. The Office of the KII Advancement — a new entity created by the NCA 
— coordinated the whole organization by mediating between the four Subcommittees: 
the KII-T Advancement Subcommittee, the KII-G Advancement Subcommittee, the KII-
P Advancement Subcommittee, and the R&D Subcommittee. Each Subcommittee was 
composed of high-ranking officials from the government agencies, the mobile and 
landline telecom service providers, the government-sponsored R&D research centers, the 
IT policy research institutes, the major Chaebols as the telecom equipment 
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manufacturers, the IT-related business associations, and the universities74 (NCA, 2003, 
January). By embracing new entrants into the project such as the mobile telecom service 
providers, the commercial Internet service providers, and the Chaebols as telecom 
equipment manufacturers in addition to the established participants, the government 
desired to maximize the economic effects of the KII project (see NCA, 2003, January, 
discussing the goals of the KII Advancement Committee).  
The main issues discussed by the Committee were promoting the domestic 
telecom equipment market, nurturing the software and media content market, and 
creating commercial values from the KII (NCA, 2003: 10–11). The Committee for the 
KII Advancement promoted upgrading the national information infrastructure in order to 
reposition it for the new economy. The telecom equipment market, however, was getting 
worse, because, after 2001, the national telecom vendors ceased to produce and install the 
domestically-made asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) switch, which was a critical 
component of the earlier high-speed information network, and replaced many of the 
ATM switches with foreign IP-based router equipment. The ATM was a core technology, 
developed by a coalition of the state, the R&D institute (ETRI), and the Chaebols, by 
which the government had created a new domestic demand for telecom manufacturing 
and thus had shielded the national telecom market from the dominant market power of 
the multinational telecom companies. Due to the change of the technological paradigm 
created by the emergence of the Internet, however, the government was forced to shift its 
                                                 
74 The participation of the universities in the KII Advancement Committee indicates the personal 
involvement of some professors as IT policy advisers, rather than the systematic involvement of the 
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R&D support from a growth policy based on the old ATM switch to one based on the 
new IP-based router (see Chapter 5.3.3), although ultimately the state–private sector 
attempt to develop a core IP network technology and redirect the technology’s 
developmental path failed.          
According to a principal researcher of the NCA (Jeong, 2007, June 5), the 
government spent KR 4–5 billion won (approximately US $500 million) for operating the 
intermediary organizations described above. This expenditure signifies the government’s 
bid to enhance the bureaucratic efficiencies. In fact, the IT-related inter-ministerial 
structures such as the KII Planning Board were a legacy of old National Basic 
Information System (NBIS), a national computerization project launched under the Chun 
administration. Chun first conceived of information and technology as a new engine of 
economic growth, as well as a bureaucratic tool to rationalize the organizational 
structures of the public sector through the use of a backbone network (see Chapter 4.1.2, 
which discusses the NBIS in detail). The NBIS Steering Committee, an inter-ministerial 
agency established in 1989, served as a model for the civilian government when it came 
to establish the KII Steering Committee in 1994. Since the period of the military regimes, 
then, intermediary organizations have served as policy mechanisms to minimize internal 
conflict and enhance the speed of decision-making processes through efficient consensual 
mechanisms.  
                                                                                                                                                 
university research centers. 
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The series of intermediary organizations for the KII project reflects the Korean 
government’s inability to enact the national infrastructure plans through a top-down 
command structure over the private sector, and its anxious desire to attract them into the 
policy planning process. The intermediary organizations were quite efficient at least in 
lessening the friction with the private sector, while at the same time they excluded the 
voices of civil society from the decision-making process. The aforementioned Figure 6.4 
and 6.5 show graphically the lack of any conduit to transmit the citizens’ concerns into 
the special committees. From the start of the KII project, the government simply 
considered the supply side for enhancing the broadband networks through a strategic 
partnership with the private sector, ignoring the possibility of the citizens’ participation. 
The government could defend itself by arguing that the KII project served the public 
interest by enabling more high-speed Internet access and at lower prices. The national IT 
policy initiative, however, manifested such undemocratic characteristics as uncritical 
technocratic IT promotion, preferential treatment for a few private sector incumbents, and 
profit-driven strategy plans. The logic of exclusion, relying on the top-down policy-
making process, enabled the government to exhibit its cause rather than to hear the real 
voices of the citizens.  
 
6.4.3. The exhibitionist IT policy initiatives and discourses  
The government’s desire to shift Korea’s economy into one suitable for the digital 
mode of global economy was heralded by a series of policy plans. Table 6.4 chronicles a 
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variety of state-led IT policy plans and reforms in the telecom market in Korea during the 
period of 1993–2007, which overlaps the period of the KII project. Since the mid-90s 
when the KII project was launched, the civilian government announced and implemented 
a series of major IT initiatives and plans such as Cyber Korea 21, the e-Korea Vision 
2006, and the U-Korea Master Plan. The KII project is also closely related to the large-
scale introduction of e-government, e-commerce, and IT economy, as well as to post-KII 
projects such as the next-generation broadband network (BcN).  
Table 6.4. Informatization Progress in Korea, 1993–2007 
Year Milestone Contributions and Accomplishments 
1993  
 
Launching 
Informatization  
 
• Opened Government Administration Information System, the part of the 
NBIS 
• Introduced market competition in paging services (10 new operators) 
• Popular distribution of personal computer  
1994  
 
Promoting 
Informatization  
 
• Established Plan for Korea Information Infrastructure (KII) 
• Founded the Ministry of Information and Communication  
• Commercializing Internet services  
• Began the duopoly system for mobile services. 
1995  
 
Stabilizing 
Informatization  
[KII launched] 
• Established the Framework Act on Informatization Promotion  
• Confirmed the Blueprint for the KII: two facility-based telecom service 
providers (KT and Dacom), exclusively involved in building the KII-G 
• Invited competition in national long distance market (2nd license to 
Dacom) 
• Launched cable TV service  
1996  
 
Dawn of Internet & 
mobile network  
 
• Joined the OECD 
• Enacted the Framework on Informatization Promotion Act  
• 27 new licenses granted: three for personal communication services 
(PCSs),  
six for trunked radio systems (TRSs), eleven for second-generation 
cordless telephones (CT-2), three for PCS, two for leased line facility 
rental, one more for international telephony (Onse enters international 
market as 3rd service provider), one for radio paging, and three wireless 
data transmission. 
• SK Telecom launched digital CDMA services (and also absorbed KMTS, 
the mobile telephony subsidiary of KT)  
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1997  
 Opening the Internet era 
• Completion of the KII’s first phase (Built 80 call zones linking 14,955 
public institutions with the capacity of 45Mbps) 
• Began e-commerce services and its preparation  
• 10 new licenses granted: one local operator (Hanaro), one long-distance 
operator (Onse Corporation), six TRSs, and one paging operator  
1998  
 
Coping with Y2K 
Problems & the growth 
of Internet culture 
• Shaped countermeasures on Y2K Problems nationwide  
• Launched public administration services through Internet  
• Popularization of Internet Plaza (PC Cafe/Network Game Room)  
1999  
 
 Raid growth of the IT 
venture and users  
• Established Cyber Korea 21(The Second Master Plan of Informatization 
Promotion)  
• Rapid increase of IT venture businesses  
• Mobile phone, surpassed fixed line subscribers in numbers  
• Launched mobile Internet service  
2000  
 
Popularizing Internet and  
e-business  
 
• Completion of the KII’s second phase (Connecting all 144 call zones 
including 28,686 public institutions and schools with ATM switches with 
the capacity of 155Mbps) 
• Established master plan to promote e-commerce  
• Applied e-document to all government agencies  
• Expanded e-Business to offline businesses 
2001  
 
Activating mobile 
Internet  
 
• Organized the Committee for the KII Advancement 
• Stimulated mobile Internet through mobile phone, PDA  
• Profiled as the world’s best broadband Internet infrastructure (OECD 
Report)  
• Launched Digital Terrestrial TV Broadcasting Service 
2002  
 
Maximizing digital  
competitiveness  
 
• Established e-Korea Vision 2006 (The Third Master Plan of 
Informatization)  
• Laid the foundation of e-government  
• Initiated IMT-2000 mobile service  
• Launched Digital Satellite Broadcasting service  
2003  
 
Shift of informatisation 
from a supply pull to a 
demand creation   
• Announced Broadband IT Korea Vision 2007 (Revision of the Third 
Master Plan for Informatization Promotion)  
• The issue moved from a facility-base development of the network over to 
a service-base one, due to the maturation of domestic telecom market  
• Established the Road Map for e-Government  
• Launched mobile banking service  
2004  
 
Building new IT growth  
Infrastructure  
• Promote the building of IT growth-engine infrastructure  
• Number of Internet users exceeded 30 million people.  
• Built Broadband convergence Network (BcN) implementation plan  
• Drew up u-Sensor Network master plan  
• Established IPv6 promotion master plan  
• Promoted IT839 Strategies  
• e-commerce transactions reached KRW 300 trillion.  
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2005  
 
Beginning of digital  
convergence era  
[Completion of the KII] 
• Completion of the KII’s third phase (Linking 32,000 public institutions 
with ATM-MPLS high quality IP service with the capacity of 1Gbps) 
• Issued the Master Plan for IT839 Strategies  
• Built mid- and long-term information security Roadmap  
• Launched terrestrial and satellite DMB service  
• Banking via the Internet exceeded banking done by tellers  
2006 First year of the journey to the ubiquitous world  
• Established U-Korea Master Plan  
• Launched commercial services on BcN, WiBro, and High-Speed 
Downlink Packet Access (HSDPA)  
• Achieved total e-commerce volume of KRW 400 trillion  
2007 Striving to enter into the  ubiquitous society 
• Achieved terrestrial DMB terminal penetration of 4 million  
• Launched nationwide HSDPA service 
 
Source: Compiled and modified from the charts from NIA (2007); NCA (2006); OECD (2000); World 
Bank (2006). 
 
 
The government’s nationwide IT policy since the early 90s has been greatly 
mobilized by the technocrats’ “exhibitionist” policy plans aimed at accomplishing the 
goal of “globalization” (shegyehwa), a term that dominated the rhetoric of the Young-
sam Kim administration (see Chapter 5.3.1). The KII project would not have been 
possible without the active propagation of IT policy plans, and each successive 
administration has propagated a series of IT policy initiatives and their accompanying 
rhetoric. To evoke the national goal of building a backbone network, in 1996 the Kim 
administration announced the Basic Plan on Informatization Promotion (BPIP), the first 
IT policy initiative at the national level (MIC & NCA, 2005). The first goal of this 
initiative was to popularize the slogan of IT-based development throughout Korea, 
among government officials at the national and the provincial level, as well as in the 
private sector. The second goal was to develop a roadmap to the KII under government 
guidance and to adapt it to the rapidly changing environment of electronic backbone 
networks being built in the advanced countries. The third, more concrete, goal was to 
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enhance transmission capacity and geographic coverage of the broadband network 
through the KII project. By improving the penetration rate of the high-speed Internet, the 
government believed that Korean society would become “a world-class strong IT 
country” (MIC, 1996). 
The Kim administration used the BPIP as a public relations tool for promoting the 
KII project. Under President Dae-Jung Kim, IT policy was promoted by even more 
colorful rhetoric (rather than using common policy titles like “plan” or “initiative,” the 
Kim administration decorated the name of Korea with the futurist adjectives or nouns like 
“cyber,” “e–,” or “vision”) about the dreams of a flourishing IT-driven Korean society. 
Kim, once a prominent political activist, was focused on alleviating the economic 
recession that had taken hold of Korea since the 1997 IMF crisis. The financial crisis 
meant that the Kim administration, which took office in March of 1998, inherited the 
heavy political burden of attempting to restructure the domestic market so as to open it to 
competition from global conglomerates. While Dae-Jung Kim had advocated a 
democratic reform of the old authoritarian regime, under the conditions of increasing 
globalization his policy shifted to the radical adoption of neoliberal economic policies 
and to promoting the information and culture industries over the labor-intensive heavy 
industries. Because of Kim’s success in enacting political reform, opposition to his 
administration’s economic drive toward privatization and commercialization was muted 
(Cho, 2000: 422). In his inaugural speech on February 25, 1998, Kim emphasized the 
value-added economic effects of the cultural industry and began to consider that the 
development of software and media contents be prioritized over other strategies to 
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nurture the national economy (Yonhap News Agency, 1998, February 25). In March of 
1999 the government announced a second IT policy initiative, CyberKorea 21 (CK21) 
(MIC & NCA, 2005). Since that time, both culture and IT have been widely regarded as 
key elements necessary for earning foreign dollars and creating a new job market. Due to 
so-called “Korean wave” (or Halryu),75 which refers to the growing appeal of Korean 
popular culture in other Asian countries (Koh, et al., 2005), Korea’s exports in the 
cultural industry such as music, games, films, animation, and television programs have 
experienced a sharp rise — they amounted to US $4.95 billion (0.3% of a total export) in 
2000 and US $13.73 billion (0.42% of a total export) in 2006 (MCT, 2007). 
The policy goal of CK21 under the Kim administration is to create a “knowledge-
based society,” improving “national competitiveness” and “the quality of life to the level 
of the more advanced nations” (NCA, 2002: 79). CK21 highlights policy support for IT 
businesses and encouraged policy goals for advanced information and communication 
economies by setting forth planned guidelines for IT growth. CK21 also stressed the 
state-driven IT education program, the so-called Informatization Education Plan for 10 
Million Citizens, and used this slogan to create 300,000 new IT-related jobs and to 
increase the digital literacy of citizens (MIC & NCA, 2005). During this period, the 
government sought to encourage the demand side of the KII, striving for the creation of a 
critical mass of consumers through public IT education. Impelled by Kim’s call for the 
                                                 
75 Korean television programs and cinema have gained a “pan-Asianist” value (Dator & Seo, 2004; Kim, 
2007), and the scope of their cultural influence in the global market has become similar to the pan-
Iberian/Latin American telenovela culture, which is relatively independent from the monolithic cultural 
dominance of the Hollywood empire. 
 
 179 
rapid completion of the KII in his New Year’s message in 2001, the MIC announced the 
Basic Plan for the KII Advancement to accelerate the KII’s construction. In September of 
that year the government organized the Committee for the KII Advancement, which was 
aimed at the market adoption of the nationwide information infrastructure, and in April of 
2002 the government announced its market-driven policy initiative, named “e-Korea 
Vision 2006” (eKV06).  
The MIC’s eKV06 states that its goal is both to promote the “information society” 
at the national level and to gain “strong ties of international cooperation with the global 
information society” (NCA, 2003: 10). To do this, eKV06 declares that the government 
itself must “create a smart government structure with high transparency and productivity” 
(e-government) and should encourage private corporations “to strengthen global 
competitiveness by promoting the informatization of all industries” (e-business) and 
enable citizens “to enhance their ability to utilize information and technologies” (e-
education). Through implementing these goals, the government hopes to persuade Korean 
society to become “a global leader e-Korea” (MIC & NCA, 2005: 100–104). Once the 
KII project entered its final phase, the government’s IT policy agenda targeted three 
areas: bureaucratic efficiencies through “smart government,” e-commerce through the 
development of media contents, and mass digital literacy through the public and private 
educational institutions. While the policy visions set forth in the e-government and e-
business areas can be read as expanded and concretized provisions of the previous 
market-oriented IT policies, eKV06’s addition of e-education for citizens seems to be a 
distinct advance on the policies of CK21 or the BPIP. It is notable as the first instance of 
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the Korean government considering at a national policy level such public issues as the 
“information gap” between individuals and between regions. As is typical of the 
bureaucratic approach to the citizenry, the government restricted its role to inconspicuous 
tasks, such as supplying computers or promoting commercial Internet access, as well as 
the routinizing and rationalizing of electronic services for citizen requests for official 
documents. The focus is on a quantitative approach that emphasizes outward appearance 
and growth, as seen in the dramatic growth of the IT industry. The government promoted 
the cultivation of digital technology as a necessity for increasing the efficiency of 
government bureaucracy, to improve national productivity, and to become an active part 
of the global society. 
President Moo-hyun Roh, who took office in March of 2003, was even more 
focused on the promotion of IT-based development of Korean society.76 In December of 
the same year, his administration issued the “Broadband IT Korea Vision 2007” (BK07), 
which sets forth IT as the real engine for national wealth in Korea that would finally raise 
the yearly salary in Korea to US $20,000 per capita. BK07 emphasizes the geopolitical 
position of Korean economy as “the electronic hub for the East Asian countries.” To 
accomplish this, with the KII plan nearing its end, the government began to design the 
                                                 
76 President Roh has been described as “the world’s first president to be elected with the broad support of 
the online generation” (Watts, 2003, February 24: 16). His image at the time of his inauguration was one of 
being technically flexible and open to the Internet. Midway in his term of office, Roh held an 
unprecedented “Internet conversation with the nation” on March 23, 2006, which had the largest audience 
in the history of online broadcasting in Korea. Moreover, the president himself uploaded five letters per a 
month onto the presidential website, named the Office of the President Briefing, in order to promote direct 
communication with the nation without the intervention of the press. His nickname “the night-owl 
president” is derived from his staying at the keyboard until late at night for decision-making and electronic 
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next generation of infrastructure plans for advancing the private sector networks. For 
instance, BK07 sets forth the goal of building the total broadband multimedia networks of 
convergence; the details were set forth in the “Basic Plan for the Broadband convergence 
Network (BcN)” and “U-Sensor Network” (USN), issued in February of 2004; the 
“Distribution and Promotion Plan of the next Internet protocol IPv6,” issued in April of 
2004; and the “Master Plan for IT839 Strategies,” issued in July of 200577 (NIA, 2007). 
In BK07, the Roh administration also emphasized that the quality of life in Korea would 
be improved by the rapidly increasing opportunities arising from e-commerce with the 
completion of the KII-P. While Roh succeeded in promoting the development of an 
Internet-based society in Korea, his IT initiatives have overemphasized business-oriented 
growth policies based on values such as “efficiencies,” “competitiveness,” and 
“productivities,” to the detriment of public welfare values such as “sustainability,” 
“public commons,” and “equal opportunities.” For instance, BK07 describes IT primarily 
in terms of its being a panacea for Korea’s economic recession and as “the engine for 
new growth that would create a GDP per capita of US $20,000” (MIC & NCA, 2005: 
104–110).      
Table 6.5 shows the major IT policy initiatives implemented by each civilian 
government. Interestingly, each president promoted a new IT-related discourse with its 
                                                                                                                                                 
approval of e-documents through the electronic record management system that he himself invented (Lee & 
Lee, unpublished work). 
77 IT “839” had three pillars (services, infrastructure, new growth engines); eight telecom services (Wi-
Bro, DMB, home networking, telematics, RFID, W-CDMA, Terrestrial D-TV, and Internet telephony); 
three infrastructures (broadband convergence network, U-sensor network, and IPv6); and nine new growth 
engines (mobile telephony, digital televisions and broadcast devices, home network equipment, system-on
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own IT policy initiative, especially at the beginning of his term. Throughout the three 
presidencies, the discourses are centered on Korea’s active affiliation to the global 
society and the advancement of domestic IT economies. The goals center on the creation 
of a new IT job market, a large demand for broadband Internet initiated by IT education, 
e-governance, and e-commerce. 
 
Table 6.5. IT policy initiatives under the civilian governments 
President Young-sam Kim (1993–1998) 
Dae-Jung Kim 
(1998–2003) 
Moo-hyun Roh 
(2003–2008) 
Government 
rhetoric 
Globalization, 
dog-eat-dog 
competition 
Liberalization, 
knowledge-based society 
Global IT leader, 
participatory society 
IT policy 
initiative 
Basic Plan on 
Informatization 
Promotion (1996–
2000) 
CyberKorea 21 
(1999–2002) 
e-Korea 
Vision 2006 
(2002–2006) 
Broadband IT Korea 
Vision 2007 
(2003–2007) 
Goal 
Construction of basic 
electronic backbone 
network 
Creating new IT-
related job market 
Upgrading the IT 
infrastructure 
E-government, 
East Asian hub of the 
IT industry 
Phase 1st Phase (1995–1997) 
2nd Phase (1998–
2000) 
3rd Phase (2001–
2005) 
BcN 
(2006– present) 
 
Source: author and NCA (2006) data 
 
 
Through the IT policy initiatives, each government gave the private sector — 
specifically, the Chaebols — its blessing, and persuaded its citizens to be members of a 
Korean-style “information society.” The state’s promotion of IT to its citizens has 
boomeranged on itself by increasing the consumption expenses per household: the rate of 
                                                                                                                                                 
chip products, next-generation personal computer, embedded software, digital content and solutions, 
vehicle-based information equipment, and intelligent robot products) (Shin, 2007).   
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IT-related consumption (5.4%) per household in Korea is burdensome, almost double that 
in Japan (3.1%) and triple that in the US (1.6%). Figure 6.6 suggests that, although 
Koreans spend less per megabit speed than other countries do, they are overburdened 
with a variety of IT consumption costs (these include fees for using the online digital 
content, mobile phone subscriptions, and other IT service charges). 
Further, due to the bureaucratic desire of all three presidents, who hoped to 
bequeath a monumental policy inheritance to the citizens within their term, the 
completion year of the KII project was repeatedly moved forward, first to 2015, then to 
2010, and finally to 2005, when it was actually completed. A principal researcher at the 
NIA observed, 
 
The reason the KII project was completed by 2005 rather than by 2015 is directly 
related to the presidential pledges of each administration, which aimed to 
accomplish its political outcomes by “exhibitionist” policy initiatives. It is 
obvious that the three phases of the KII project were greatly curtailed or 
condensed in response to the inauguration of a new president. (Jeong, 2007, June 
5)       
 
 
For instance, due to the 1998 inaugural speech of Dae-Jung Kim, the MIC was forced to 
make a new IT policy initiative, CK21. BK07 was launched at the time of Roh’s 
inauguration, even before the eKV06 initiative of his predecessor had been implemented 
(see Table 6.5). In fact, the four IT initiatives over three presidencies largely promoted 
Korean IT development in order to meet the exhibitionist (or public relations) political 
goals of each administration, rather than to fulfill the “soft” goals of improving the 
citizens’ ability to access, use, and recreate information freely. Consequently, the rhetoric 
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of these initiatives — such as that of surviving global competition and of regenerating the 
national economy — successfully played upon the citizens’ anxieties, such that there is 
now one broadband Internet per household, and allowed the state-led project to be 
completed with ease and even ahead of schedule. 
 
6.5. CASUALTIES OF THE STATE–CHAEBOL CRONY RELATIONSHIP 
To sum up, in contrast to the old military regimes, the civilian governments since 
1993 have articulated various mechanisms, such as intermediary organizations and the 
exhibitionist (or public relations) policy initiatives, in order to successfully guide the 
state-led infrastructure plan to completion. The Korean government’s attempt to stimulate 
the private sector and to create new IT demand was extremely successful over the three 
phases of the KII project. Nevertheless, the process by which the KII success story was 
carried out raises at least one serious issue, that of the entire exclusion of the citizens, as 
previously mentioned, from the decision-making process of domestic telecom policies. In 
the same way, they have been excluded from the series of multilateral and bilateral 
negotiations such as the WTO basic telecom agreement and the recent Korea–US Free 
Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) negotiations. In a more recent example, during the 
2007 FTA negotiations with US trade representatives, for instance, the Korean 
government exerted monopolistic power on the decision-making process, ignored various 
stakeholders’ voices, including those of civil society groups, and even disseminated 
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disinformation to the citizens in order to accomplish its political goal.78 As the next 
chapter indicates, these undemocratic aspects of the government’s IT policies have 
evoked civil society’s resistance to the policymaking processes behind the closed doors. 
One case that highlights these tensions occurred around such as the KII-based system of 
collection and management of citizens’ data, as embodied in the National Education 
Information System (NEIS).  
                                                 
78 During the negotiations over the Korea–US FTA, the Korean government frequently concealed the 
details of its agreements with the US, despite the requests of civil rights groups that such information be 
made public; further, the government even disseminated disinformation claiming that the bilateral trade 
negotiation would be wholly beneficial to Korea’s citizens and its national economy, even though the risks 
involved could threaten local sustainability. Anger against the government’s propaganda finally brought 
tens of thousands of demonstrators to the streets in protest against the Lee administration, which aimed to 
reopen the Korean beef market, once the third-largest importer of American beef, due to Koreans’ fear of 
eating meat tainted with potentially-fatal mad cow disease, since they placed no faith in the Lee 
administration’s reiterated assurances that the beef would be thoroughly inspected and safe (e.g., Hansen, 
2008, June 20).  
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Chapter VII: The KII and the Transformation of State Surveillance 
Practices toward a Grid of Control 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
While the previous two chapters investigated politico-economic aspects surrounding the 
birth and development of the KII project, the present chapter focuses on how the Korean 
Information Infrastructure (KII) functions as a virtual network to enhance the 
government’s surveillance power over its citizens. The “National Education Information 
System” (NEIS), initiated in 2003, is a nationwide database system aimed at managing 
more than 200 pieces of personal information about each of the eight million students in 
South Korea in a central server computer operated by the Ministry of Education and 
Human Resources. This policy initiative, which was first planned as integrated 
management of students’ profiles but later evolved into a plan for a central database 
system monitoring each student, could not have been conceived without the material 
existence of the KII. This chapter first investigates the shift in South Korea from a 
disciplinary society (in which there is the visible and physical violence of power) to a 
control society (with its modulating and normalizing techniques of power). Under the 
authoritarian and military regimes in Korea (1948–1992), the national ID system and the 
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National Security Law were the state’s primary means of social control over the citizens. 
Under the civilian governments (1993–present), the deployment of institutional power by 
the government has been based more on the logic of free-floating control and the 
articulation of micro-power. This chapter examines how the techniques of power were 
gradually transformed from a centralized and hierarchical model into a distributive and 
dispersed network model, based on the flow, speed, and mobility of the KII. 
Theoretically, this chapter supports Gilles Deleuze’s thesis (see Chapter 2.3.2.) that 
today’s society has become increasingly based on digital technology, which is used for 
the reproduction of power systems — an idea summarized by his term “control society” 
— while never demolishing the conditions of disciplinary suppression by state power 
over the citizens. For observing the new techniques of social control based on the 
electronic backbone network, this chapter examines the policy debate over the 
introduction of the NEIS, a plan that ignited the anger of civil rights movement groups, as 
well as that of unions for lawyers, parents, teachers, and professors, who blocked its 
implementation. Although the overall scope of the NEIS was reduced due to these 
protests, this chapter concludes by examining it as an example of the state’s continuing 
bureaucratic desire to manage the citizens’ data electronically.  
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7.1. INTRODUCTION 
The present chapter examines the recent asymmetric relationships between the 
citizens and the state, especially as they are revealed in the surveillance practices of the 
Korean government. Since the launch of the Korean Information Infrastructure (KII) in 
1995, Korea, even more than most countries, has been subject to the dual effects of the 
bureaucratic state and the advance of digital technologies, owing to the authoritarian and 
hierarchical structures of Korean politics and business, as Castells (2000b: 262–266) has 
observed. The East Asian development model of an information economy, specifically, 
South Korean development model, can be described as one characterized by a 
“democratic deficit” (Venturelli, 2002: 81). Due to the abatement of the Cold War, by the 
time the first civilian government took office in 1993, it was able to begin a shift from the 
anti-communist rhetoric of previous regimes79 to a more pragmatic rhetoric of achieving 
prosperity through IT-based bureaucratic efficiencies. The North-South summit meeting 
of leaders from both Koreas in June of 2000 in Pyongyang increased the momentum for 
ending the rigid anti-communist sentiment based on the National Security Law in South 
Korea. Since then the government has instead focused on baptizing digital technology as 
the foundation to a flourishing welfare state. Due to the government’s pro-IT policy, 
Korean society has accomplished rapid growth in networking and mobile technology, 
while at the same time the nationwide backbone network, as well as the high penetration 
rate of mobile phones, has allowed the government elites increasing electronic access to 
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citizens’ data. The new material conditions of electronic networks have enabled the 
government to monitor the citizens’ activities through its real-time based surveillance 
practices, to integrate citizens’ local data into the national database, and to sort out the 
collected information based on the government’s specific purposes in a given situation.     
This chapter explores the ways in which the Korean government’s desire for 
social control were articulated and realized under the new material conditions of digital 
networks, specifically, the Korean Information Infrastructure project. First, this chapter 
examines the changing patterns of surveillance practices from the period of the military 
regimes (1948–1992) to that of the civilian governments (1993–present): while the 
surveillance practices of the former were based on the disciplinary logic of confinement, 
censorship, centralization, and physical violence, the surveillance practices of the latter 
have increasingly been based on a digital grid of control. Second, this chapter looks at a 
series of controversial laws and policy initiatives under the civilian governments that 
have enabled the government elites to perform electronic network-based censorship or 
surveillance over the citizens. Third, to delineate the institutional desire for control 
through the electronic backbone network, this chapter focuses on the societal debate over 
the introduction of the “National Education Information System” (NEIS) of 2003 as an 
archetypical case of institutional surveillance, which led to a mass protest of the citizens. 
Finally, this chapter explores how the NEIS — an offspring of the KII project — stands 
                                                                                                                                                 
79 As late as 1997, however, “communist sympathizer” was still an accusation hurled at Dae-Jung Kim by 
those who hoped to undermine his presidential campaign.    
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as an example of the emerging digital surveillance techniques for the state desire for 
social control.  
As the data for its analysis, this chapter uses the NEIS and other privacy-
relevant laws, along with press conference reports, documents on public hearings, 
written reports of events, and policy analysis reports, most of which were published 
by the Jinbo Network and the Citizens’ Action Network, organizations defending 
citizens’ cyber-rights in Korea. 
 
7.2. THE RISE IN GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE PRACTICES  
Many countries are increasing their surveillance of citizens in order to enhance 
societal control. The bureaucratic interests that underlie the current strategies are aiming 
to install a code of control within each technical artifact (such as the KII), and thus 
technological rationalization will be complete when technical design merges with social 
and political hierarchies. According to Human Rights Watch report (2008), state-led 
censorship and surveillance of bloggers and citizens has been pervasive in authoritarian 
countries such as Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tibet (under the Chinese 
government), and Tunisia, in the name of preserving the social order. For instance, the 
Chinese government has employed new technology to tap 153 million users’ cell phones, 
especially, those of political dissidents using text-messaging services (Kurtenbach, 2004, 
July 2). Further, the Chinese government has been oppressing their citizens and those of 
subject territories (such as Tibet) by severely censoring what they can access online. 
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Internet giants like Google and Yahoo have helped facilitate this oppression in order to 
gain access to the Chinese market (Våge, 2004).  
The surveillance practices in the developing countries differ little from those of 
advanced Western countries such as the UK and the US, although the latter’s surveillance 
techniques are more refined and complicated. For instance, the UK government has 
supported the so-called “Celldar project” that intends to enable locational tracking of 
users wherever a mobile phone receives a signal (Burke & Warren, 2002, October 13). 
“Celldar” conceals its aim of ubiquitous surveillance under the ideological cover of 
“protecting national security from terrorism,” but this potentially repressive project seems 
to mirror Latour’s (1992) description of how impulses of state control will be realized 
and “delegated” to technological devices. Similarly, since the 9-11 terrorist attack, the US 
government has also gained easier access to mobile phone and email conversations 
(Cauley, 2006, May 11). The US federal government has increasingly gained the 
bureaucratic power of monitoring the citizens by shifting the security concept from 
national security to homeland security (Relyea, 2002).80 For example, since 9-11 there 
have been well-publicized large-scale instances in the US of Internet and wireless carriers 
tapping citizens’ communications on behalf of the federal government without the issuing 
of a court order. As shown by these examples from various different countries, the 
                                                 
80 According to Relyea’s (2002) analysis, security concepts function as ideological and political signs that 
aim to promote public security and safety at the price of the civil right of privacy. These ideological 
concepts are easily institutionalized under threats and anxieties such as the Cold War or terrorist attacks. 
Since the events of September 11, existing security concepts are being reconfigured as the security threat 
has changed from communism to terrorism. The evolution of security concepts from national and internal 
security to homeland security, according to Relyea, depicts the expansive processes of consensus and 
persuasion by policymakers.  
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increasing patterns of surveillance and censorship can be largely characterized by the 
bureaucratic drive to preserve the security of society (Beniger, 1986: 11), that is, to 
preserve the stable reproduction of society from both internal and external attacks — at 
the cost of a reduction in citizens’ human rights. The invasion of privacy, in other words, 
is regarded as a price worth paying for the promise of security.  
It should be noted, however, that private corporations have also introduced into 
the workplace electronic monitoring devices, such as those that record and store 
telephone conversations, voicemail messages, computer files, e-mail messages, and 
Internet connections. For corporations, high-tech surveillance technologies are used to 
monitor efficiency and to ensure behavior that is in the company’s best interests; they are 
also used, as in South Korea, to prevent workers from organizing and to fight union 
activism. In this context, technology affiliates itself with the private desire for a 
“panoptic” workplace. Even without the monitoring of overseers from a physical 
watchtower, technology functions for corporations as “a fail-safe system to increase their 
sense of certainty and control over both production and organizational functions” 
(Zuboff, 1988: 390). For private corporations, the suppressive side of technology can be 
activated by an aggressive desire for labor control. The government normally interacts 
with the private sector to produce both the economic foundation and the normative 
standards for surveillance (Phillips, 2003). This combinative effect of surveillance by the 
state and the private sector illustrates the gradually expanding “asymmetry of power 
between individuals or groups of individuals on the one hand and powerful governmental 
and commercial entities on the other” (Doty, 2001: 123).  
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In Korean society, systematic surveillance practices conducted by both the state 
and the private sector also have risen in recent times. Korea has historically experienced 
shifts in the practices of power concurrent with major shifts in its political life. The next 
two sections of this chapter investigate in detail the historical transformations of state 
surveillance techniques from the military regimes to the civilian governments. This 
investigation establishes the context in which to understand the evolution of government 
surveillance in Korea’s recent history as well as the newly emerging surveillance 
techniques that have largely been made possible by the nationwide expansions of telecom 
infrastructures such as the KII.  
7.3. SOLID AND DISCIPLINARY POWER  
After being liberated from the thirty-six-year Japanese military occupation 
(1910–1945), Korea was split into two nations through civil war in 1950, and the 
country was left in ashes. Korea had little experience with the representative system 
of democracy found in advanced Western countries, and this political immaturity 
enabled a series of autocratic governments to wield oppressive power over the 
citizens during the periods of the first two civilian governments (1948–1962) and 
the following three military regimes (1963-1992). Using anti-communism against 
North Korea as a rationale, these South Korean governments justified their 
repressive practices against citizens in the name of national security. From the time 
of General Cheong-hee Park, who seized power in 1963, up through the early 
1990s, anti-communism was a powerful ideological shield to suppress political 
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dissent and citizens’ demands for human rights. Throughout the 1960s, 70s, and 
80s, citizens were controlled by a pervasive grid of military-authoritarian practices: 
the national ID system identifying each Korean, the use of paramilitary violence to 
break worker unions, the use of closed-circuit television for policing, the 
widespread practice of government eavesdropping, and politically motivated 
investigations of activists. The military regimes employed a wide variety of means 
to compel most citizens to be docile subjects, imposing curfews, forcibly shearing 
the hair of “hippies,” torturing political activists, searching citizens’ possessions on 
the street, and silencing the voice of dissent in the public arena.  
 In 1979 Park was assassinated, and on December 12 of that year General Doo-
hwan Chun spearheaded a coup d’état. As soon as he seized power, Chun declared 
nationwide martial law, which was directed at banning all political activity, crushing the 
labor movement, closing the universities, and arresting pro-democracy politicians and 
activists, including Dae-Jung Kim (Shelley, 2001). These actions sparked an uprising in 
Gwangju on May 18, 1980. For the five days of the uprising, the citizens of Gwangju 
held the city: over 200,000 people participated in demonstrations and hundreds of 
citizens in the provincial capitol building (which served as the headquarters for the 
citizens’ army) took up arms against the military regime. During this period, when 
Gwangju was completely blockaded by siege and cut off from contact with the outside 
world, a Citizens’ Council was spontaneously organized to defend the city, maintain 
public security, distribute food and water, and prepare to offer armed resistance to the 
military. On May 22, 1980, however, the military regime brutally quelled the uprising, 
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massacring as many as 2,000 people — striking workers, protesting students, and citizens 
— and took control of Gwangju.81 Chun then used the demonstrations in Gwangju as a 
pretext for furthering his repressive policies. 
The Park and Chun administrations (1963–1988) typify the brutal era of 
repressive and disciplinary society at the institutional level. During this period, the state’s 
regulatory control apparatus was twofold: the National Security Law and the national ID 
system. In the name of ferreting out spies or sympathizers aligned with communist North 
Korea and of protecting South Korea from the dangers of communist infiltration and 
influence, the National Security Law (NSL) had already been enacted in December of 
1948 under Syngman Rhee, the first president of the republic (1948–1960). Over the next 
half century, military dictators used the NSL’s elastic definition of “anti-state groups” to 
suppress political opponents. The NSL, which is still in force and was last revised in 
1996, still defines “anti-state groups” in such a way as to allow arbitrary interpretation of 
the term. Article 2 states that “anti-state groups refer to domestic or foreign organizations 
or groups whose intentions are to conduct or assist infiltration of the Government or to 
cause national disturbances” (as revised 31 May, 1991). The NSL prescribes up to seven 
years in prison for those who praise, encourage, disseminate the materials of or cooperate 
with anti-state groups (Article 7), and five years’ imprisonment for failure to report “anti-
state” activities (Article 10). Using this law, any dictator who desires to punish political 
                                                 
81 The role of the US in crushing the Gwangju uprising has never been officially clarified. Since the US 
government had final authority over the US-Korean Allied Forces Command, and thus the Korean 
government would have had to obtain official permission from the US in order to move infantry divisions, 
airborne units, and special task forces into Gwangju, most Koreans believe the US government was 
indirectly involved in the Gwangju massacre.    
 196 
opponents can legally imprison or even execute them, relying on the law’s ambiguous 
language. Although Korea’s Constitution declares that “all citizens enjoy freedom of 
speech and the press, and of assembly and association” (Adopted on 17 July 1948: 
Chapter 1, Article 21), the NSL has empowered the government to effectively override 
the Constitution.  
Many countries have used identity cards in one form or another, but the national 
ID system in Korea is a total surveillance system individually identifying each Korean. 
Originally, a Resident Registration System was used for regulating the population’s data 
on the basis of place of birth and residency. This system was a legacy of the Japanese 
imperialist occupation of Korea (1910-45). The project of regulating the entire citizenry 
was established under Park, who in 1968 extended the notorious registration system to 
the whole populace, and by 1975 the data was managed by means of computer databases. 
Since that time period, all citizens have been required to obtain and to carry a national ID 
card. If the police ask to see the card, one must be able to provide it. Each citizen must 
obtain a personal identification number given by the state, which must then be used for 
all kinds of purposes, some of which are described below, over one’s lifetime. Also, all 
citizens over the age of 17 must have all ten fingerprints on file. In all, the government 
collects over 140 different pieces of profiling information on each individual citizen.82 
Successive Korean governments have defended the bureaucratic efficiency of the system 
and emphasized that it is the price to be paid for the protection of citizens from crimes 
                                                 
82 In addition to such basic data as name, sex, date of birth, and national identification number, Korea’s ID 
system includes detailed personal data such as permanent address, current address, military record, criminal 
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and for identifying victims in accidents. This ID system is not much different from that of 
a Big-Brother-type “superstate,” which regulates all citizens with a thirteen-digit personal 
reference number83 not unlike the bar code system used on commercial goods. A citizen 
would have severe difficulties without it, because one must submit it any time one buys 
certain goods, rents a house, drinks a beer in a bar, applies for loan from a bank, applies 
for employment at business or school, or even when one posts a comment on the Internet. 
The regulatory control of citizens is an example of a serious violation of fundamental 
human rights of privacy, because it is permanent in duration and vast in scope.  
By using the regulatory weapons of the national ID system and the NSL, military 
dictators controlled the citizens for more than twenty-five years. For instance, the 
national ID system was the easiest way to ferret out the political dissidents — students, 
union organizers, politicians, and other critical citizens to the military regime — during 
on-the-street questioning or a crackdown by the intelligence officers. General Chun, the 
worst of them, recognized the value of the intelligence agencies in maintaining control 
over the citizenry. Just before he came to power via the military coup in 1979, Chun took 
control of both the Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) — created in 1961 under 
the presidency of Park, it was renamed the National Intelligence Service (NIS) in 1999 — 
and the Defense Security Command (DSC), whose original mission focused on counter-
communist activities and fighting military corruption. After the success of Chun’s coup, 
                                                                                                                                                 
records, records of each change of residence, the issuing agency and issuance date of the ID card, 
photographs, family relations, and all ten fingerprints. 
83 In the Korean ID system, each identifier (e.g., 681207–1xxxxxx) consists of a combination of the date 
of birth (the first group of six digits; in this case, the date of birth is 7 December 1968), sex (this is the first 
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the KCIA and the DSC were used as domestic surveillance and spying agencies to 
collect, analyze, and, whenever useful, fabricate intelligence information about the 
citizenry. For instance, these agencies created imaginary underground spy rings loyal to 
communist North Korea and then falsely accused citizens of belonging to them, as shown 
in the 1985 case of a group Korean students studying abroad in the US (Hankyoreh, 
2008, June 23), and the 1986 case of Hee-Chul Kang (Lawyers for a Democratic Society, 
2005, March) who were convicted of espionage; only after serving long prison sentences 
were individuals in both cases were finally cleared of these charges  
The integration of the intelligence agencies, the national ID system, and the NSL 
enabled the development of an extreme disciplinary society to control and suppress the 
“abnormal” or “other,” such as striking workers, protesting students, progressive 
politicians, and, in general, any citizen critical of the government. During the dark days 
of these repressive military regimes, Korean citizens were eager to have more political 
rights, such as freedom of speech, expression, and assembly. Under the Chun 
Government in 1987, a university student (Chong Chul Park) was killed by water torture 
during police interrogation. Although two policemen were charged and the Interior 
Minister and the national police chief were dismissed in the aftermath of the incident, 
demonstrations in Seoul and other cities had to be dispersed by the police with tear gas 
(Haberman, 1987, April 5). By June, confronted with nationwide rioting, Chun was 
forced to step down from the presidency and allow direct presidential elections in Korea. 
                                                                                                                                                 
number of the second seven digits: 1 was assigned to a man and 2 to a woman, but, since 2002, these 
numbers have been changed into 3 or 4), and a randomly given six-digit number. 
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1987 was a momentous year for South Korea as it marks the beginning of the end of the 
repressive military regimes. In December of that year, citizens elected a president by 
direct popular vote for the first time in 26 years, even though Tae-Woo Noh, a former 
military colleague of Chun’s, won the election by fraud (Han, 1988); he held the 
presidency from 1988 to 1993. Nevertheless, with the Noh administration, Korean society 
entered an era less brutal than the one under the Park and Chun administrations. During 
the Noh administration, the NSL, the national ID system, and other repressive 
surveillance mechanisms were still in place, but their use began gradually to shift and be 
modified.     
 
7.4. LIQUID AND NORMALIZING POWER   
Upon entering into a stable phase of civilian government after the citizens’ 
political victory in the second direct presidential election in December of 1992, the 
public’s focus gradually shifted from demands for political democracy to demands 
for freedom of expression. This shift can be viewed as extending democratic 
concerns into a new cultural arena. With the widespread dissemination of digital 
communications since the mid-1990s, the Koreans have discovered the freedom 
afforded by electronic conduits of cultural expression. The eruption of sociocultural 
exchange spurred by the mobility and interconnectivity of new communication 
technologies has acclimated citizens to speaking out in their own voices and 
expressing their own values. The ecology of the citizens’ autonomous culture has 
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shifted from the street barricade struggle of resisting authoritarian regimes by 
throwing stones and Molotov cocktails to resisting the dominant discourses of 
society through electronic forms of cultural expression such as the Internet café, 
electronic forums, blogs, and text messaging with mobile phones.84 These changes 
were ironically facilitated by the Young-Sam Kim administration’s drive to shift 
the Korean economy from traditional labor-intensive industries to cultural or 
knowledge-based economies. The new material conditions of electronic mobility 
were firmly undergirded by the launch of the Korean Information Infrastructure 
(KII) in 1995, which has promoted the rapid growth of commercial broadband 
Internet service nationwide, as well as the increase of bureaucratic efficiencies in 
government agencies. The eruption of socio-cultural exchange spurred by the 
mobility and interconnectivity of new communication technologies has also 
acclimated citizens to speak out in their own voices and express their own values. 
The ecology of the citizens’ autonomous culture has gradually shifted from the 
street barricade struggle of resisting authoritarian regimes by throwing stones and 
Molotov cocktails to resisting the dominant discourses of society through electronic 
                                                 
84 Koreans actively spoke out their own voices by using electronic media as shown in the following 
political protests: 1) In the 2002 Korean presidential election, an election campaign using mobile phones 
was very effective in organizing citizens and uniting them on the agenda of political democratization. At 
that time, using their own cell phones, Korea’s younger citizens mobilized and encouraged friends, 
families, and peers to vote for the progressive candidate (Kim, 2003); 2) Another example is OhmyNews, a 
Korean online news site launched in 2000 with the editorial principle that “every citizen is a reporter,” 
which has enlisted 38,000 “citizen reporters” who publish about 150 stories on the site each day 
(http://www.ohmynews.com). The website now draws half a million visitors a day and has become one of 
the alternative Internet media framing the public agenda. 3) In June of 2002, a citizens’ rally 
commemorating the tragic death of two teenaged girls struck by a U.S. military vehicle was initiated for the 
first time by one citizen’s online posting expressing anger at the presence of U.S. Armed Forces in Korea 
(People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, 2003, February). 
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forms of cultural expression such as Internet cafés, electronic forums, blogs, and 
text messaging with mobile phones.  
Due to the civilian government’s pro-IT policies, more than seven out of 10 
households now have high-speed Internet access. The number of mobile phone users in 
Korea is also rapidly growing — as of June 2007, there were over 42 million registered 
users in Korea, out of a population of 48 million — and the high-speed data 
communications of mobile phones utilize the seamless multimedia services throughout 
the country (MIC, 2007, July). According to data from the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (2005), the process of digitalizing all telecommunication 
networks in Korea was completed in 2003. In fact, most Koreans spend their time on 
electronic networks (Fackler, 2007, November 18)85 — playing online games in Internet 
cafés, decorating their blogs, communicating with each other using mobile devices, 
connecting with hobby or other interest groups through Internet portal sites, and 
exchanging audio-visual materials with others. This constant communication through 
electronic media, and the rise of a culture of free expression via these new media, led to 
the state’s desire to control the communicative networks of Korean “netizens.” This 
state’s desire first took place in the indirect way of suppressing the online users’ free 
speech rights through the application of more rigid copyright: between 1957, when the 
Copyright Act (No. 8029) was first enacted in South Korea, and 2004, it has been revised 
                                                 
85 As one of the negative symptoms of compulsive Internet use in Korea, The New York Times (Fackler, 
2007, November 18, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/technology/18rehab.html?_r=1&oref=slogin) 
reported, “a growing number of students have skipped school to stay online, shockingly self-destructive 
behavior in this intensely competitive society. […] Up to 30 percent of South Koreans under 18, or about 
2.4 million people, are at risk of Internet addiction.” 
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eleven times — three of them since 2000. The trajectory of the act’s revisions can be 
summarized in a phrase of the “reinforcement of intellectual property rights” for the 
copyright owners and holders (Hong, 2005: 9).86 The government frequently uses the 
charge of copyright infringement to arrest those who express criticism of the government 
on the Internet. For instance, recently the government arrested the CEOs of major online 
storage companies for violating copyright by illegally transacting video files and movies; 
however, the Internet users suspect its real intention, because their websites became 
famous for live broadcasts by users of candlelight vigils against the import of U.S. beef, 
part of the government’s KORUS FTA negotiations (Chosun Ilbo, 2008, June 18).    
In Korean digital society, furthermore, few constitutional provisions exist to 
protect citizens’ privacy rights against the surveillance practices that are systematically 
carried out by the government. If one wonders why such practices are still widespread 
under a civilian government, one must realize that state agencies have continued to hire 
officials who served under the military regimes, and government hiring has continued to 
be dominated by Korea’s traditional clan culture, in which affiliation by region, 
educational institution, and birth place are paramount. Yet because the disciplinary 
                                                 
86 In October 2004, without any public discussion on this sensitive issue, some conservative members of 
the Korean parliament pushed through a twelfth revision of the Copyright Act that dramatically increased 
copyright owners’ rights. The revision gave copyright owners an absolute monopoly over digital content 
and extended authors’ copyrights to the span of their lifetimes plus 45 years. On January 17, 2005, the 
revised Copyright Act, which included controversial provisions that rigidly applied proprietary rights to 
immaterial labors, took effect. Under the revised copyright law, copyright owners gain the rights of 
transmission of artistic products over the Internet and all mobile communication devices; anyone who 
enjoys the new culture of sharing can be prosecuted for copyright infringement. This has led to the policing 
of images uploaded for decorating Web sites, background sounds for blog sites, lyrics from commercial 
music, and essays copied from online newspapers or magazines. Even if such sharing is for individual, 
noncommercial purposes, the use of copyrighted works without their owners’ permission, such as 
uploading and linking others’ creative works, is illegal. 
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mechanisms of the military regimes conflict with the gradual development of citizens’ 
socio-cultural freedom, the power system since the civilian government began has tended 
to reconfigure itself using “soft” mechanisms such as creating integrated electronic 
databases or hiding identifiable tracking codes within the technological artifact itself. For 
instance, the electronic ID card and e-passport containing a chip with fingerprints and 
other personal information are typically used for identifying and monitoring any citizen at 
any time or place. Scholars’ descriptions of new urban geographies dominated by 
electronically “fortified” cities (Davis, 1990) or “carceral” cities (Soja, 1996) reflect the 
new stage of Korea’s policing of citizens through pervasive panoptic technology.  
Table 7.1 shows a timeline of the regulatory control of electronic communications 
showing privacy-related scandals and legislation under the civilian governments.  
 
Table 7.1. Regulatory control of the electronic networks under Korea’s civilian 
governments 
Dates Events 
(1993–1998)    The Young-Sam Kim administration  
Nov     1997 
 
– Submitted revision plan of the “Resident Registration Act” (including introduction  
  of the electronic ID card), but it was defeated by citizens’ opposition 
(1998–2003)    The Dae-Jung Kim administration 
  –      1999 – Instead of e-ID card, introduced the plastic resident registration card  
 Jul     2000 
 
– Proposed to enact the so-called “Framework Act for Establishment of the Public  
Order in Telecommunications”  
Nov     2001 
 
– Introduced the “Rating System of Internet Contents,” led by the Information  
  Communication Ethics Committee 
Mar     2003 
 
– Introduced the “National Education Information System” (NEIS) to manage more 
than 200 items of personal information about 8 million students in a main computer 
server 
Jun      2003 – Installed 340 CCTV (Closed-Circuit TV) systems (360 degree rotation/ 22x zoom) 
  in Kangnam-Ku district in Seoul, sparking social protests 
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Oct      2003 – Allowed investigators to access short text message of cell phones without a warrant 
Nov     2003 – Proposed the “Protection from Terrorism Act,” which aims at increasing the  
  investigative power of the National Intelligence Service  
(2003–2008)    The Moo-hyun Roh administration 
Sep      2004 
 
– Proposed an “Act on the Use and Protection of Location Data” which offers little  
  protection to the citizen from illegal mobile tracking by a third party 
Dec      2004 – Organized a task force for the “National Total Management Information System of 
Crime and Justice” (NTMIS) to integrate citizens’ legal data on a central server 
Feb      2005 
 
 
– The Samsung SDI mobile tracking scandal: Samsung secretly tracked union 
  workers by using cloned cell phones, but the Public Prosecutor terminated the     
  investigation because of the extreme difficulty in locating perpetrators 
Jun      2005 
 
– Proposed revised edition of the “Protection Act of Telecommunications Secrets,”     
  which makes it easier for prosecutors to eavesdrop on phone calls 
Oct      2005 – New ID cards planned for 2007 to protect against ID forgery 
Oct      2005 
 
– Installed CCTV systems (270x zoom/ 1km visibility range) in the Cheonggyecheon 
  public park in Seoul, and gathered over 3 million citizens’ images information 
Dec     2005  – Proposed revision of the “Act on Promotion of Information and Telecommunication  
Network Use” to enact the “Enforced Real-Name System,” mainly led by the 
Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC), for the purpose of forcing users 
to put their real names and resident ID numbers whenever posting any message on 
the Internet  
April    2007 – Revision of the “Protection of Communications Secrets Act” enacted in 2004 
(2008–present) The Myung-bak Lee administration 
March  2008 – Provincial government officials discovered using Voice over Internet Protocol 
(VoIP) to eavesdrop on subordinates in Kyonggi-Do province   
April    2008 – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade requires new e-passports to conform with the 
US Visa Waiver Program (VWP), which requires that passports have a chip 
containing fingerprints and other personal information 
April    2008 – Lax privacy policies of the ISPs and telecom companies revealed: 
• 22 former and current executives and managers of Hanaro Telecom charged 
with leaking private information of its customers to telemarketers 
• Auction, an Internet shopping mall and subsidiary of eBay, facing two massive 
lawsuits after hackers stole IDs, passwords, phone numbers, and shopping logs 
of 10.81 million customers in February of 2008 
• LG Dacom facing a class action suit for leaving customer records open on the 
Internet between 2005 and March of 2008 during which time 8 million 
subscribers’ data was stolen 
 
 
The various legislative acts found in the timeline of events in Table 7.1 are intended to 
regulate the new spheres of the citizens’ new communication activities, including the 
Internet and cell phones. The main direction of government surveillance as evidenced in 
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the timeline from 1997 to the present can be summarized as follows: First, the 
government has desired to update the traditional disciplinary tools, such as the national 
ID system and the closed circuit TV (CCTV) system by digitizing and interlinking them 
over the Net. Second, the government has continuously legitimized the control of 
electronic space by means of legal enactments (e.g., the Framework Act for 
Establishment of the Public Order in Telecommunications of 2000, the Act on the Use 
and Protection of Location Data of 2004, and the 2005 revision of the Act on the 
Promotion of Information and Telecommunication Network Use). Third, the government 
has introduced “positive technologies of power” (Foucault, [1999] 2003: 48),87 such as 
e-ID cards and e-passports for the purpose of invisible social control in wired space. 
Fourth, the locally dispersed data on citizens have been integrated into a central server, as 
will be discussed in the NEIS case (Chapter 7.5). Finally, the scandals in Korea’s large 
corporations are representative of the country’s unethical business culture, which has few 
qualms about leaking customers’ data to third parties, whether intentionally or 
accidentally. 
Under the Young-Sam Kim administration (1993–1998), electronic surveillance of 
citizens was undeveloped, marked mainly by the government’s desire to collect the 
citizens’ data by introducing the e-ID card in the last year of Kim’s presidency. 
Considering that the Kim administration had begun to introduce the new pro-IT policies 
and initiatives, including the KII project, from 1995 onward, the network-based 
                                                 
87 This term of Foucault’s stems from the effect of digitalization on social control. By automating and 
systematizing control electronically, power is able to hide its real intention of social control.   
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surveillance practices were still embryonic and had yet to be applied nationwide. The 
state’s electronic surveillance practices were rapidly increased under Dae-Jung Kim’s 
administration (1999–2003), during which the nationwide electronic backbone network 
was almost completed and the distribution of mobile telephony was dramatically 
expanded. 
Even under the civilian governments, control mechanisms of the military regimes 
such as the national ID system and the National Security Law have been used as the 
major mechanisms to manage the citizens. However, with the new information and 
telecommunications policies promoted by the civilian governments, especially under the 
administrations of Dae-Jung Kim and of Moo-hyun Roh (2003–2008), the rigid and 
visible techniques of power have become more integrated with and veiled by the digital 
networks — that is, the techniques of control have shifted to more refined and invisible 
ones.  
The invention of positive technologies for free-floating control is the most 
significant of all of these, because it can hide beneath an ethical patina the real intention 
of control directed at establishing the new digital rule of cybersociety; for instance, the 
enforcement of the “real name system” prevents anonymity of expression, which can be 
considered as a form of pre-censorship (i.e., it exerts a “chilling effect” on free speech). 
Moreover, the new technique of control embeds the old disciplinary technique of the 
national ID system within it because it uses the national ID database to verify real names 
on the Internet. Introduced under Dae-jung Kim’s administration, the “rating system on 
Internet contents” has been actually used to stifle minority voices on the Internet such as 
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those of political radicals, gays and lesbians, high school drop outs, and feminists. In 
contrast with the “real name system,” the rating system on Internet contents is a form of 
post-censorship, which intends to regulate “aberrant” websites that deviate from the 
ruling norms of power.  
In addition to this pre- and post-censorship on the Internet, the government and 
the private sector have shown an increased desire for surveillance on a real-time basis in 
the wireless sphere. For instance, the use of mobile phones for labor control in the 
Samsung SDI case88 confirms once again the undemocratic tendencies of the Korean 
business culture of surveillance, with the government’s acquiescence in longstanding 
practices of the Chaebols such as the blacklisting of militant workers. A political dispute 
was also ignited by the eavesdropping of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) on the 
cell phone conversations of a news reporter working for a daily newspaper (Joo, 2004). 
On further investigation, it was revealed that government agencies, including the 
National Police Agency and the NIS, tracked mobile phone users in 12,184 cases in 2002, 
20,773 cases in 2003, and 16,497 cases in just the first half of 2004. Cell phone users 
tracked included 12 politicians and five journalists (Media Today, 2005, September 27). 
                                                 
88 In July 2004, twelve former and current workers of Samsung SDI, a subsidiary of the Samsung group, 
filed a lawsuit claiming that the company had secretly tracked their activities outside of the workplace to 
stop them from establishing a labor union: Samsung SDI used hacked and duplicated mobile phones to 
monitor militant employees and laid-off workers who were attempting to organize a trade union (Joint 
Committee for Fact-Finding and Management Accountability Regarding Surveillance of Samsung 
Workers, 2005, February 16). This scandal evoked public protests over the violation of workers’ human 
rights. Even though there was serious infringement of the workers’ rights, however, in February of 2005 the 
Public Prosecutor terminated the investigation after six months because of the extreme difficulty in locating 
perpetrators, and thus no one at Samsung has been held legally responsible for a systematic, intentional 
violation of human rights. Further, at the behest of conservative politicians of both major parties, the issue 
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Most significant is that the intelligence agencies’ eavesdropping was made possible by 
the voluntary cooperation of SK Telecom, one of the largest mobile telephony carriers, 
which gave access to its customers’ records without any consideration of privacy. These 
surveillance scandals and practices in Korean society depict the confluence of unethical 
business interests randomly collecting citizens’ personal information and an 
underdeveloped political system which trivializes citizens’ privacy rights. 
While the military regimes used physical oppression (such as imprisonment, 
abduction, torture, and police violence) and disciplinary control through collecting data 
about citizens (such as the residential ID system, wiretapping, surveillance, and on-the-
spot inspections), the civilian governments have rapidly built the Internet backbone and 
wireless networks not only to adapt to the global trend of digital capitalism but also to 
conceal the state’s surveillance and control techniques within technological artifacts. 
During both periods, a common goal has been the “war of speed” aiming at both control 
and growth. This local dynamic of building main national infrastructures was not so 
much decided by a simple affiliation into the global market as it was by complex 
processes of domestic control and economic development through the mass mobilization 
of the citizens toward informatization. In Korea, the major drive of informatization has 
been not only the state’s desire to support the domestic conglomerates — as discussed in 
previous chapters — but also its desire to regulate the citizens by the normalizing control 
of network technology. In the process of Korea’s informatization, the legacies of control 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Samsung workers’ human rights was dropped from the official agenda of the parliamentary 
investigation.  
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constructed by the military regimes have become the material basis of the electronic 
backbone networks that are currently advancing the technocratic desire for centrally 
amassing and managing data on every citizen.  
 
7.5. CASE STUDY: “NATIONAL EDUCATION INFORMATION SYSTEM” (NEIS) 
Civilian governments not only enforced interception of the network-based data on 
the citizens but also centralized local databases, to become more of a control society. 
Both the “National Education Information System” (NEIS) inaugurated in 2003 and the 
“National Total Management Information System of Crime and Justice” (NTMIS) 
inaugurated in 2004 are examples of the central government’s modulating and 
assembling of locally dispersed micro-powers (see Table 7.1).  
The NTMIS aims to integrate citizens’ criminal and legal data in one central 
database system operated by the Ministry of Justice, whereas previously, such data had 
been managed separately by the police, prosecutors, courts, and other special criminal 
investigation agencies. Similarly, the NEIS is designed to integrate the information from 
over ten thousand schools and education agencies in a central server operated by the 
Ministry of Education and Human Resources (MEHR). The records of eight million 
students — more than 350 items of personal information about each student, including 
academic, health, activity, and family records — which had previously been managed in 
each school or district have now been integrated into the Ministry’s central database. In a 
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climate of weak legal and technological privacy protections, the government pushed 
forward with the NEIS, despite the protests of civil rights groups in Korea, based on the 
bureaucratic elites’ utilitarian rationale, discussed below, that centralizing the 
management of all citizens’ data would be efficient for managing organizational society 
(in the case of the NEIS, the national school system). 
The introduction of these database systems to manage each citizen’s personal 
information would be inconceivable without a national electronic backbone network, the 
KII, which enables the integration of local data on the central database. The following 
sub-sections investigate the historical origin and controversial issues of the NEIS, the 
counteraction of the citizens against the NEIS, and its implication in relation to the NII. 
 
7.5.1. Prehistory of the NEIS 
The NEIS was originally derived from the earlier National Basic Information System 
(NBIS), a national computerization project launched under the Chun administration. 
From 1987 to 1996 the NBIS was a nationwide computerization project made up of five 
major information networks, 89  one of which was the Education and Research 
Information System (ERIS), the predecessor of the NEIS. The NBIS under the military 
regime was the first state-led IT network building plan to computerize the administrative 
affairs of government agencies and public institutions, and by building the ERIS the 
                                                 
89 The National Administrative Information System, the Financial Information System, the National 
Defense Information System, the National Security Information System, and the Education and Research 
Information System. 
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government expected to create a new labor market through IT education. In December of 
1988, the ERIS was again split into two separate project units — the Education 
Information System (EIS) and the Research Information System — because the 
government aimed to develop each project separately. The goal of the EIS implemented 
under the guidance of the MEHR was quite simple: by 1996, the government aimed to 
distribute one PC training room per school, each equipped with 20 computers (to be 
shared by two students apiece) and a PC with a printer for a teacher (MIC & NCA: 2005). 
This PC-supply policy contributed to shifting the schools’ documentation activities from 
hand-written documents to a computerized system — a “stand-alone” (S/A) computing 
system, since the concept of the networked PC system had barely been conceived at the 
time (the late 1980s). In 1998, the MEHR introduced the “client-server” (C/S) system, 
which enabled the schools to largely interconnect themselves through an Intranet. This 
C/S system was directly managed by school principals on a separate school server within 
each school. To construct the C/S system, which was installed in 8,651 (86%) out of a 
total 10,061 primary and secondary schools, the government had invested about US $150 
million up to 2001 (Joint Struggle Committee for Human Rights in Information Society 
and Against the NEIS [hereafter JSC], 2003a).  
Since 1998, the information backbone network (KII) has gradually expanded 
throughout the nation’s major metropolitan areas, and the demand for high-speed 
broadband Internet has rapidly increased as well. To create a critical mass of subscribers 
for the KII, the government offered a steeply discounted institutional rate on service 
charges; in general, government agencies and educational institutions received a 40% 
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discount on broadband service charges from the service providers and a 40% government 
subsidy, so that they paid only 20% of the actual cost (see Chapter 5.4.1).90 The 
government further discounted the rate to subscribers from elementary, middle, and high 
schools by charging them only 13% of the actual cost, and even offered them free access 
to the Internet at 256Kbps (MIC & NCA, 2006). To accomplish this massive discount of 
service charges, the MEHR had already requested the government to benchmark the “E-
Rate” offered by the US government, which is a 20% to 90% subsidy for schools and 
libraries drawn from the Universal Service Fund (US Department of Education, 1997). 
Following this US standard, the steep discount rate for educational institutions in Korea 
became decisive in creating the momentum to expand the broadband service into isolated 
schools in remote areas.  
In 2001, the KII project was entering into its third phase — the optical backbone 
network for interlinking the government agencies and public institutions (KII-G) — and 
the government began to focus on the quality of the network service and the development 
of commercial media contents, since the physical backbone network had been completed. 
The broadband Internet services of educational institutions through the physical conduit 
of the KII-G had grown enough to cover the entire school system due to the 
government’s sponsorship of subscriptions. To exploit to the new material conditions 
brought about by the KII (the increase of broadband interconnectivity and the national 
                                                 
90 Moreover, the major daily newspapers participated actively in advocating the government’s goal of IT 
education by means of their own IT campaigns to the students, such as the IIE (Internet in Education) by 
the Chung-Ang Ilbo, the KidNet movement by the Chosun Ilbo, School Informatization and Internet Youth 
Camps by the Dong-A Ilbo, and GreenNet by the Hankook Ilbo (MIC & NCA, 2006). These campaigns led 
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coverage of the optical networks), President Dae-Jung Kim announced eleven e-
government initiatives. The goal of e-governance was to digitize key administrative and 
civil information and construct a seamless web of data through the national backbone 
network. The government planned to develop such IT policy programs as the Internet-
based Civil Service, e-Procurement System, and National Finance Information System, as 
well as the National Education Information System (NIA, 2007). Through these 
programs, the government wanted to create integrated online government services, such 
as “a service enabling any citizen to report, file, or pay taxes over the Internet” (NIA, 
2007: 29).   
The government introduced the NEIS as part of the e-government initiative to 
connect the nation’s 10,870 primary and secondary schools to 16 provincial education 
boards in order to handle educational affairs electronically. Since the NEIS was designed 
under the state-led e-government initiative, the government designed it as a centrally 
integrated database system interlinking educational institutions under a bureaucratic 
vision. The locally managed C/S system was abruptly dismantled even before it was fully 
installed. While it was discarding the enormous investment in the old C/S system, the 
government spent an additional US $52 million to install the NEIS and more than US 
$500 million to upgrade the schools’ PC system with new models. From March to 
September of 2002, the MEHR undertook a system design and deployment for the NEIS 
with the technical support of Samsung SDS, and then from September of 2002 to 
                                                                                                                                                 
by major newspaper companies worked synergistically with the government’s IT promotion at the national 
level. 
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February of 2003, it conducted a pilot test at 267 schools in order to measure the 
feasibility of the NEIS. In February of that year, as the Presidential Transition Committee 
was preparing for the Moo-hyun Roh administration to take office, the Korean Teachers 
and Educational Workers Union (KTU), or Jeongyojo, a left-wing labor union, along 
with civil rights movement groups, requested that the new Roh administration cancel the 
implementation of the NEIS because it threatened the civil rights of students and teachers 
and would create problems such as infringing on the privacy of students and parents, the 
bureaucratic control of teachers, and overburdening staff with computer work, since 
teachers would be required to register every detail of school management and of students’ 
academic performance, health, and enrollment records (Alliance of Seventeen Human 
Rights Groups, 2003, February 12). On March 1, 2003, the inauguration day of the new 
administration, however, the MEHR launched the NEIS, heedless of the request from 
civil rights groups. 
 
7.5.2. Bureaucratic efficiencies vs. an Orwellian vision  
The NEIS was a typical policy program directed by the central government. The 
proponents of expanding the NEIS to the entire nation — the government, the MEHR, 
and the system developer — have defended the “openness” of the system, in contrast to 
the “closedness” of the locally-operated C/S system (Presidential Commission on Policy 
Planning [PCPP], 2008). They stress the efficient management of an “integrated” system 
of students’ records on a central server (PCPP). Meanwhile, the opponents of the NEIS 
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— the KTU, the coalition of parents, and the civil rights groups — have critiqued the 
scope of data collection and the security weaknesses of a central server controlled by the 
MEHR.  
The strongest criticism of the NEIS has been directed against the amount and 
sensitivity of the personal information it collects on each student (Jung, 2003, April 1). 
The NEIS collects 358 personal records per student, as previously mentioned, which are 
broken down into the following three categories: student academic and enrollment 
records, school management information, and health records. “Student academic and 
enrollment records” consist of 45 records for each student, such as resident ID number, 
passport picture, attendance, lateness, sick leave, accidents, special talents, behavior 
patterns, and written evaluations. “School management information” consists of 170 
items related to each student’s socio-economic status, such as whether the student is a 
beneficiary of a social security program, receives special education, is the head of a 
family, or has been subject to disciplinary action at school, the birth dates and educational 
backgrounds of students and parents, and records of counseling, delinquency, deviancy, 
and imprisonment. “Health records” include 143 records about a student’s health, such as 
preventive inoculation, physical condition (obesity, eyesight, color blindness, hearing 
difficulties, nose trouble, malnutrition, mental disorders, and allergies), the results of 
pathology tests, and disease history. Besides these detailed records, the NEIS also 
incorporates 24 other sections including data such as a school’s budget, salaries, 
equipment, facilities, accounting, and personnel records, including 27 items of personal 
information on each teacher, such as the state of their health, their property (including 
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real estate), records of political activities, and criminal records (Kim & Kim, 2004; JSC, 
2003a). The database also links each student’s personal information with that of their 
parents, including birthdates, residential ID numbers, and educational backgrounds. The 
NEIS therefore enables the state to control vast amounts of specific personal information 
about students, parents, and teachers. This so-called “open” system integrates these 
privacy-sensitive data into the central server of the MEHR, and that database is once 
again integrated and re-sorted into the national ID number database and other databases 
containing even more personal information about individuals: the scope is thus truly 
Orwellian. 
This integration of databases signifies a new stage of integration and articulation 
between micro-power in the local and macro-power in the central government. If these 
integrated data in the central server are greatly vulnerable to security breaches, the 
damage might be unlimited in scope. Already in early 2003, Korea was substantially 
affected by a virus attack that crippled the domestic Internet system.91 The so-called “1-
24 Computer Disaster” was caused by a security flaw in Microsoft’s web-server software, 
and since then Koreans have begun to believe that any networked computer is vulnerable 
to a malicious virus or hacking. Other new doubts were created by the sudden shift of 
                                                 
91 The vulnerability of Microsoft’s software provoked harsh criticism, and since then the government has 
begun to consider alternatives to it. At that time, despite the availability of patches, Microsoft made it 
difficult to keep track of its security alerts, so the alerts did not get through. Software users were furious 
with Microsoft’s self-contained, monopolistic software technology, and an influential Korean civil rights 
group, People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, launched a lawsuit for damages related to the 
Slammer virus. Named in the suit are Internet service providers such as KT and Hanaro Telecom, the 
Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC), and Microsoft itself. The civil suit was brought on 
behalf of some 1600 Internet users and companies, but their claims were ultimately denied (the Civil Suit 
Bureau 24, Seoul Central District Court, 2005, December 23). 
 217 
government policy from the C/S system to the NEIS. The government had already 
invested massively in the C/S system, and, up until April of 2001, the MEHR had 
expressed no other plan than to expand the installation of the C/S system into every 
school. Interestingly, according to a monograph released by the JSC (2003a), just after 
the MEHR’s briefing about the C/S system in the Blue House (the Korean White House), 
the Special Committee for E-government — a special joint taskforce for implementing 
eleven e-government policy goals under the Dae-Jung Kim administration — caused the 
MEHR to change their policy plan from the C/S to the NEIS. This report adds that the 
government urged the MEHR to cooperate with Samsung SDS, a network system 
developer and subsidiary of Samsung Corporation, to shift school networking from the 
C/S system to the NEIS. According to the recent policy report by the Presidential 
Commission on Policy Planning (2008), since then, a total of 88 members —12 public 
officials of the MEHR and 76 persons from Samsung SDS — began to launch to analyze, 
design, and build the NEIS, without considering the participation of the general citizenry, 
more broadly selected expert groups, and the relevant civil society groups. In fact, these 
two reports confirm that the government and Samsung SDS exclusively arranged a secret 
deal to replace the C/S system with the NEIS. These opaque decision making processes 
and controversies over the government’s IT-driven educational policy finally evoked the 
mass protest of citizens against the NEIS, as discussed in the next section. 
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7.5.3. The battle over the NEIS  
From early 2003 onward, the KTU and other civil society groups were already 
developing a civil disobedience movement against the implementation of the NEIS (JSC, 
2003a), which they claimed would allow the government to keep and control an 
unconstitutional database system threatening the civil rights of students, teachers, and 
parents. On February 18, the KTU filed a petition with the National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC)92 claiming the NEIS violated human rights by its systematic 
surveillance of students’ records. On March 3, the KTU also launched a sit-in protest 
against the NEIS, and on March 17 and the parents’ group also announced their 
opposition to the NEIS’ implementation, but the government continued to implement the 
database system despite these protests. The NHRC (2003, May 12) issued policy 
recommendations siding with the civil rights group, judging that the three categories of 
students’ records (school management information, student academic and enrollment 
records, and health records) infringe upon the basic human rights under international law 
as well as the national constitution’s protection of privacy.93 The NHRC recommended 
that each school continue to use the C/S system to store such private information, while 
enhancing the security level of the system. The NHRC also called for the government to 
                                                 
92 The NHRC is a government commission “established in 2001 as a national advocacy institution for 
human rights protection. It is committed to the fulfillment of human rights in a broader sense, including 
dignity, value and freedom of every human being, as signified in international human rights conventions 
and treaties to which Korea is a signatory” (NHRC, 2007). 
93 The NHRC cited the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Article 12), the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (Article 17), the Convention of the Rights of the Child (Article 16), the 
OECD’s Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Trans-border Flow of Personal Data, and the 
UN’s Guidelines for the regulation of computerized personal data file, as well as Article 10 (the Right to 
Pursue Happiness) and Article 17 (the Right to Protect Private Life) of Korea’s Constitution (JSC, 2003b). 
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remove the three privacy-sensitive categories containing students’ information and 
teachers’ personnel records from the NEIS (Privacy International, 2007). The NHRC has 
no power to enforce its rulings, because its scope is limited to issuing policy 
recommendations, but the NHRC’s recommendations in this case had sufficient impact 
throughout Korean society that the government was forced to scale back its 
implementation of the NEIS. The Ministry of Education and Human Resources (MEHR) 
officially announced that it “would consider the NHRC’s recommendations with respect” 
(Hankyoreh, 2003, May 5). On May 26, the MEHR, in its negotiations with the KTU, 
finally seemed to accept the NHRC’s policy recommendations to drop the three contested 
categories of students’ data and to revise the whole process of implementation. Table 7.2 
shows the number of items that the government agreed to remove from the NEIS 
database and what items remain. 
Table 7.2. The three contested categories of NEIS data   
Categories Original Plan Removed Retained Percent removed 
School management 
information  170  56 (37) 114 (133) 33% (22%) 
Student academic and 
enrollment records  
45 45 0 100%* 
Health records 143 135 8 95% 
Total  358  236 (217) 122 (141) 66% (61%) 
  
Notes: * 100% is to be removed after a student’s graduation. 
       Numbers in parentheses refer to the figures for special schools for the disabled. 
Source: JSC (2003a: 7) 
 
 
Even though the government agreed to drop 60% of the personal information from the 
original database, a total of 122 privacy-sensitive records were still problematic. Despite 
 220 
the civil rights groups’ concessions during negotiation, the MEHR later betrayed them by 
announcing that it will allow each school to choose its own database management system, 
raising the suspicion that schools would be pressured to adopt the original version of the 
NEIS (JSC, 2003b). Reacting to this announcement from the MEHR and under 
persuasion from the Provincial Offices of Education, which are subdivisions of the 
MEHR, some primary and secondary school principals began to voluntarily introduce the 
NEIS into their computer system, although the principals’ decisions were taken without 
any agreement from the teachers (Yonhap News Agency, 2003, June 19). 
The MEHR’s betrayal aroused public outrage: on June 18, human rights activists 
launched a hunger strike struggle against the NEIS (People’s Solidarity for Participatory 
Democracy, 2003, June 26). On June 20, the KTU visited the MEHR building to resist 
the government’s adherence to the NEIS and to launch a nationwide rally with large 
demonstrations to halt its implementation, while shouting a slogan that “the MEHR must 
stop the NEIS policy of an ostrich sticking its head in the sand” (Hankyoreh, 2003, June 
21).94 Facing such a strong backlash, the government realized that the MEHR had lost 
the credibility to lead the NEIS policy program and instead created a Committee for 
Educational Informatization (CEI) headed by the Prime Minister. Ostensibly, the CEI 
was to listen to the various stakeholders’ voices in redesigning the NEIS plan. The KTU 
argued that, in reality, the government arbitrarily appointed CEI members behind closed 
doors and entirely excluded the anti-NEIS civil rights groups. The KTU claimed that “the 
government should never have included on the Committee persons who opposed the 
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NHRC’s policy recommendations” (Hankyoreh, 2003, June 24). On June 25, a large 
number of civil society groups, human rights organizations, and unions — including the 
People’s Solidarity for the Participatory Democracy, the Lawyers Association for a 
Democratic Society, the KTU, and the Democratic Labor Party — jointly held a press 
conference demanding that the CEI be reformulated on the basis of transparency and 
democracy. On July 8, the 43 civil rights groups opposing the NEIS established a Joint 
Struggle Committee to Protect Human Rights in Information Society and Against the 
NEIS (JSC). The JSC announced to the media that it would “organize a pan-national 
movement against NEIS, to conduct national campaigns for abolishing the e-government 
project [the NEIS] which infringes the human rights, and more broadly, to discuss the 
citizens’ human rights in an information society” (JSC, 2003, July 8). The JSC also 
declared that it would reinforce solidarity with the international organizations fighting for 
human rights such as the United Nations Human Rights Council, Privacy International, 
Education International, and the International Labor Organization. In September of 2003, 
the JSC began to stage a massive candlelight vigil protesting against the NEIS in several 
major cities and a one-person picket protest95 in relays in front of the entrances to 
schools.  
To end the long-lasting conflict surrounding the NEIS, in September of 2004, the 
government again entered into a bargain with the KTU, and came to the conclusion that 
                                                                                                                                                 
94 http://www.hani.co.kr/section-005000000/2003/06/005000000200306211816391.html. 
95 In Korea, this is a popular way to express one’s anger against the authorities: one person stands or sits 
in front of the building where the targeted authority resides while holding a picket or a banner until relieved 
by the next protester. 
 
 222 
in September of 2005 the NEIS would be tested in a revised form and installed in the 
following year. Both parties agreed on some controversial points: First, the plan to have a 
central server of the NEIS managed by the MEHR would be nullified. Instead, each 
individual school could choose the S/A, the C/A, or the NEIS system. If choosing to 
introduce the NEIS system, a high school must install an individual Intranet server unable 
to connect outside servers, and an elementary or middle school must construct a group 
server system capable of linking no more than 15 schools internally. Second, once the 
NEIS was operated by the server of an individual school or a group of schools, the three 
privacy-sensitive categories for students’ record (school management information, 
student academic and enrollment records, and health records) could be kept, on the 
condition of deleting some highly sensitive records (Kim, 2004, September 24). Third, to 
save the costs of building the distributive networks, Linux was adopted as its major 
operating system. Linux, an open source operation system, has been installed on 2,335 
NEIS servers since March of 2006 when the revised NEIS was officially launched (Kim, 
2007, July 16). 
 Although the civil rights groups failed to abolish the NEIS, they did accomplish 
the goal of blocking the government’s desire to manage students’ personal information 
through a central sever system. In this case, public protest achieved its goals, or some of 
them. Through a dramatic bargaining process, the NEIS scandal came to an end, but 
privacy issues in the education system have not. For instance, although in March of 2005 
the National Assembly passed the revised Basic Education Act with a new provision to 
protect students’ personal information, simultaneously, illegal activities such as the 
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leaking of students’ data to the private educational service companies are increasing 
(Park, 2007, August 29). The Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology — created 
under the new president, Myung-bak Lee, by a reshuffling of the MEHR and the Ministry 
of Science and Technology — has planned to install CCTVs in 70% of school buildings 
by the year 2010 in the name of monitoring gang activities in schools (Noh, 2008, May 
18). The state’s desire to collect students’ personal data seemed to backfire and was 
almost foiled in the NEIS case, but the government’s recent plan to install CCTVs in 
most schools signifies that the state is incessantly seeking to monitor students, at the 
same time as the increasing leaks of student data to private companies (Hankyoreh, 2005, 
April 21) indicate that the private sector is on the prowl for whatever data it can obtain 
from these expanding stores of government data.  
The KII was the government’s chosen instrument for improving the global 
competitiveness of the national economy, providing the citizens more efficient public 
services, and promising them a better quality of life. The government considered the KII, 
and within it, the NEIS, to be the first step toward creating a rosy digital future by 
interconnecting the public educational institutions at the national level. The case of the 
NEIS, however, has begun to suggest to the public that anti-democratic and retrogressive 
aspects of Korean political culture have been deeply embedded within the design of such 
technical codes. 
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7.6. LESSONS ABOUT SURVEILLANCE, PRIVACY, AND PROTEST IN THE KII ERA 
Even among Asian countries, South Korea is known as a country highly passionate about 
education, where the parents are wholly devoted to improving the social status of their 
children through their investment in higher education. From elementary school through 
high school, Korean students strive fiercely to enter the exclusive universities in and 
around the Seoul metropolitan area. The government and the public and private 
educational institutions have also justified promoting stronger competition among the 
students and wielding disciplinary control over them. The NEIS case represents a worst-
case scenario resulting from the technocratic education policies by which the state has 
regulated the students’ academic affairs and their personal information. The NEIS also 
became a locus of confrontation between privacy groups and proponents of IT 
efficiencies in which both parties failed to accomplish their ultimate goals. To install the 
integrated database system, the government used the plea of “efficiencies” of systematic 
management to justify bureaucratic control of citizens. The opponents resisted the NEIS’s 
lack of privacy safeguards (Park, 2007) and warned of the potential dangers of a state-
controlled database system.  
The NEIS controversy in Korea offers several lessons about surveillance, privacy, 
and protest in the age of nationwide networks like the KII: First, surveillance cases 
similar to the NEIS are arising with increasing frequency in the digital age, all aimed at 
bolstering the bureaucratic capacity for social control. It is obvious that national networks 
like the KII not only promote the national economy but also stimulate and refine 
government surveillance practices such as the “free-floating” control of digital databases 
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(Deleuze, [1990] 1995; see Chapter 2.3.2.1). Second, with the conjoining of digital 
technologies and bureaucratic control, citizens’ privacy rights are more easily vaporized, 
and their losses more difficult to perceive, than in disciplinary society under the military 
regimes. Third, the confluence of an underdeveloped political system, vulnerable citizens 
who are sorted by bureaucratic and business interests, cronyism between the Chaebols 
(e.g., Samsung SDI and LG CNS) and the government for creating the national database 
systems such as e-ID card and the NEIS, and the lack of a legal system protecting privacy 
continuously reinforce the pervasive use of public power in Korea. Fourth, despite these 
constraints, in the new era of civilian government, Koreans’ political engagement — as 
can be seen in the robust alliance of civil society groups against the government’s NEIS 
policy — has become mature enough to counteract the new network-based surveillance 
techniques in the contemporary control of power. In this lies the hope for Korea’s future. 
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Chapter VIII: Conclusion 
 
 
8.1. THE REAL CONDITIONS BEHIND KOREAN-SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENTALISM 
This study had its origins in questioning the popular belief among policymakers 
that the Korean Information Infrastructure (KII) project has improved the quality of 
Korean society and culture and further upgraded the country’s IT status in the global 
community. It is obvious that policy rhetoric that ignores the real conditions behind the 
successful KII policy plan creates a barrier to an accurate evaluation of the KII project by 
telecom policymakers, politicians, and communication scholars. In fact, Korea’s 
developmentalism — its continuing efforts to catch up to the economic power of the 
advanced nations — has been founded on close linkages between the state and powerful 
corporate interests, which resulted in neglecting the participation of the citizenry. From 
each chapter, this study can detect the opaque decision-making processes surrounding the 
KII, such as allotting the KII business licenses for specific vendors, KT and LG Dacom 
(Chapter 4 & 5); redesigning the KII as a regulatory means to control the citizens as seen 
in the case of the National Education Information System, though this attempt was largely 
thwarted by public reaction as detailed in Chapter 7; and excluding the citizens’ voices in 
the intermediary organizations built to facilitate the KII as discussed in Chapter 6. The 
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underdeveloped political culture of Korea led the KII project to be a half-ripe policy: it 
serves as the material foundation which has made Korea an IT powerhouse but also, as 
policy, it represents the already entrenched corporate interests and reinforces the 
bureaucratic efficiencies for social control. The present study has confirmed that the past 
legacies of authoritarian interventionism and developmentalism under the military regimes 
still haunt such projects as the KII. Although it was planned and implemented under 
civilian governments, the KII could not escape the authoritarian and undemocratic 
character of the politico-social structure inherited from the military regimes.  
This study has examined in detail the major contextual factors conditioning the KII 
project: the global constraints conditioning its telecom policies (using globalization 
theory), the dense state–capital linkages (using developmental state theories), and the 
bureaucratic desire for control (using critical geographies).     
As the background for investigating the major driving forces that conditioned the 
birth of the KII project in the early 1990s, Chapter 4 surveyed how, from the period of 
Japanese colonialism through the military regimes to the current civilian government, 
different regimes have changed space and spatialization in Korea by building national 
transportation and information infrastructures. Specifically, this chapter examined how the 
state-led infrastructure plans in each of these eras have been closely related to the 
economic goals of the various regimes: Under the colonialist regime, the infrastructure 
across the peninsula was built to serve the Japanese imperialist desire to access the 
Manchurian market. The military regimes had a strong sense that they must industrialize 
the national economy, which lagged far behind the advanced nations. This industrial 
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modernization project rapidly developed the economy; by the early 90s, however, Korea 
was experiencing an economic recession as a result of losing its privileged export status 
based on low-wage labor in textiles and heavy industry. The civilian government’s main 
goal, therefore, was to shift the national economy towards a knowledge-based system, and 
they chose the KII as an infrastructure to revive Korea’s economic growth in the new 
digital economy. This chapter, thus, situated the KII project not only within the succession 
of past administrations’ infrastructure plans, but also within the response of Korean 
government and business to the new digital mode of capitalism. 
As regards the global constraints, Chapter 5 examined how Korea’s state-
sponsored project to create the most developed broadband network in the world was 
catalyzed by the context of market liberalization, a process led by the US and other 
developed countries and including the WTO regulations and the US Trade 
Representative’s designation of Korea as a Priority Foreign Country. This chapter 
investigated the dynamic mechanism of the nation confronting the pressures of economic 
globalization, which has two contradictory aspects: the voluntary affiliation of Korea into 
the unified global economy and the local adjustment to survive within the hierarchical 
system. While the government’s series of IT-driven policy plans aimed at positioning 
Korea’s IT infrastructure in the forefront of universal global capitalism in the digital age, 
this chapter showed that tensions have arisen between the strong wave of economic 
liberalization and the desire to protect and promote national sovereignty. De-nationalizing 
processes, rather than being a simple integration of local economies into the global, have 
also fed nationalizing dynamics at the same time (Sassen, 2006). The development of the 
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ATM switching technology, an essential part of the KII, was a typical case illustrating 
how the Korean government wanted not only to enlist the local economy as part of the 
global network of capitalism, but also to promote priming-the-pump policy plans in order 
to create new profitable resources for the local market. Thus, this chapter describes how 
the state leadership in the KII project was an active expression of the national IT strategy, 
even though in the case of the ATM switching technology it ended with a “broken dream” 
because the ATM technology became outmoded by the IP-based router. Further, within 
the process, this chapter shows how the state assumed a collaborative role as an agent of 
local capital and as a mediator controlling the inflow of global capital. This analysis once 
again confirms the assessment that the globalizing process is “partly inhabiting and even 
getting constituted inside the national” (Sassen, 2007: 2). Theoretically, this chapter 
exemplifies the East Asian textures of localization in response to the irresistible force of 
economic globalization. The economic sphere of globalization can be seen as the 
underdevelopment or closure of local economies overwhelmed by the globalizing flows of 
capital, finance, and commodity, while the socio-cultural spheres of globalization have 
been more flexible and autonomous in their response the universal principle of globalism. 
Even within the economic sphere, however, this chapter notes the strong tendencies of the 
local manifested under the structural hierarchy of economic globalization.        
With regard to the dense state–capital linkages, typical in the developmental state 
model in Korea, Chapter 6 first surveyed the legacy of the developmental state model 
under the military regimes (1963–1992) which created centralized, authoritarian national 
plans for industrialization carried out through intergovernmental organizations mediating 
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close linkages between the state and the Chaebols; this model showed some continuities 
but also some discontinuities with the KII policy plan under the civilian governments. 
Continuity is seen in the Chaebol-biased policy plans of the government and its 
intermediary organizations in both eras. For instance, like the Economic Planning Board 
(EPB) established under the military regime of Cheong-hee Park, the KII Planning Board 
was distinctively effective in implementing the IT project through its intermediary role in 
which it managed the various interests of the different government agencies and the 
Chaebols. Discontinuity can be seen in the shift in the role of the state: While the 
developmental state under the military regime acted as a commander directing the 
Chaebols in the execution of its plans and policies, the post-developmental state under the 
civilian government became a coordinator who guides policy projects in a manner 
favorable to the Chaebols. Under the military regimes, the state and the Chaebols had a 
direct crony relationship in which the government granted business licenses and in return 
the Chaebols donated political slush funds. In contrast, this chapter described how the KII 
project’s success was facilitated by indirect government subsidies to the Chaebols such as 
public investment loans, a joint public-private sector KII fund, and the Internet subscriber 
promotion through the cyber-building certificate system.  
Chapter 6 confirms that even in today’s Korea, “those with a connection to a few 
leading political figures have precedence over others who might be better qualified” to 
participate in policymaking (Hyun & Lent, 1999). The backward political conditions in 
Korea (which can be seen in the pervasive practice of ignoring the procedural consensus 
mechanisms of policymaking and relying instead on personal ties or favoritism to specific 
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Chaebols) combined with the dominant trends of contemporary global capitalism have 
made the market more vulnerable to crises such as the IMF financial crisis of 1997, and 
impeded new entrants into the market. Chapter 6 assesses the KII project as a prototypical 
IT policy reflecting an evolving phase of the developmental state model (the “flexible” 
state), an IT policy which was enacted in the midst of the shift from the “strong” state to 
the present “market-driven” state. As regards the Chaebols, the KII project has created the 
material conditions enabling them to become “e-Chaebols,” incumbents in new IT sector, 
as well as in the traditional manufacturing sector. Theoretically, Chapter 6 contributes to a 
critical reading of the developmental state theories through disclosing the negative effects 
caused by the symbiosis between the state and the Chaebols during the KII project and by 
relating the evolutionary phases of the state power to the emergence of Korean civil 
society and to the Chaebols’ growth. 
Chapter 7 examined how the KII has also facilitated the state’s control of its 
citizens and how the civilian government’s surveillance techniques based on the digital 
networks differs from the disciplinary surveillance techniques of the military regimes. The 
KII has provided the citizens more efficient public services by the e-government system, 
but at the same time it has enabled the government to shift its surveillance of citizens from 
a visible, disciplinary, oppressive, and place-based mode of social control to an invisible, 
mobile, and flow-based one. To illustrate the KII-based control conducted by the 
government, Chapter 7 examined the case of the NEIS, which aimed at managing the 
profile data of students, parents, and teachers through the central server of a government 
agency (MEHR). The NEIS was a unique Big-Brother-type proposal, one which could 
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hardly be imagined without the nationwide high-speed backbone networks. It represented 
the conjoining of bureaucratic efficiencies and digital technologies under the conditions of 
an immature political culture, which took no consideration of the citizens’ privacy rights. 
The chapter concluded that the confrontation between the proponents of IT efficiencies 
and the civil society groups that united against the NEIS epitomizes the citizens’ hopeful 
possibilities for increased democracy in public life in Korean society. Theoretically, 
Chapter 7 confirms Gilles Deleuze’s thesis (see Chapter 2.3.2.) that today’s society has 
transformed the power mechanism for social control from one of disciplinary suppression 
to a digital grid of control over the citizens. In regard to the NEIS case, this chapter 
confirms that, in this Deleuzean world, there is a new tendency of surveillance techniques 
to articulate locally dispersed micro-power (localized data) into the centralized macro-
power (a central server system). 
In sum, it is unquestionable that the KII project, sustained by government 
subsidies, has enhanced the national IT indicators and elevated Korean society into the 
first tier of global IT development (a shift of the Korean economy from the export-
oriented industrial system to knowledge-based one); nevertheless, the legacy of 
developmentalism practiced by the military juntas has also left its mark on the KII project 
(which was carried out under the “flexible state,” a mixture of the strong state and the 
market-driven state). Just as under the military regimes, so today the Chaebols such as 
KT, LG Dacom, SK, and Samsung have been great beneficiaries of the KII and become 
the dominant actors of the IT economy (the creation of e-Chaebols). Moreover, without 
strong protections for citizens’ privacy rights, the KII can easily become (as the NEIS case 
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shows) a further extension of the state’s surveillance of its citizens, and in this way the KII 
signifies a shift in Korea from a disciplinary society to a network-based control of society 
(see Table 8.1).  
Table 8.1. The role of the KII as a catalyst 
 The KII as a catalyst of the following evolving phases: 
Major infrastructure From a physical infrastructure to a virtual infrastructure 
Catching-up economy From an export-oriented industrial economy to a knowledge- or digital-based 
economy (from Chaebols to e-Chaebols) 
Form of the state The flexible state (a transition from the strong state to the market-driven state) 
Social control From a disciplinary society to a network-based control of society 
 
Further, the KII embodies a decision-making process that is confined to 
technocrats and business interests and has excluded the general citizenry, more broadly 
selected expert groups, and the relevant civil society groups. The lack of democratic 
decision-making processes in building the KII can be seen in such policies as the careless 
introduction of the NEIS, the ill-judged choice of the ATM as a core technology, and the 
exclusive membership of the intermediary organizations that guided the KII’s design. It is 
thus all the more necessary to construct a democratic forum at the national policy level 
which is sustained from below to work on behalf of the public welfare against the 
proprietary interests of the Chaebols. 
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8.2. BEYOND A DEVELOPMENTAL STATE MODEL: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT MODEL  
South Korea has accomplished rapid economic growth within a brief period: under 
the Park regime, the “developmental dictatorship” succeeded in accomplishing industrial 
modernization; at the same time, it caused a “tendency toward deformation” of economic 
growth under conditions of extreme state intervention, a deformation that includes such 
phenomena as the increase of inequalities between the classes, environmental destruction, 
harsh labor control, and crony capitalism. At the present time, although economic policy 
is no longer implemented by an autocracy, the close relationships between the government 
and the Chaebols are still influential in designing the national economic plans, and civil 
society’s ability to be involved in or monitor the policymaking processes is limited. The 
state rhetoric of a “catching-up” economy has easily overruled voices from below by 
regarding them as unnecessary noise.  
Policy change in Korea should lead toward reformulating telecom policies along 
much more socially-interventionist and redistributive lines, and toward decentralizing or 
democratically controlling the overwhelming power of the Chaebols. What is needed is a 
democratic force from below that can exert itself against such interests and assert instead 
the public’s interest. Understanding the history of the KII project provides insights into 
how to formulate future telecom policies along much more democratically participatory 
lines while restraining the overwhelming power of the telecom oligopolies and Chaebols 
and soliciting the input of citizens and citizens’ groups. The results of the present study 
suggest that the attempt of states to intervene in a protectionist way to oppose global 
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capitalism will only serve to further expand the power of the Chaebols, which will in the 
course of time simply expand into transnational oligopolies. What options are open to 
those who would avoid furthering the same type of collusion between the state and the 
Chaebols?  
First, to stop the crony linkages between the state and the Chaebols in Korea, the 
civil society needs to force both the government and the Chaebols to guarantee small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) a fair share in granting the IT-related business licenses. For 
instance, in composing a consortium for a specific IT project such as metropolitan-area 
network (MAN), the central and city governments can legally require the allocation of one 
half of the business rights to SMEs, along with restrictions on the share allotted to each 
Chaebol. Korean SMEs have existed in a “master–slave” relationship with the Chaebols 
in which they are forced into serving as the Chaebols’ subcontracted sweatshops. The best 
way to revive IT venture capital in Korea is to shift away from such practices and allow 
SMEs equal access to the market as independent actors. None of the SMEs in Korea were 
able to grow large enough to challenge the established Chaebols; due to the favoritism 
shown by the state to the Chaebols, the rise of new Chaebol-sized corporations is rare, 
indeed, almost impossible in the current Korean market. The irrational slogan that only the 
Chaebols can nurture the national economy and compete with other countries’ 
multinationals in the global market has prevailed; instead, the logic of scale should be 
replaced with the IT growth thesis focusing on the SMEs’ innovative roles in a creative 
industry. The government should set out fair rules that allow for the SMEs to survive and 
compete in the market, rather than serving as “midwife” to the Chaebols.  
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Second, while the privatization and commercialization of the Internet are 
significant factors endangering a free culture in Korea, as they are throughout the 
developed world, the most urgent issue surrounding media and the Internet in South Korea 
is the government’s continuing pre- and post-censorship, such as the Internet content 
rating system, the real name system that prohibits anonymous postings on discussion 
groups, and the imprisonment of system operators and users in order to restrict free 
speech. Under the contemporary undemocratic and underdeveloped political culture, the 
political elites could easily pollute the IT infrastructure by restricting the citizens’ public 
life. While Korea has, as mentioned in Chapter 7.5.3, a National Human Rights 
Commission, currently its rulings are only advisory; what is needed is for the Commission 
to be given legal power to enforce its rulings against acts of censorship carried out by the 
government or its agents, or by corporations or others.  
On a broader societal level, in order to resist such invisible and concealed 
bureaucratic power of social control, as in the NEIS case, citizens’ privacy and human 
rights should be cultivated by the tactics of counter-surveillance or so-called “synopticon” 
(Mathiesen, 1997) that enables the public not only to monitor power’s surveilling eyes but 
also to resist the surveillance networks of political power. Whereas, in its original 
conception, the panopticon is a disciplinary model for supervising prisoners from an all-
seeing high tower, the counter-surveillance or “synopticon” designates a reversal in which 
the many (the citizens) watch the few (the powerful). For instance, following the example 
of environmental impact assessments which measure the potential results of such 
development projects as a dam, motorway, airport or factory even before their launch, one 
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of the tactics of the synopticon could be the creation of technology impact assessments 
(TIA) which ensure the citizens’ ability to monitor and participate in an IT policy from its 
design to implementation. In control societies, place has been transformed into “flows.” 
The greater the role communication networks play in the production and reinforcement of 
power, the more the citizens are enabled to re-appropriate the dominant system residing in 
the flows. It is likely that the same conditions that reinforce abilities of power can also 
empower the citizens. Even under seemingly rigid control, political tension exists between 
the codification of power and its rearrangement by the intervention of human agents.  
Third, the KII was a project designed by self-assured technocrats, without 
considering minority voices or feedback from civil society. It has been the pattern of 
Korean IT policies to ignore the importance of social inclusion and the civic participation 
of marginalized community groups and user groups that should lie at the heart of IT 
development. What is needed is a democratic force from below that can exert itself against 
such interests and assert instead the public’s interest. For instance, in his history of South 
Africa’s transitional period of 1990 to 1994, Horwitz (2003) notes the policy setting of a 
“culture of democratic consultation and transparency.” He describes various stakeholders’ 
“forums” in South Africa as providing a space for the effective intervention of civil 
society groups in a more “concerted” setting rather than a “corporatist” in national 
telecommunications policymaking processes. A well-ordered society creates the optimal 
conditions for citizens to participate in the policymaking processes and within it to 
cultivate for their own benefit the virtue of cultural diversity. In contrast to the unfair 
conditions in the market supported by the state’s developmentalism and favoritism in 
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Korea, the present study suggests a democratic “forum” at the national policy level could 
be sustained from below to work on behalf of the public welfare against the proprietary 
biases of economic oligopolies that have manipulated Korean social reality up until now. 
Speaking of the situation in the US today, McChesney (2004, 2007) mentions the concept 
of “critical junctures” at which there is the momentum for media and telecom reform; at 
the present time, civil rights activists such as media watchdog groups and grassroots 
movements should exert pressure on the Korean government to rearrange the 
technological and cultural resources, wealth, and power now controlled by the interests of 
big business and by neoliberal deregulatory policy. 
Finally, at the rhetorical level, Korean civil society needs to take a leading role of 
transforming the current social climate which is dominated by the central and local 
government’s logic of economic development through the IT industry and competition in 
the global economy. In a Korea desiring to accomplish in a compressed timeframe the 
creation of a modernity resembling that of wealthier Western societies, the spontaneous 
elements springing from local demands are always viewed from a business perspective of 
“development” and “competition.” There is a strong tendency for the Korean government 
to “see the information society still in industrial terms, bent and shaped to fit the old 
economy of mass produced electronic hardware commodities” (Venturelli, 2002: 83). 
Public rhetoric in Korea needs to be enriched by adding some adjectives to these nouns: 
we need “sustainable” development and “fair” competition to enhance the living 
conditions of citizens. Civil society in Korea should encourage the government to situate 
the IT development within the concerns of “sustainable” development, which aims to 
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promote democratic values in the information society such as a diversity of IT 
opportunities to the underserved and underprivileged, respect for privacy and human 
rights, and the relative independence of IT policy from the industrial approach. 
 These four suggestions for Korean society are in accord with the 
recommendations set forth in the joint Civil Society Declaration (“The Seoul 
Declaration”), which was endorsed by a variety of online civil rights and civil society 
groups around the world (such as the Electronic Privacy Information Center, the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, the European Digital Rights Initiative, IT4Change, Public 
Knowledge, the Associations for Progressive Communications, Consumers Korea, and 
the Jinbo Network), submitted to the 2008 OECD Ministerial Meeting on the “Future of 
the Internet Economy” held in Seoul on June 17–18. At this meeting, the world civil 
society groups urged the developed countries to promote the following issues in the age 
of “the Internet economy:” freedom of expression, the protection of privacy and 
transparency, consumer protection, support for pluralistic media, an inclusive digital 
society, cultural diversity, and other human rights issues. Going beyond the Korean IT 
aspects focused on in the present study, the agenda expressed in this declaration 
expresses essential information rights principles which need to be taken into account in 
national decision-making processes for IT polices in order to guarantee citizens’ basic 
human rights around the globe.   
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8.3. LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
As a macroscopic inquiry into the structural contexts surrounding the KII project, 
this study has limitations that need to be addressed by future research: First, with regard to 
the research scope, due to its emphasis on the KII’s structural aspects (such as its global 
constraints, the close state–business linkages, social control, and the shift toward a new 
economy), this study intentionally minimized the autonomous role of actors who were 
isolated from or went against larger forces in the system. The relation between structural 
determination and human agency is a central concern of political economy, the theoretical 
base of this study, and the conceptualization of this relationship is at the core of the theory 
and method of the political economic approach. Nevertheless, this study excluded the role 
of agency in the analysis; the justification for this lies in the fact that the voices from 
below have been entirely excluded from the policymaking process throughout the KII 
project. For the state-led KII policy, the dialectic tension between agency and structure 
appears to be inactive, except the case of the NEIS (see Chapter 7.5), in which it can be 
seen “how it comes about that structures are constituted through action, and reciprocally 
how action is constituted structurally” (Giddens, 1976: 161). In Korea, it is at the socio-
cultural level of IT development, rather than at the policymaking level, that the louder 
grass-root voices have been heard and it is at this level that one can see structural changes 
being brought about through human agency. For instance, the IT-related scandals and their 
framings in Korean society shown in Table 7.2 illustrate the structural processes 
constituted by the agents’ actions. Meanwhile, the NGOs and the citizens are rarely seen 
monitoring or intervening in the elites’ decision-making processes for IT policies. Rather 
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than searching Korean history for nonexistent empirical cases of policy interventions from 
below, future study should expand the research scope to examine how to develop policy 
alternatives at the process of decision-making and how to build a more open forum which 
would enable agents to be actively involved in as an impetus for societal change. In other 
words, the dominant pattern of elitist structure in IT policy in Korea needs to be overcome 
by developing realistic policy alternatives to democratize the design, use, and impact of 
IT.  
Second, this study has a limitation in illustrating the power structure among the 
major stakeholders, especially the political entities surrounding the KII project. This could 
be overcome through a network analysis detailing the policymaking processes in each of 
the different administrations and agencies involved. Since a political entity is composed of 
a class of politicians, their shared interest groups, and various government agencies, the 
present study’s approach, which presents the state as a unified entity seeking to attain a 
goal, is a simplification that may have lost the rich textures of the conflict involved in 
policy decision-making processes. Further research can fill in this blind spot by doing 
policy network analyses that stress the performative character of relations among 
policymakers and relevant interest groups, so as to understand patterns of linkage in terms 
of political motives and the synergistic effect of the policy activities constituted in those 
relations.  
Third, many researchers (see Chapter 5.3) from the academic field of Asian 
Studies have compared and analyzed the East Asian countries’ economic growth and its 
relationship to state interventionism; however, a comparative study which aims to 
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examine the “catching-up economy” model among these countries in the new digital age 
is still to be performed. The present study is also restricted to one country; future research, 
thus, could extend its scope to perform a comparative study with other East and South 
Asian countries such as Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Japan, which have shared 
political experiences analogous to those of Korea in their IT development, specifically, in 
having state-led IT infrastructure plans. 
Finally, this study can be extended by examining how the post-KII infrastructure 
projects initiated by the government are connected to or differentiated from the now-
completed KII project. Since the 1997 financial crisis in Korea, private investment in the 
national infrastructure plan has increased significantly, and future research can return to 
the investigation of the new characteristics arising in the new IT infrastructure projects 
that continue to be implemented in South Korea.  
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Appendices 
 
APPENDIX A: EXCERPT OF A SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
I am preparing a doctoral dissertation in the Department of Radio-TV-Film, 
University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX  78712. The dissertation will be titled “The 
Political Economy of Networked Mobility: The Historical Development of the Korean 
Information Infrastructure, 1995–2005.” 
This semi-structured interview aims to capture your viewpoint on the nationwide 
information superhighway project. If you feel that any issue was not adequately 
addressed during your interview, I would be grateful if you left your phone number and 
email so I could contact you in person. We are confident that, as a key actor or expert 
related to the national IT project, you have highly-qualified opinions that will contribute 
to understanding the dynamics of the Korean telecom project.  
Please state your job position at the time of the IT project and your current job 
position. If you prefer to answer under cover of a pseudonym, please let me know.  
 
   A. EXTERNAL INFLUENCES 
In the introductory phase of the information superhighway project, did multilateral 
trade agreements such as 1997 WTO Agreement on Telecommunications and the 
early 1990s’ information superhighway policy experiments in advanced countries 
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such as the US, Japan, and the EU greatly influence the launch of our own nationwide 
project?  
Probe: If not, what factors most influenced the project? Why? How? 
 
B-1. GOVERNMENT INTERESTS IN THE NATIONAL IT PROJECT  
(Directed at governmental officials) 
What governance issues are of primary concern to the government as regards the KII?  
Probe: Was the introduction of the NEIS in 2003 a successful example of a 
governance issue related to the KII? Why or why not? Are there any other 
plans to introduce similar integrated database systems in other areas? 
 
B-2. SHIFTING TOWARD A DIGITAL ECONOMY  
(Directed at business executives) 
How do you think that the KII project affected the 1997 IMF crisis in Korea?  
Probe: How? Can you clarify its effects on economic growth? Have there been 
any changes in the major policy goals of the superhighway since the 
crisis? 
 
C. MUTUAL INVOLVEMENT OF GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS 
How did the policy consultation between industry representatives and government 
officials affect the IT project?  
Probe: Could you tell me more about the organizational structure of the 
consultative body? Were there any other examples of close cooperation 
between the government and the private sector?    
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If there are other important issues that were not addressed in this interview, please 
feel free to discuss those with me. Your answers will never be used for any purposes 
except academic ones. Thank you for your cooperation and your honest answers. 
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APPENDIX B: CONSENT FORM 
Interviewing key actors involved in South Korea’s telecom policy 
 
 
Title: The Political Economy of Networked Mobility: The Historical    
Development of the Korean Information Infrastructure, 1995–2005 
 
 
Conducted by: Kwang-Suk Lee, PhD Candidate (Email: suk_lee@mail.utexas.edu) 
Radio-Television-Film, the University of Texas at Austin, Telephone: +1 512 477 4725  
 
 
Supervised by: Dr. Sharon Strover (Email: sharon.strover@austin.utexas.edu) 
Director, the Telecommunications and Information Policy Institute (TIPI) 
Chair, Radio-TV-Film Department, the University of Texas at Austin, Telephone: +1 512 
471 6652  
    
 
You are being asked to participate in a research study. This form provides you with 
information about the study. The person in charge of this research will also describe this 
study to you and answer all of your questions. Please read the information below and ask 
any questions you might have before deciding whether or not to take part. Your 
participation is entirely voluntary. You can refuse to participate without penalty or loss 
of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You can stop your participation at any 
time and your refusal will not impact current or future relationships with UT Austin or 
participating sites. To do so simply tell the researcher you wish to stop participation. The 
researcher will provide you with a copy of this consent form for your records. 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate South Korea’s structural 
mechanisms/politico-economic processes for installing the information superhighway 
network throughout the country from 1995 to 2005. As part of the requirements for the 
research, we are collecting in-depth policy opinions of key actors from the regulatory 
bodies and the telecom business who were involved in the Korean Information 
Infrastructure (thereafter KII) project. You are being asked to participate in the study 
because you are a representative speaker in the project I am interested in documenting.   
 
If you agree to participate in this study, we will ask you to do the following things: 
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• If you participate in this research, you will be asked to tell us your job position at 
the time of the information superhighway project and your current job position.  
• The interviews consist of three parts; each part has three or four main questions 
eliciting participants’ opinions about external and internal factors that affected the 
KII project in Korea. 
• You will be asked to discuss these questions based on a semi-structured 
interviewing technique that combines open-ended informal questions with a fairly 
open format of conversation, in order to sketch out the dynamic processes of 
conflict and alliance among actors involved in this decade-long project.  
    
Total estimated time to participate in study is one hour. 
 
Risks of being in the study: 
Since this study will be dealing with high-ranking public officials’ unique opinions on the 
KII project, it is not expected that there are any physical or mental risks to participating 
in this study. However, there may be risks or discomforts that are unknown at this time. 
To protect participants’ privacy and the confidentiality of the research data, you will be 
given the option of answering under cover of a pseudonym. If you wish to discuss the 
information above or any other risks you may experience, you may ask questions now or 
call the Principal Investigator listed on the front page of this form.  
 
Benefits of being in the study: 
Since the in-depth interviews are intended to utilize the expertise of each informant, you 
will have the opportunity of expressing your unique perspective on the KII project. 
Additionally, after this study is completed, the results will be beneficial in aiding others 
in both the public and private sectors who will be designing similar large-scale policy 
initiatives in the future.    
 
Compensation: 
You will not receive any compensation for your participation. All the participants will 
take part in this study on a voluntary basis.   
 
Confidentiality and Privacy Protections: 
• In order to maintain the confidentiality of the research data and protect your 
privacy, you will be given the option of giving your answers under cover of a 
pseudonym, and I will store the interview records in a secure place and limit 
access to the data to myself and my supervisor.  
• During the interviews, you may decline to answer question if you think they may 
threaten your privacy or you do not want to reveal some information concerning a 
particular issue. 
• The data resulting from your participation may be made available to other 
researchers in the future for research purposes not detailed within this consent 
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form. In these cases, the data will contain no identifying information that could 
associate you with it, or with your participation in any study. 
• The interview records of this study will be stored securely, kept confidential, and 
destroyed after they have been transcribed or encoded.  
• Authorized persons from the University of Texas at Austin and members of the 
Institutional Review Board have the legal right to review your research records 
and will protect the confidentiality of those records to the extent permitted by law. 
All publications will obtain your prior permission about whether to exclude or 
include any information that will make it possible to identify you as a study 
participant. Throughout the study, the researchers will notify you of new 
information that may become available and that might affect your decision to 
remain in the study. 
 
Contacts and Questions: 
If you have any questions about the study please ask now. If you have questions 
later, want additional information, or wish to withdraw, please call the researchers 
conducting the study.  Their names, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses are at the top 
of this page. If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, complaints, 
concerns, or questions about the research please contact Jody Jensen, Ph.D., Chair, The 
University of Texas at Austin Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human 
Subjects at (512) 232-2685 or the Office of Research Support and Compliance at (512) 
471-8871 or email: orsc@uts.cc.utexas.edu. 
 
You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records. 
 
 
Statement of Consent: 
 
I have read the above information and have sufficient information to make a decision 
about participating in this study.  I consent to participate in the study. 
 
 
Signature:__________________________________ Date: __________________ 
 
___________________________________________ Date: ___________________ 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent 
 
Signature of Investigator:__________________________ Date: __________________ 
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